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During 1945-51, under two Labour governments, the
techniques used in British economic policy-making changed
from those of the wartime command economy to those of
demand management. The widely accepted explanation of
this change is that a wartime consensus about the future
of economic policy was being consolidated. Evidence from
the Public Record Office is used in this thesis to show
that the consolidation theory is inadequate and to
support a different view of the course of economic policy
under the Attlee governments.
A detailed examination of reconstruction discussions
in 1943-5, about the future of economic policy, leads to
doubts about the scope and solidity of the consensus
achieved in wartime between Labour and Conservative
ministers, economic advisers and senior administrators.
There was broad agreement about the aims of post-war
economic policy, notably the need to maintain 'a high and
stable level of employment', but there was disagreement
about the instruments of economic policy to be used.
Labour ministers were committed to testing a variety of
ideas about economic planning which had become
influential in the labour movement during the 1930's,
whereas most of their colleagues wanted to limit economic
policy reform to less radical methods.
The Attlee governments did try to implement various
forms of economic planning in their attempts to attain
ambitious economic and social objectives in difficult
conditions. Their efforts ran into obstacles, and after
much controversy some experiments were abandoned and the
range of economic policy instruments was reduced in
practice. Despite this, Labour ministers did not accept
tha tit would be sufficient to rely on fiscal and
monetary instruments alone to maintain full employment
without inflation in the long-term. Hence, events during
1945-51 were at least as important as any during the war
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INTRODUCTION
'Planning as it is now taking shape in this country under
our eyes, is something new and constructively
revolutionary which will be regarded in times to come as
a contribution to civilisation as vital and distinctly
British as parliamentary democracy and the rule of
law,.(1) This was said in a public speech made by
Herbert Morrison in 1946 when, as Lord President of the
Council, he was the minister responsible for co-
ordinating economic policy. Morrison was expressing the
confident mood of the first majority Labour government as
it set about transforming peacetime economic policy.
Many reacted strongly against the idea that economic
planning was a positive development. Professor John
Jewkes, a former government economic adviser, wrote in
1948: 'The planned and centrally directed economy must
inevitably undermine the economic freedoms and, with
them, the whole fabric of a free society'. (2) Such
polarised statements were common in the second half of
the 1940's; but in the early 1950's the word
'Butskellism' was coined, to represent the observable
continuity of economic policy between Labour and
Conservative governments. A broad consensus had been
created which arguably lasted until the 1970's. 'The
planned economy and the centralisation of power are no
longer socialist objectives', declared Richard Crossman
in 1952.(3) From different points of view it appeared
that the Labour Party had given up the idea of economic
planning or that the Conservative Party had adopted it,
but in either case the significance of Butskellism was
that there was little apparent difference between the
economic policy of successive governments.
When and how was this consensus created?
the most influential and widespread view is





was more or less programmed by a consensus which had
developed within the coalition government towards the end
of the Second World War. In The Road to 1945 Paul
Addison concluded: 'The Attlee governments of 1945 to
1951 completed and consolidated the work of the coalition
by establishing a peacetime managed economy and the
expanded welfare state envisaged by Beveridge,.(4) The
coalition consensus on economic policy was formalised in
the white paper Employment policy, published in May 1944.
In what became one of the most quoted sentences from any
official document on economic policy the coalition stated
that one of its primary aims would be 'the maintenance of
a high and stable level of employment after the war,.(5)
Given favourable trade and payments conditions (a crucial
qualification) this was to be achieved by 'maintaining
total internal expenditure' - a phrase which essentially
conveys the method of what later came to be called demand
management. Employment policy was also concerned with
the short-term problems of the 'transitional period'
immediately after the war: to deal with these it was
proposed that any post-war government would temporarily
have to retain the system of wartime economic controls to
guard against instability during the enormous structural
changes that would follow the end of the war.
Given the extent of this agreement, covering both
short-term and long-term policy, events between 1945 and
1951 - however colourful and turbulent - have often been
dismissed as mere froth on the surface of the pre-
existing consensus. True, the policy of economic
planning was virulently condemned at the time by some,
like Professor Jewkes, who argued that it was opposed to
the spirit of Employment policy, while others argued
equally strongly that the objectives of the white paper
could not be achieved without planning; however, later
historians have tended to regard this as a relatively
unimportant polemic. According to Paul Addison, 'The
commitment to centralised economic planning ••• gradually
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faded away,.(6) Similarly, Samuel Brittan has written:
'The controls and regulations which caused so much
controversy were basically a hangover, which probably
lasted too long, from wartime restrictions,.(7)
Moreover,
significance
despite grand proclamations about the
of economic planning, there can be little
dispute that the efforts to implement it had few tangible
results. D.N. Chester, one of the most knowledgeable
critics of economic policy in this period, came to this
conclusion: 'it would..be wrong •••to say that Britain had
an economic plan •••if by economic plan is meant a set of
economic objectives, integrated and consistent in their
assumptions, which the government had decided to carry
out and which they had the power to carry out. ,(8)
Nevertheless, the persuasiveness of the consolidation
thesis depends, in the first place, on the scope and
solidity of the wartime consensus. To the extent that
this has been exaggerated, the controversies which took
place after the war may, after all, be significant; the
emergence of a durable consensus in the early 1950's may
have involved events between 1945 and 1951; Employment
policy may not have been the crucial turning point of the
Keynesian revolution, leading directly to later demand
management methods. There are several reasons for
suggesting that the idea of wartime consensus has been
overdone. Firstly, the labour movement (i.e. the Labour
Party and the trade unions) became strongly committed to
the idea of economic planning during the 1930's. From
being the property of the left-wing fringe in the 1920's,
the idea spread throughout the movement after the debacle
of the second minority Labour government under Ramsay
MacDonald. Although the term economic planning was
interpreted
popular, it
in a wide variety of ways once it became
can be argued that its supporters usually
wanted to go far beyond what was contemplaterlby prophets
of demand management, and by Keynes in particular. It is
difficult to be precise about the centre of gravity of
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this planning movement, which extended well beyond the
labour movement, but its importance in the 1930's is
sufficient to argue that Labour was not simply using an
empty slogan when it promised to implement economic
planning in the 1945 election campaign. To the extent
that Labour came to power with a serious intention of
putting economic planning into practice, and to the
extent that this required the implementation of policies
distinct from those on which the wartime consensus was
based, the argument that the development of economic
policy in this period was a consolidation of an existing
consensus must be open to question.
A second line of argument is based on an examination
of the discussions that led up to the publication of
Employment policy, and the discussions which continued
afterwards about preparations for the transitional
period, these being key points at which to assess the
potential durability of the wartime consensus. No-one
could dispute that Employment policy was the result of
some degree of consensus; what is argued here is that the
scope and solidity of this was less than adequate to
support the notion of subsequent consolidation. There
were powerful reasons why some kind of agreed statement
on economic policy by the coalition was required in 1944,
but many differences had to be brushed over and obscured
in order to make it. During the discussions before the
publication of Employment policy it was mainly the long-
term policy that was controversial, but as the end of the
war came near there was also strong pressure for the
'return to normalcy' to be assured by the early lifting
of wartime controls. On both major aspects of the white
paper policy, therefore, the extent of consensus is open
to doubt. Even more important, there was either little
discussion or little agreement about major issues which
came to the forefront in peacetime. There are therefore
good grounds for re-examining the economic policies of
the Attlee governments, in particular what was done or
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attempted in the name of economic planning, even though
the practical outcome does not conform to strict criteria
by which planning can be judged.
An alternative to the consolidation thesis is to view
the development of economic policy in this period as a
series of controversial experiments undertaken in
uncertain conditions. The uncertainty resulted partly
from difficult economic circumstances,
from a curious double transition of
but also arose
policy. It was
generally recognised, though not always accepted, that
the state was on the way to becoming permanently more
involved in the peacetime economy than it had been before
the war, but less involved than it had been during the
war. However, within the active lifetime of those
concerned with policy-making, the economic role of the
state had fluctuated between remarkably wide limits, and
this produced an unusually broad spread of ideas within
the policy-making machine about what was possible, an
effect which was obviously reinforced by Labour's
victory in 1945. Given this combination of economic
problems and political uncertainty, it was
difficult to predict, except within quite
what the outcome of the cross-currents of
transition would be.
Through this series of experiments ran Labour's theme
of economic planning: the problems of implementing
planning were explicitly discussed in the first and the




occasions in between. It can be shown that this theme was
constantly controversial among the ministers, senior
administrators and economic advisers responsible for
economic policy. The development of economic policy
nowhere
in an atmosphere of conflict between radically
conceptions of the economic role of the state,
more clearly reflected than in the discussions
proceeded
different
about planning. This basic conflict was mixed up with
many other political and technical considerations, but is
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sufficiently clear to sustain the argument that movement
from the wartime command economy to demand management
cannot be correctly understood as the consolidation of a
consensus. Not only can the existence of a firm
consensus be questioned, but the conduct of policy during
during 1945-51 had a temper quite different from that to
be expected from the idea of consolidation, a temper
which arose from basic rather than superficial
differences among policy-makers.
I
An important part of the argument of this thesis depends
on establishing that the economic policy ideas with which
the Labour government began were substantially different
from those of the wartime consensus. For reasons of
brevity these two sets of ideas are called economic
planning and
qualifications
demand management, but several
must be made concerning the use of these
terms. First, the former was in use at the time but the
latter was not. Second, demand management, in the period
of Butskellism and later, involved the use of
which had not been envisaged in Employment
methods
policy.
Third, the term economic planning was used so flexibly
and generously in the 1930's and 1940's that it is
necessary to admit from the outset that no clear-cut
distinction between economic planning and demand
management is justified.(9) As used in general political
and economic discourse the former often included, or was
identical with, the latter. A good example of a rather
vague and generalised idea of planning can be found in a
private letter Keynes wrote to F.A. Hayek in 1944, giving
his views on the latter's book The road to serfdom.(10)
Keynes expressed agreement with the moral and
philosophical tone of Hayek's book, but questioned its
practical proposals, concluding with an interesting
statement of Keynes'sown view: "I should say that what
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we want is not no planning, or even less planning, indeed
I should say that we almost certainly want more. But the
planning should take place in a community in which as
many people as possible .•• wholly share your own moral
position".(l1) Keynes~ view, which was probably shared
by many policy-makers at the time, underlines the
difficulty of adopting a simple approach to what the
Attlee governments did in the name of economic planning.
Keynes was clearly prepared to use the term to cover the
policies he supported. Moreover, within a broad
definition almost all policy-making involves planning.
Instead of a clear-cut idea of economic planning being
rejected and replaced by a clear-cut idea of demand
management, the development of economic policy during
1945-51 involved a continuous discussion in which
different ideas about planning or aspects of planning
were discussed and tried out. In view of this it is more
accurate to call planning the theme of a series of policy
experiments, rather than a fully-fledged policy.
The problems of relating the actual practice of
economic policy under the Attlee governments to any
clearly defined theoretical framework of economic
planning or demand management, or sharp distinction
between the two, makes it necessary to clarify in some
other way how the development of policy can be
approached. The most useful theoretical analysis of
economic policy for my purpose was found in Jan
Tinbergen's Economic policy, principles and design,(12)
which analyses economic policy at a very general
starting with the most basic distinction: that
level,
between
ends and means. This study is mainly concerned with the
means rather than the ends of economic policy; though
conflicts between objectives, or between objectives and
methods, were also very important in this period, and
these problems are expanded below. Tinbergen suggests a
useful division of the means of economic policy into
three major categories: reforms, qualitative policy and
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quantitative policy. Reforms are policies which change
the 'foundations' or 'structures' of an economy. For
example, the abolition of any part of the private
ownership of means of production would be a reform of
foundations, while an anti-monopoly law would be a reform
of structure. Reforms were clearly an important part of
Labour's economic policy in the 1940's, but are not
central to this study for several reasons. The most
important reform was nationalisation, which was closely
connected with ideas about economic planning, but this
has been exhaustively dealt with by D.N. Chester in his
official history. (13) Apart from nationalisation,
reforms were initially less important than they would
have been if the policy of economic planning had been
attempted well after the end of a war, because of the
wide powers made available to the government temporarily,
under the extension of wartime emergency legislation. The
remaining cases of economic reforms either never really
got off the ground (like Industrial Development Councils)
or remained on the periphery of policy-making (for
example, anti-monopoly legislation).
Qualitative and quantitative policy-making take the
existing foundations and structure of the economy as
given. Unless it makes reforms, a government has a
definite range of policy instruments from which to select
in order to achieve its objectives; the process of
selection is qualitative policy-making. Many economic
policy arguments in this period concerned the use of
'physical' or 'direct' controls versus the use of
financial policy, which was a question of qualitative
policy-making. The selection of policy instruments can be
governed by many factors, not all of them economic, and
any explanation of the development of policy must take
all these into account. By examining records of policy-
making it is often possible to clarify why particular
instruments were selected or rejected, and I have aimed
primarily at an explanation of qualitative policy-making.
8
In fact, at its simplest, the movement from wartime
command economy to demand economy can be seen as a
narrowing of the range of policy instruments, and hence
of the scope for qualitative policy. As this happened,
the question constantly arose as to whether some means of
attaining the goals of planning was being prematurely
jettisoned.
At this point it is worth enlarging a little on the
remark that, apart from nationalisation, reforms were
initially not important for the attempts to implement
economic planning. Labour thinking about economic
planning in the 1930's assumed that it would be necessary
to extend the range of economic policy instruments by
reforms, but because of the coalition consensus to retain
the legal basis for economic controls at least for the
transitional period, it was possible in principle to use
a wide range of economic policy instruments which would
otherwise have required reforms. During the war the
government was able to command the economy almost as if
it had abolished the private ownership of the means of
production. True, the same techniques proved difficult to
use in peacetime, even immediately after the end of the
war. However, the legal basis for economic controls did
not become an important political issue until later, when
the emergency laws were due to expire. Thus, the
relationship between reforms and qualitative policy was
unusually complex.
The third major category of means is quantitative
policy. Target values are usually assigned to variables
to be influenced by policy instruments; sometimes, the
search for policy instruments takes place after a target
has been set. This is using the word 'target' in a very
general way, to reflect the fact that a policy instrument
can hardly be used aimlessly, and to this extent almost
any type of economic policy requires targets. Targets
can be divided into 'fixed' or 'flexible'. A fixed
target sets a certain value to be attained within a
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certain time. A flexible target simply requires change
in a particular direction. During 1945-51 there was an
explosion of quantitative policy-making, and for a time
there was a great emphasis on fixed targets. It would no
doubt be possible to make useful additions to the
existing analyses of quantitative policy-making in this
period, (14) but this has not been my intention.
Nevertheless, as with reforms and qualitative policy,
there were important interactions between qualitative and
quantitative policy-making. For example, the failure, or
the expectation of failure,to achieve a target was a
frequent cause of policy instruments being dropped; lack
of instruments sometimes led to targets being dropped.
It is also true that the importance attached to
particular targets such as a certain level of coal or
steel production caused the search for new policy means
to be continued even in the face of great difficulties.
Reforms,i~ualitative and quantitative policy are,
then, the three main elements through which it is
theoretically possible to grasp the means of economic
policy as a whole, and this study focuses on qualitative
policy-making. Let us return briefly to the question of
aims in economic policY4making. Even in this period,
when economic policy had attained such importance,
political aims were not always predominantly economic in
character; to this extent, policy-makers had to derive
economic aims from more general objectives. These
consisted of objectives such as certain levels of
housing, education, health care and military
preparedness, which could be tranlated into material
programmes fairly easily; they also consisted of notions
such as individual freedom, which played a key role in
qualitative policy, though they concerned the nature of
social relationships within the economy rather than any
material aim. Making a practical relationship between
ends and means in economic policy is notoriously
difficult. There may be too many aims, raising the
10
question of priorities; or aims may be inconsistent or
even mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the use of some
methods may preclude the achievement of some objectives;
this was the view of the anti-planners, who argued very
generally that the aim of individual freedom espoused by
the Labour government was incompatible with the methods
of economic planning they also espoused. At a less
ideological level, the continued use of wartime
techniques of economic policy was often held to conflict
with the objective of greater industrial efficiency,
though it served other objectives such as stabilisation
and equitable distribution. Obviously, the more a
government is trying to achieve and the more difficult
the circumstances it is working in, the more complex the
dialectic of ends and means becomes. Indeed it is mainly
for these reasons that the Labour governments of 1945-51
present such an interesting challenge to the historian of
economic policy.
II
The Public Record Office was used as the primary source
of evidence. I found several books particularly useful
in getting to grips with the records. D.N.Chester's
monumental official history The nationalisation of
British industry 1945-51 educated me in the mechanism of
policy-making in this period. J.C.R Dow's The management
of the British economy 1945-60 was crucial for an
understanding of how economic management developed in
practice over the longer term (as a member of the
Economic Section Dow played a part in the development of
budget policy in the late 1940,s).(15) However, economic
planning has only a shadowy presence in Chester's book,
and is covered superficially by Dow, though both works
point to the importance of the idea in policy-making
during 1945-51. This realisation, plus the disagreements
with Paul Addison's book The road to 1945 that have
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already been mentioned, provided the starting point for
research.
At the PRO the biggest problem was the vast number of
records relevant to economic policy-making, which had a
very wide scope in this period. At one point I made a
list of several thousand potentially relevant PRO piece
numbers from the Cabinet and inter-departmental
machinery, mainly from the Lord President's Office,
Cabinet Office,
Planning Staff.
Economic Section, and Central Economic
I also looked at some departmental
records, mainly from the Treasury and Board of Trade. By
starting at the top of the policy-making machinery and
working down, formulating questions as the work
progressed, I tried to examine the most significant
fraction of economic policy records. A complete list of
records given detailed examination in the course of
research is included in the bibliography. Stuck in the
'seamless web' of policy, the researcher feels constantly
compelled to broaden and deepen the search, in order to
explain developments adequately. For example, in the area
of foreign policy, Britain's political relationship with
the United States was on several occasions explicitly
linked with problems of economic planning. Similar
points could be made about other areas such as social
policy and environmental policy.(16) But it was
impractical to examine records of policy-making in these
areas except where they became directly involved with
economic planning. At the same time, there was the
imperative to examine how policies were generated or
implemented at a departmental level. However, when I
examined departmental records I found that, except for
the Treasury, there seemed to be comparatively few
records of economic policY4making of similar quality to
those of the central machinery. Also, the vast
quantities of licences and similar documents, which were
the currency of the administered economy, have not
survived. Perhaps we should be thankful not to have to
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face the 16 miles of shelves of Board of Trade records
which official historians could dabble in during the
1940's!(17)
I experimented with different approaches to the PRO
evidence. For the reconstruction discussions I
concentrated mainly on ministerial committees, and used a
formal technique to record the discussions and decisions.
For the development of economic planning I examined
mainly correspondence files, which I found much less easy
to digest with a formal approach. A comprehensive account
of the activity of the central machinery of economic
policy between 1945 and 1951, though it would be
necessary for making a more exhaustive and conclusive
account of economic planning, was impractical given the
time and resources available. There is evidence that the
Cabinet Office found it difficult to keep track of the
most important committees at the time, and had even more
difficulty with the wider scene, which consisted of some
600-700 inter-departmental committees considered broadly













spending a few sentences to counter these, at least for
the case of economic planning. It is sometimes maintained
that accurate conclusions about the development of policy
have been reached in the past by writers working without
official records, and that researchers can become
mesmerised by the PRO as a necessary, even sufficient,
source of evidence. This is undoubtedly a danger, but it
is hard to see how such an archive can be dispensed with
in the particular case of economic planning, where
administrative decisions and mechanisms displaced so much
'normal' economic activity. To the extent that it is
possible to get direct evidence of the nature of
bureaucratic or political thinking (not to mention the
relationship between the two), then this must be more
conclusive than relying on inferences about what went on
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inside the black box of policy~king. However, there is
also the objection that the PRO material can be very
limited. The PRO (or any archive) is like a fossil: the
bones remain, but the flesh has disappeared. For example,
large quantities of records I examined were forecasts,
programmes, allocations and surveys made by officials:
quantitative policy-making in the sense defined above. In
the event many of these efforts were straws in the wind,
unimportant for the overall development of policy or the
selection of policy instruments. The records tend to be
weakest on evidence of ministerial views. It is a truism
that much political decision-making has been done on the
telephone or in other informal ways, and this has
probably applied more to ministerial than official work.
In general, however, a policy of economic planning
intrinsically requires a more formal approach by both
officials and ministers than some other areas or types of
policy, so this truism is perhaps less applicable here.
Sufficient written documents about qualitative aspects of
economic planning survive to construct a useful account,
and it seems improbable that the problems arising from
this kind of policy could be decided over the phone or at
a dinner party; unlike, say, a leadership struggle.
There is probably truth in the remark that "Often what
is written into the official record or preserved for the
historian to discover in personal archives are not a
statesman's true thoughts, but what he hopes will be
thought to be his true thought". (19) However, between
1943 and 1951 there was limited time for the exercise of
this kind of vanity, and statesmen (or officials) - where
prone - probably used it on the issues that seemed most
important to them, which may not be what historians
become interested in. The most important materials from
my point of view were those reflecting the problems and
dilemmas that officials had to 'focus' for ministers,
typically involving some clash between poliCies, or the
practicality of a policy objective. With some notable
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exceptions, most of these documents seem to have been
shaped by practical considerations. The main difficulty
was not that vanity might have led to distortion of the
records, but the more mundane one of finding the
documents relating to the beginnings, ends and turning
points of issues, and connecting the language of official
writing with the political conflicts that often lay
behind it.
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Chapter 1
ECONOMIC PLANNING BEFORE 1945
How did economic planning come to be such an important
idea for the Labour Party in 1945? This can be explained
mainly as a reaction to the political and economic crisis
of 1929-31, which culminated in the fall of the second
minority Labour government under Ramsey MacDonald. This
traumatic experience led Labour politicians to the view
that one of their crucial weaknesses had been the lack of
a distinctive economic policy. Subsequently, during the
1930's, there was a succession of radical writings and
statements on economic policy by Labour politicians,
several of whom who became ministers under Attlee. These
provide some evidence of how seriously the Labour Party
took the idea of economic planning before 1945, and
provide essential background to the various viewpoints in
the Attlee governments. In the 1930's there was also a
diffuse 'planning movement' which went far outside the
Labour Party. This non-socialist planning movement made
no direct impact on economic policy before the war, but
it did influence post-war policy and its environment.
These pre-war developments show that the idea of planning
was more than a fashionable slogan in Labour's 1945
election campaign.
I
Before the 1930's, the idea of economic planning in
Britain grew partly because of the influence of socialist
and collectivist political thought, partly because of the
experience of total war between 1914-18, and partly as a
consequence of industrial developments. On this last
point, Donald Winch has observed: "The increase in the
size of business corporations, the divorce of ownership
and control, the rise of schemes for concerted action by
producers, and the attempt to encourage and regulate this
movement by governments, provide one of the dominant
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themes of British industrial history in the twentieth
century". (1) The economic problems of the inter-war
period, and in particular the experience of mass
unemployment and regional stagnation, was a further
important reason for the development of economic planning
ideas. As it developed, the broader planning movement
became a diverse, contradictory mixture of all these
influences.
Virtually no ideas for economic planning by the state
were advanced in Britain before the first world war.
Indeed, radical ideas of any kind about the reform of
economic policy were rare, not least because the notion
of a relationship between the state and the economy as a
whole was also virtually absent from politics and
economics. The main exceptions were schemes for the
redistribution of wealth, and recommendations such as
that in the Minority report of the Royal Commission on
the Poor Law, that more should be spent on public works
in a slump. (2) It is not necessary to dwell on the
reasons for this, except to note that most writers put it
down to the relative stability and success of the British
economy before the 1914-18 war.
The first world war itself led to the first
significant practical experience in economic planning:
inflationary pressure in the first part of the war forced
the government to recognise that normal market mechanisms
were not adequate to adjust the economy to war
production. Some administrative controls over industry
were instituted, and the relative efficiency with which
the state was then able to fulfil its needs was regarded
by some collectivist and socialist thinkers as decisive
proof that the state could order the economy better than
private firms for other purposes than war. The practical
example of the administered war economy became coupled
with revulsion against 'war-profiteering' and pressure on
the government to carry out a bold social reconstruction
programme after the war. However, there was a strong
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backlash against economic controls towards the end of the
war.(3) In the name of a 'return to normalcy' laissez-
faire economic policies were largely restored, and
reconstruction planning came to very little. (4) The
pent-up pressure of monetary incomes earned during the
war, combined with wildly exaggerated expectations about
the fruits of 'victory', led to a boom which could not be
sustained. In reality a whole series of changes had
taken place, particularly in the international econo~,
which made the idea of a 'return to normalcy' untenable.
Decontrol did not create the longer-term malaise of the
inter-war period, but it added to the problems. Two main
lessons were drawn from these events during the second
world war. First, the government headed much more quickly
towards overall planning of the economy at the beginning
of the war. Second, as early as 1941 the economist A.C.
Pigou was responsible for an official report on the
transitional period after the first world war, in which
it was cautiously concluded that some of the monetary and
employment instabilities of that time had resulted from
the abolition of controls. (5) It was soon agreed that
controls would have to be retained after the second world
war. Furthermore, there was a vigorous popular
determination that reconstruction would not fail again as
it had done in 1918. This was in contrast to the
movement for a 'return to normalcy' at the end of the
first world war, when those who thought that wartime
methods could usefully be continued into peacetime found
themselves politically isolated.
The idea of planning the British economy in peacetime
re-emerged in the mid-1920's, in left-wing
dealing with mass unemployment. The
pamphlets can be taken as representative.





(the latter - who became a minister under Attlee - being
responsible for most of the economic arguments).(6) The
living wage was published by the Independent Labour
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Party. Both placed the main emphasis on financial
remedies, but argued that these financial measures would
not be enough by themselves to ensure increased output
and employment. Other proposals were therefore made,
ranging from import boards to the socialisation of
recalcitrant firms. Indeed, it is the comprehensive and
inter-locking argument of these programmes that marks
them out as precursors of the planning movement. It is
also notable that the formulation of these Left-wing
planning proposals of the 1920's involved politicians,
economists and ex-administrators who had wartime
experience, such as E.M.H. Lloyd and E.F. Wise. Of the
latter Pimlott has observed: "Unlike almost any other
prominent
intimate
political figure of the time,
knowledge of economics with
he combined an
an extensive
experience of government administration, acquired at the
one time at which planning had official sanction - during
the First War".(7) The idea of planning did not remain a
left-wing monopoly: another programme of the 1920's which
had points in common with later planning schemes was
Britain's industrial future, published by the Liberal
Party in 1928. Like the left-wing programmes published
earlier, it was mainly designed to end mass unemployment.
Its centrepiece was a policy of public investment,
especially road-building. Targets were set for the number
of jobs to be created, and for costs and completion
times. To co-ordinate economic policy the Liberals
wanted an 'economic general staff' and a 'council of
industry,.(8) This was a radical approach to economic
policy at the time, with which Baldwin's government had
no sympathy; it replied that the whole range of schemes
was unworkable, an attitude based on the well-known
'Treasury view': that public investment would merely
displace private investment and thus could not create
extra employment. (9)
Thus the idea of planning gained some acceptance
across a broad spectrum of British politics during the
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1920's, on the grounds that mass unemployment was a kind
of social emergency in which the government should take
action. Yet economic planning was dismissed by Ramsay
MacDonald, at a Labour Party conference in 1927, as a
"flashy futility". (10) When Baldwin's Conservative
government was replaced in 1929 by a minority Labour
government, MacDonald preferred Gladstonian financial
orthodoxy to the radical solutions put forward by the ILP
and Mosley from within, or by Lloyd George and the
Liberal Party from without. The Labour Party conference
of 1927 had effectively killed the proposals of The
living wage by referring them to the executive.
ideas were turned down by the Labour cabinet in
Subsequently, Mosley contemptuously asked: "What would
you think of a Salvation Army that took to its heels on





interventionist economic policy it can be conjectured
that it would have run into strong opposition from civil
servants. For example, Sir John Anderson was a member of
the civil service secretariat set up to co-ordinate the
work being done on the unemployment problem when it got
suddenly worse in 1929. Writing to MacDonald, Anderson
perfectly expressed the prevailing mood of economic
fatalism when he compared the government's position with
that of "the captain and officers of a great ship which
has run aground on a falling tide; no human endeavour
will get the ship afloat until in the course of nature
the tide again begins to flow". However, in reality




on this point; MacDOnald replied that
letter expressed exact~y his own frame of
As Skidelsky has concluded, the Labour Party
had "no practical socialist economic policy, no theory of
how to use Parliament to further socialist aims.
Socialism explained the past and promised the future; it
had nothing to offer the present". (14) This became
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crystal clear at the time of the 1931 crisis, a key
turning point in the history of the Labour Party which
remained an important reference point in the minds of
leading Labour politicians; this is shown, for example,
by the fact that it is explicitly mentioned in the
minutes of several ministerial meetings under the Attlee
governments. (15)
After the Left-wing proposals of the 1920's had been
rejected, a new initiative for the labour movement to
develop its own distinctive economic policy came from the
trade unions. During the 1931 political crisis the
unions bitterly opposed proposed cuts in unemployment
benefits, to the point of splitting the government; but
they discovered that they had no persuasive counter-
proposals. (16). Until this crisis, the trade unions had
kept aloof from Labour Party disputes about economic
policy, but in the early 1930's the TUC began to press





own research department tried to synthesise Labour
aims with Keynesianism.(17) Specialist groups to
economic policy were also set up by the Labour
The result of this effort was that within a short
time economic planning became the concept around which
economic policy proposals from every shade of Labour
opinion revolved. The radicalism of this, particularly
in the trade union movement, should not be exaggerated.
In 1931, Arthur Pugh, speaking at the TUC congress,
welcomed "the•••tendency towards a planned and regulated
economy in our national life".(18) However, the
following year, relating the General Council's annual
report to the "fashionable" use of the term 'planning',
it was stressed that the TUe did not favour "detailed
supervision and regimentation all through the economic
system". Instead, "continuous progress should be made
towards the intelligent organisation of production,
distribution and finance in the interests of the whole
cOlIlDunity".(19) The TUC's commitment to a rather vague
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form of economic planning fitted in with
industrial developments, or so it was hoped.
The situation within the labour movement as a whole
broader
was complex. While the TUC General Council had moved to
the right after the General Strike, after the 1931 crisis
the Labour Party moved to the left. Within the party the
idea of economic planning as a specifically
form of economic policy was taken up by the




However, planning was not a left-wing monopoly in the
Labour Party of the 1930's, it was also espoused by the
New Fabian Research Bureau and individual writers such as
Douglas Jay and Evan Durbin on the right of the party.
To illustrate this wide range of views it is useful to
begin with G.D.H. Cole, who argued that Labour needed
both an 'immediate programme' and a workable idea of how
to bring about Socialism. In the 1930's, Cole set out his
own views on socialist economic policy in a number of
works on economic planning, which ~ere influential in the
Labour Party. (20) In his most detailed economic work,
Principles of economic planning (1935), Cole examined
non-socialist planning ideas and concluded that they must
all fail in the face of opposition from private
interests. He thought that public works begun as
stabilising projects would, in the long-term, invade all
large-scale production, and thus provoke hostility from
capitalists. (21) For Cole only a total solution was
adequate: ..':all industries ought to be conducted in
accordance with a comprehensive plan directed to the
-public interest and finally subject to democratic
control". (22) He visualised the integration of the
parliamentary political system with a socialist economy.
Both production and the distribution of income would be
centrally planned. Trade would be planned as far as
possible. All aspects of planning would be co-ordinated
through machinery directly responsible to the Cabinet,
while democratic control would be safeguarded by
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Parliament.
Stafford Cripps, at this time a leading light in the
left-wing Socialist League, suggested using Orders-in-
Council to "wrest" control from the capitalists in the
transition to socialism. A former Solicitor-General and
member of the Parliamentary Bar, Cripps' writing utilised
existing trends in government as the basis of future
socialist practice. For example he drew attention to the
operation of the Import Duties Act. Cripps wanted a
reform of Parliament in the longer term, but thought that
there would be "no time to enter upon a reform of
Parliamentary institutions before starting upon the
introduction of socialism".(23) Cripps envisaged a form
of democratic planning once socialism was established. An
annual plan would be drawn up by an Economic General
Staff. Discussion of a Planning and Finance Act would
allow Parliament to focus on economic policy.
Cripps and the Socialist League had no more success
than the ILP before them in getting the labour movement
as a whole to accept their vision of how to bring about
the final end of capitalism. The crisis of 1931,
however, to an extent also radicalised the reformist
majority of the Labour Party. The most important
illustration of this tendency is to be found Dalton's
Practical socialism for Britain (1935), a post-crisis
synthesis of Labour policy with a strong planning theme.
Dalton argued that planning was not the same as socialism
because the latter was a question of ownership, while the
former was a question of control. For Dalton, "both in
the expanding socialised sector and in the dwindling
private sector, there should be social planning".(24) He
stressed the extent of his agreement with non-socialists
in the diagnosis and prognosiS of the problems of
individual industries, and linked this with the prospects
for shifting the centre of gravity of British politics to
the Left. For planning in the socialised sector, Dalton
proposed that the boards of public corporations should
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produce plans for the industries they controlled and that
some part of the central machinery of government should
be responsible for relations between public corporations.
Social planning of the private sector would depend on
reforms of financial mechanisms. First, the
stabilisation of the internal price level and exchange
rates through a centrally managed currency, with the Bank
of England more closely related to the government.
Second, the control of long term credit through a
National Investment Board able to control both the
quantity and direction of investment. Third, the creation
of a National Banking Corporation for the provision of
short-term credit. These changes, Dalton argued, would
enable a future Labour government to implement a
programme of expanding employment without hindrance from
finance capital. (25) In order that all the separate
kinds of intervention should be co-ordinated through the
machinery of central government, Dalton visualised a
Cabinet committee with its own staff, an extension of the
Cabinet secretariat, composed of experts, permanent civil
servants and 'temporaries'. This staff would in effect be
a planning department, able to contruct and implement
plans. (26)
Dalton's was not the political visionary's idea of
planning; unlike Cripps' it did not involve 'wresting'
power from capitalists in a quick and dramatic transition
to Socialism. In fact, Dalton suggested pragmatically
that a future Labour government could begin with a
minimum of planning machinery: each minister would push
ahead with departmental programmes until the stage was
reached where co-ordination would be necessary. It could
be foreseen that the implementation of a set of separate
reforms would require some form of central planning, and
this is what planning came to mean for many Labour
supporters. Moreover, unlike Cole, Dalton did not see
private interests and the aims of a Labour government
aims as mutually exclusive.
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The scope of Dalton's synthesis was vast, including




the planning of external trade, geographical
and control of the location of industry. In
covered everything which had been a subject of
policy discussion or public debate. Similar ideas can be
found in many Labour writings on economic policy in the
1930's: in Morrison's Socialisation and Transport, in
Attlee's The will and the way to Socialism and in W.A.
Robson's Public Enterprise. (27) It can be concluded that
the idea of planning had affected all shades of Labour
opinion by the mid-1930's.
II
Many planners in the Labour Party, as Dalton made clear
in Practical socialism for Britain, were keen to reflect
thinking from outside the party, no doubt in the hope of
increasing the Labour Party's support in the political




There was a wide spectrum of planners who saw
as 'non-political', and certainly were not
a political party, and therefore could be
freely quoted and supported by reformers in various
parties. Independent pressure groups such as Political
and Economic Planning were formed on this basis. A
leading example of this strand of the planning movement
was the Next Five Years Group, which brought together a
large number of planners with different points of view.
They asserted that the price system had ceased to bring
equilibrium in some spheres of the economy. Indeed, they
claimed, "the motive of profit-making has, to a greater
extent than is commonly realised, ceased to be the
mainspring of economic activity in this country: and we
think it safe to assume that this tendency will continue
in the future.,,(28) The main themes of economic policy
under the National Government in the 1930's were a
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tariff, a managed currency and rationalisation schemes;
changes in the direction of economic policy which
followed the collapse of the Gold Standard in 1931. This
meant, the Next Five Years Group pointed out, that "an
elaborate and extensive system of state control is being
built up haphazard, successive measures being determined
by emergencies or by the successful pressure of some
sectional interest, and neither related to any general
conception or scheme nor co-ordinated among
themselves". (29) The non-socialist planners believed
that they were developing a new kind of common sense in
economic policy, related to changes in the economy.
The planning movement has sometimes been dismissed as
incoherent by those who argue that Keynesianism was the
most important development in this period. For example,
Winch makes two critical points about the planners: he
asserts that the movement was "based on an amorphous and
eclectic set of ideas possessing none of the intellectual
clarity of Keynesianism"i(30) also, "Considered as
contributions to the unemployment problem, the efforts of
the planners in this period were likely to be in conflict
with those of Keynes". (31) The latter criticism is based
on the argument that the majority of planners advocated
monopolisation, without considering the effects on total
output and prices, and ignoring the reflationary
potential of financial policy. Keynes, for example,
urged Macmillan to stress reflation rather than re-
organlsation.(32) He also objected to Roosevelt's New
Deal 'planning', because its focus was the individual
firm rather than the whole economy. Keynes urged the New
Dealers to install central economic controls and a
programme of loan-financed public works. (33)
Roosevelt's eclectic approach, leading to economic
policies that were contradictory in practice, is well-
known, as is the conclusion that the New Deal measures
did not create a consistent recovery in the US during the
1930's.
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In fact the British non-socialist planners did not
always ignore the effects of monopoly on price and
output. The public corporation was widely seen as an
answer to this problem, because it was believed that
public monopolies could be made to behave differently to
private monopolies. Nor did the planners completely
ignore the potential of financial policy. For example,
according to the Next Five Years Group, the banks largely
determined "whether at any time expansion should be
encouraged
opposite;
by easy or cheap money or discouraged by the
and this may well be a decisive factor both in
the general economic position and in the specific schemes
which a government may be promoting".(34) It is more
accurate to say that it was one of the themes of planners
of all political hues that financial policies alone would
not solve current economic problems, and this made them
distinct from those Keynesians who counterposed financial
remedies to all others. But the distinction between
Keynesians and planners is more difficult to draw if more
of Keynes' own ideas are brought into the picture. The
outlook of many non-socialist planners was not so
different from that of Keynes in his essay The End of
Laissez-Faire (1926), in which he envisaged various types
of state intervention. For example, he argued that
"technically social" activities should be separated from
"technically individual" ones, and that the state should
take on those activities that individuals could not. He
therefore supported the trend towards the creation of
public corporations, and urged the collection and
dissemination of economic information by the
government.(35) He also thought that a "co-ordinated act
of intelligent judgement is required as to the scale on
which it is desirable that the community as a whole
should save".(36) On a practical level, he took part in
an attempt to reorganise the cotton industry in the early
1930's. His later work concentrated almost entirely on




excluded all other remedies, even though he saw them as
secondary.
As for the issue of intellectual clarity, not everyone
was convinced at the time that Keynes had stated his case
for financial reflation very clearly,(37) but part of the
reason why Keynes~ later writings are less amorphous than
the planners' lies in the nature of his subject matter:
according to Cairncross, "He was, par excellence, the
Treasury man, the believer in financial agencies of
control, who would regulate the economy by skilful
management rather than by interventions operating
directly on supply". (38) It is wrong to reduce Keynes's
thought to this formula, but it is easy to see how ideas
about the financial management of a whole economy can
appear to have more intellectual clarity than sets of of
schemes for rationalising industries or regulating the
location of industries, although both have been important
aspects of economic policy.
Some of Keynes~ close associates encompassed a much
wider range of economic policy than Keynes himself chose
to write about in the 1930's. For example, J.E. Meade -
who could not be fairly accused of being amorphous or




theoretical economics and considered its
for policy in his book Economdc Analysis and
Meade was a member of the Keynesian
'Cambridge Circus'; with R.F.Kahn, he helped Keynes to
make the transition from the Treatise on Money to the
General Theory. (40) His work was widely influential:
Douglas Jay has written that The Socialist Case owed more
to Meade's book than any other printed work; John
Strachey, in turn, was convinced by Jay's book that
"socialist governments working within the system" could
"abolish capitalist crises".(41) In wartime, Meade later
became a member of the Economic Section of the Cabinet
Office, and was one of the activists who pushed forward
the Beveridge plan and schemes for full employment. After
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the war he was,
Section of the
for a time, the head of the Economic
Cabinet Office and as such the Labour
government's chief economic adviser. In his theoretical
work of the 1930's, Meade acknowledged his debt to
Keynes, and his efforts anticipated much of what later
became Keynesian orthodoxy. An example of this is his
programme for the reform of the international economy.
For international trade he was in favour of a monetary
system 'managed' by central banks, a lowering of trade
barriers and an international agreement that full
employment within countries be maintained by "control of
internal banking policy, the stimulation of public works
expenditure, and of expenditure on consumption
goods". (42) (Meade differed from Keynes in arguing that
measures directed at investment would probably not be
sufficient to prevent unemployment and therefore proposed
ra1s1ng effective demand by public expenditure aimed at
consumption.) In other ways, Meade was very close to the
planning movement. He stressed the problem of monopoly,
questioning the efficacy of the most often proposed
remedies: anti-combination laws, rationalisation and
price control. He suggested that industries with very
high capital expenditure should be socialised, a proposal
which led him to look at the problems of public
management and planning of industries and groups of
industries, and he even examined the case of a completely
socialised economy, thus entering the territory of the
theoretical 'planning debate' being vigorously conducted
in academic economic circles during the 1930's.(43) The
breadth of Meades analysis belies the view that a sharp
distinction can be made between planners and Keynesians
in the 1930's; instead it can be suggested that this is a
product of hindsight.
The theoretical planning debate just mentioned is
another interesting example of the ways in which the idea
of economic planning was made respectable in the 1930's.
Its origins lie in an obscure article, The Ministry of
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Production in a Collectivist State (1908), in which the
Italian economist Barone showed that in general
of theequilibrium theory there is a formal similarity
economic problem in a purely competitive and a centrally-
planned economy, concluding that scarce resources could
be efficiently allocated in both.(44) In the 1920's Von
Mises, Hayek and others attempted to argue that, in
principle, a centrally-planned economy could not solve




decisions about what to produce and how much to
would degenerate into irrational chaos.(45)
the 1930's the planning debate developed in
several interesting directions. The anti-planners were
forced to retreat to the position that in practice a
central planning authority could never obtain the
information necessary to solve the equilibrium
equations. (46) Meanwhile, some theorists of planning
moved towards hybrid models of centrally-planned and
market economies. For example, R.L. Hall (who later
became chief of the Economic Section of the Cabinet
Office) used Paretian theory to argue the feasibility of
a socialist economy which retained many features of a
market economy. (47) A number of young intellectuals
destined to become Labour ministers took this approach to
economic planning. It was the basis for the economic
ideas in the writings of Douglas Jay and Evan Durbin.
Philip Williams has related the story of how Gaitskell
went to Vienna in 1933 to argue with Von Mises that there
could be rational pricing in a socialist state.(48)
Part of the political significance of the planning debate
was that by adopting subjective value theory as the
bedrock of their arguments it was possible for supporters
of economic planning to avoid the charge of alignment
with Marxism and the Soviet model of planning. Not many
would have
assertion:
agreed with George Bernard Shaw's
"As to where Socialism stands today,
glib
we told
it to go to Russia and it has. We shall have to copy
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Russia presently in consequence, though Marxism was a
genuine British Museum export.,,(49)
There were, in fact, also Marxist voices within the
academic framework of the planning debate. Maurice Dobb
argued that the concepts of neo-classical theory did not
allow the full practical merits of planning to emerge.
Besides, he asked, what was the point of a planning
system if it was only a perfect mimic of a market system?
Dobb based his arguments on a detailed analysis of
economic development in the Soviet Union. (50) For many
on the British left in the 1930's the practical example




the idea of economic planning
popular writings of John




Marxists were attracted to the Soviet model: the Webbs'
optimistic study of the the Soviet Union reflected a
Fabian belief in the effectiveness of using the state to
solve social and economic problems. Their enthusiasm is
said to have influenced Beveridge in the later
1930's.(51)
Thus, during the 1930's there was a ferment of
discussion about economic policy. As with any similar
movement there were contradictory ideas, and many cases
where different political and theoretical ideas
overlapped. In the event, 'Keynesianism' became dominant
in the 1950's, but it is not exactly clear what
constituted Keynesianism as against economic planning in
the 1930's; there is no basis for making a clear-cut
distinction between the two. Instead, the ideas of
Keynsianism and economic planning were together fed into
the series of practical economic policy experiments which
were carried out by the Labour governments of 1945-51.
The turmoil of debate about the future of economic
policy just described had little practical influence on
policy-making in the inter-war period. This can be shown
by reference to the fate of one key proposal: almost
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every economic policy reformer of the inter-war period
advocated changes in the machinery of central government,
the most popular proposal being that there should be an
'Economic General Staff', employing economists. Opinions
varied about whether the body should have executive
functions or advisory status, but the idea that economic
expertise should come closer to the centre of government
was common ground. The setting up of a secret Economic
Advisory Council was one of the innovative acts of the
1929-31 Labour government, but it was not a great
success. The EAC was not integrated with the work of the
government and civil service. Snowden and the Treasury
cold-shouldered it. MacDonald chaired its meetings
weakly, thus causing delay in getting down to fundamental
issues. There was dissension between economists and
businessmen, not to mention economist and economist.
Keynes, a member of the EAC, persuaded MacDonald to set
up a committee of economists "To produce ••• an agreed
diagnosis of our present problems and a reasoned list of
possible remedies", the result was an unspectacular
compromise after a lot of heated theoretical debate. (52)
The economists' report was ignored by the cabinet. The
arguments in the EAC probably confirmed Keynes in his
resolve to "bring to an issue the deep divergences of
opinion between fellow economists which have for the time
being almost destroyed the practical influence of
economic theOry".(53)
Although the government did continue to take expert
economic advice, and EAC members were involved in the
major changes of policy which followed the collapse of
the gold standard in the summer of 1931, this episode was
not an auspicious start to putting into practice the idea




there was a retreat from the original
of the Economic Advisory Council, but a
on Economic Information was retained, to
provide advice on various problems, providing a link to
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the next development in central government mchinery for
economic policy - the setting up of the Central Economic
Information Service in 1939.
This brief survey of the development of the idea of
planning before 1939 has demonstrated the diversity of
approaches involved in the planning movement in the
Labour Party and more widely. It was to the great
advantage of the Labour Party was that it was able to
harness this diffuse movement of thought, which helped it
to capture the middle ground and the left in 1945. This
was possible because all the trends of thinking about
economic planning co-existed within the Labour Party; but
many contending views of how economic planning ought to
be implemented proved a disadvantage when Labour set up a
government. Differences had remained unresolved as, in
the course of the 1930's, political attention and
intellectual interest moved away from economic policy to
international affairs. Nevertheless the idea of economic
planning was imprinted on the minds of future policy-
makers, and it was an idea shared by all those who wanted
a future Labour government to avoid another debacle like
that of 1931.
III
When the Labour government was formed in July 1945, the
day-to-day business of economic policy was dominated by
wartime or transitional problems which were solved by
wartime methods. Most of the senior ministers in
Attlee's governments had practical experience - as
ministers or temporary civil servants - of the wartime
command economy, experience which strongly influenced
their approach to post-war problems. The war gave rise
to specific economic problems which required the
extension of wartime methods, and also stimulated
view that economic planning would be feasible





development of wartime economic planning, to illuminate
these points and provide some necessary background
information about the nature of the economic machinery
which continued to play an important role in policy-
making up to 1951.
The origins of economic planning in the second world
war are to be found in the Anglo-French view of the
coming war developed in the 1930's: to prepare
immediately to resist a quick knock-out blow by Germany
and build up military production in the course of a long
war in which, it was believed, the superior combined
resources of the two empires would prove decisive. In the
event, the power of the initial German blow was under-
estimated, as was the size of the military production
base from which the war effort could be smoothly built
up.(54) The latter problem became evident as soon as the
war began, when the financial and political constraints
on rearmament were removed. Bottlenecks immediately
appeared in the supply of raw materials and skilled
labour, causing problems in the acceleration of military
production. However, throughout the 'phoney war',
economic controls were used sparingly. A policy of total
mobilisation was adopted only after the crises of 1940.
Wartime planner E.A.G.Robinson later wrote: "There was no
conscious thought in the early stages of a definite goal
in the form of a perfect war economy towards which we
were moving. At each stage we relied on the working of
the normal incentives so far as they were practicable,
and replaced them only to the extent that they appeared
at a particular moment to be working badly in a
particular field".(55)
In the war economy, military production was the
leading sector, and its growth and decline can very
simply be divided into four phases. The first phase,
investment in increased capacity, began before the war.
The second phase was dominated by production of equipment
for the expanding armed forces. In the third phase war
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production was maintained at a point sufficient to cover
losses, which meant that it could be levelled off or even
reduced. By the fourth and last phase the end of the war
was in sight, and stocks could be reduced, allowing some
reconversion of capacity, a process which was completed
after the end of the war.(56) For the economy as a
whole, the guiding principle of policy changed from
'normal trade' to 'level economy' to 'everything for the
war'. These changes were accompanied by a growth of
administrative controls. At the start of the war the
price system was allowed to operate while most supplies
were plentiful, but by the end it was necessary to
reconcile total supplies with total demand for many
resources through centrally administered budgets and
allocations.
Economic activity was controlled throughout these
different phases of the war by regulations stemming from
the 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. In this law the
government acquired general powers from which it made
legal tools for particular purposes through Orders-in-
Council. There was one significant exclusion from the
economic powers obtained at the outbreak of war: command
over labour. This was at first held to be politically
unacceptable, a view which changed after the reverses of
1940 and the formation of the coalition government. The
effective use of economic powers required co-ordination
and central direction, for which horizontal and vertical
integration of the machinery of government was very
important. At the start of the war, or even just before,
special economic ministries (Food, Supply, Shipping) were
set up to carry out government purchasing, to build up
strategic stocks, to allocate scarce materials and to
gather information. Economic administration was vastly
expanded, creating a class of civil service 'temporaries'
whose elite was drawn from the academic and business
worlds. Virtually the whole of economic life was
'sponsored' by one government department or another.
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Inter-departmental machinery was contructed to






War Cabinet and a complex and
ministerial and official committees.
Thus, the government could command through emergency
powers and an effective administration, but the war
economy depended to a great extent on co-operation
between government departments and privately-owned
businesses. Raw materials controllers, for example, were
usually chosen from among the business leaders in the
relevant industry. Some less important controls were
operated directly by trade associations. This policy was
justified by the argument that only people knowledgeable
about conditions in the trades to be controlled could
make sound decisions quickly. (57) Government departments
found it easier to deal with centralised bodies rather
than each firm in an industry individually, so trade
associations and trade unions became an intrinsic part of
the machinery of economic policy. They were consulted
about how the government could direct particular economic
activities; they could relay the warning signals of
frictions generated by controls; occasionally they agreed
to use their own executive powers to help economic
policy. There were complaints of unfair treatment by the
hastily improvised wartime economic administration, but
the social cohesion brought about by war ensured





did the government use its emergency
the concerted will of industrialists or
powers
trade
unionists. Generally, both sides of industry accepted
public control and the government designed its policies
to create as little friction as possible. Comprehensive
economic powers allowed departments to deal very flexibly
with problems of control. Examples of very complicated
developments in particular
private business interests,
civil histories of the war.
controls, to accommodate
can be found in the official
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Any given firm, of course, felt the impact of one of a
vast number of possible combinations of these controls.
At the simplest a firm might be restrained by a lack of a
controlled input, a situation that often applied to the
contracted 'inessential' industries. In the most complex
cases the organisation of government departments and
firms virtually merged - with businessmen becoming
temporary administrators and government officials being
stationed in key factories. The government became most
intricately involved in business organisation in war
production industries, but there was a limit to this form
of central control: partly because firms were reluctant
to accept government inspection, and partly because the
civil service lacked the necessary technical skills to
control production in detail. The two main activities of
government planners were:
(1) reconciling total demand and supply for raw
materials and labour,
(2) drawing up production programmes.
The task of securing the most efficient use of
resources within industries was hardly attempted. This
would have required specification of not only the type
and quantity of output, and the allocation of inputs, but
also the methods of production to be used. Postan
concluded that government planning was "at least
prevented •••from penetrating at all deeply into the
managerial autonomy of private business".(58) Even so, it
was not unknown for managers of firms to be sacked by
ministers if they were thought to be negligent or
inefficient. (59)
At the start of the war the government was more
concerned with measures to hold prices steady than with
detailed allocation of resources. Among the stabilisation
measures adopted were price controls and an Excess
Profits Tax. Private trading in many raw materals was
displaced by government buying, in an attempt to
stabilise the cost of raw materials. The government aimed
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to keep the cost of living level by a combination of
propaganda and food subsidies. What it feared above all
was a wage-price spiral, a threat which arose as early as
October 1939 when - following a spurt of price rises
the miners put in a wage claim which the employers were
willing to concede providing they could raise coal
prices. The War Cabinet decided not to confront the
miners, but had to decide what to do about future claims.
On the assumption that price rises were the main factor
leading to pressure for wage rises, it was concluded that
if the retail prices index could be stabilised then
workers would abstain from wage claims. The aim of
stabilising the index began in a small way; later it led
to a comprehensive system employing a number of different
methods of taxation, subsidies and standardisation
schemes which had important implications for post-war
policy. In particular, the elimination of food subsidies
was a very tricky operation which was carried out after
the war in conditions which equally threatened a wage-
price spiral. At the start of the war prices rose slowly
after the sharp initial rise; open or general inflation
was avoided. Apart from hot spots like the skilled
labour market there were still ample reserves of labour
and industrial capacity. The need to counter internal
inflation was well understood after the experience of the
first world war, but there had been no regular official
national income accounting before the outbreak of
war. (60) The first steps in this direction were taken in
1939 with the appointment of the Stamp Survey of
financial and economic plans, which drew on the tradition
of central economic advice descended from the Economic
Advisory Council. However, a great deal of work had to
be done before the government was in a position to design
a budget to close the 'inflationary gap'.
Another very difficult area of economic policy in the
early part of the war was the balance of payments, which
was a constant headache until the advent of Lend-Lease in
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March 1941. Import prices were kept down at the start of
the war by government trading in food and raw materials,
and exchange controls prevented any export of capital or
panic flights from sterling. Subsequently it was
necessary to requisition and liquidate a large part of
British overseas assets to obtain means of payment for
imports. Economic policy was also complicated in the
early part of the war by the need to run an export drive.
The main problem was that the United States was still an
'isolationist' power. The 'cash and carry' provisions of
the 1939 Neutrality Act forbade the purchase of war
materials on credit terms,
dollars for cash payments.
so Britain had to obtain
At the start of the war the
government had to divide the world into 'hard' and 'soft'
currency areas. Exports were steered towards dollar
markets, while more imports were sought from the sterling
area, which could be relied upon for easy credit;
however, the build-up of sterling balances throughout the
war rebounded on the Labour government during the 1947
convertibility crisis. When Lend-Lease came it was
possible to end the export drive, and wartime exports
ultimately fell to about one-third of the 1938 volume.
IV
The fall of France in June 1940 was a disastrous setback
for the strategy of resisting an initial German knockout
blow and building up for victory in the long-term. With
Germany dominating the resources of the Continent, and
the ultimate necessity of an invasion from Britain, a
much larger burden was thrown onto the British war
effort. Moreover, the need to resist air attacks and the
possibility of an invasion of Britain itself created
urgent priorities in war production. 'Normal trade' had
already been replaced to a large extent by administrative
mechanisms in this sector. But in the absence of
effective central reconciliation of demand and supply,
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symptoms of repressed inflation appeared: shortages,
delays, queues, revisions of programmes and priority
listings. Departments inflated their requirements,
hoarded resources and 'poached' labour from other
departments. As a result, controls such as those on raw
materials were operating to some extent in a haphazard
way.(61)
In this situation it also became clear that the
central machinery of economic policy had a number of
flaws. Economic policy was divided fairly obviously into
two main areas: military and civilian. Before the start
of the war the military machinery had been thoroughly
prepared, but the civilian economy was left to Cabinet
committees whose responsibilities were unclear or
unforeseen, resulting in a lack of central direction and
co-ordination. Also, the dominance of the Treasury in
economic policy committees meant that inflation and the
balance of payments were topics more to the fore than
production, shipping, manpower and raw materials. For
example, it was possible for an issue as crucial as the
allocation of shipping space to slip through the hands of
all the committees.(62)
The formation of the coalition government was followed
by changes in the central economic policy machinery. The
most important immediate change was the decisive demotion
of the Treasury from its dominant position. This happened
partly because financial considerations were increasingly
of secondary importance and partly because the Treasury
was too closely identified with the discredited policy of
appeasement. (63) Finance still mattered in international
trade, but even this was affected by Churchill's
determination to reach an accommodation with the United
States. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley
Wood, was not made a member of the War Cabinet at first ,
and was not made chairman of the key economic policy
committee of the government as his predecessor had been.
Instead, the centre of gravity of economic policy shifted
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to the office of the Lord President of the Council, a
post initially held by the former Prime Minister, Neville
Chamberlain. The Lord President's Committee was
deSignated as a 'sub-Cabinet for home affairs'. Its
membership overlapped with the War Cabinet, the purpose
being to direct 'home affairs' authoritatively while
dividing them from the military conduct of the war. The
Lord President's Committee's reponsibi1ities ranged wider
than economic policy, but a crucial part of its terms of
reference was that it should concert and direct the work
of ministerial economic policy committees (apart from
those dealing with war production), and make sure that no
part of the field was left uncovered. (64)
Powerful figures in the coalition government chaired
the Lord President's Committee, ensuring that economic
issues only went to the War Cabinet if they were very
contentious or momentous. Under Sir John Anderson the
Lord President's Committee expanded its influence at the
expense of other Cabinet committees. When manpower
planning became central to economic policy-making, the
LPC effectively became responsible for the balance of the
economy as a whole, because Anderson played a key role in
reconciling all departmental programmes with total
supplies of labour. One of the chief problems of central
co-ordination and control was to establish economic
analyses and facts that were acceptable to all
departments. The combination of the Lord PreSident, a
non-departmental minister, with central groups of
economic advisers and statisticians overcame this
difficulty. (65) (See Figure 1.) Towards the end of the
war, under Attlee, the LPC was concerned with the day-to-
day work on reconstruction. The LPC continued to playa
central role in economic policY4making after the war when
Herbert Morrison became Lord President. Only after the
1947 Fuel CriSis, when economic policy machinery was
completely revised. did the this committee lose its
significance. With that, the post of Lord President also
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(1) Central Statistical Office continued.
(2) Prime Minister's Statistical Branch was abolished.
(3) Economic Section continued in the same form.
(4) Central Economic Planning Staff was set up in 1947.
Source:
Wilson, S.S. The Cabinet Office to 1945, 1975, p. 110-111
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declined in importance.
The coalition also made important changes in manpower
policy. Accordingly, when Ernest Bevin became Minister of
Labour he reformed social policy and obtained labour
movement consent to labour controls. The first steps to
manpower planning were made in the summer of 1940 when
military equipment programmes were translated into labour
volumes by supply departments. The Board of Trade did a
similar job for civilian production and exports. From
then it took until the end of 1941 for the system
connecting military planning and war production, central
co-ordination and regional organisations, departments and
suppliers, to become fully effective. First the skilled
labour shortages had to be overcome, then the more
general labour shortages which had become acute by the






of different categories of labour, schemes
labour in civilian industries and the
of women workers. Once in place the
workers was subject to the Essential Work
in 1941.
These changes in policy and central machinery did not
immediately solve all the problems of the wartime
coalition. Apart from the LPC the structure of economic
policy committees continued to be a shifting one, which
there is no point in describing in detail. It took many
months to develop an effective system of central co-
ordination and control; the coalition government had to
settle in, and cope with the series of military crises
that followed the fall of France.
v
The period from May 1940 to the end of 1941 saw rapid
developments in the machinery of war production. "The
losses of equipment in France, the Battle of Britain, the
threat of invasion, the German night-raids, the crisis of
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the Libyan campaign, the Battle of the Atlantic and, as
the period was drawing to an end, the German invasion of
the USSR: each of these events raised urgent problems of
production which for a time absorbed the attention of the
public and a great deal of war industry's time and
effort". (66) These events dictated the use of a priority
system in the short-term, the best known being the crash
programme of aircraft production under Beaverbrook in the
early days of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
However, the dangers of shortages and disruption of
production outside the priority areas led ultimately to
the replacement of priorities by central allocations.
Particularly important here were the development of raw
materials controls and the Materials Committee of the War
Cabinet. (See figure 2.) The Materials Committee
continued to play an important role after the war.
Flaws in the operation of the war economy were visible
to the public as repressed inflation, and this led to
considerable agitation for stronger central direction of
the war economy both before and after the formation of
the coalition government. War production was carried out
after May 1940 under the auspices of the Admiralty, the
Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft
Production. This was seen by many as an inefficient
division of responsibility leading to muddle, hence the
demand for an all-encompassing Ministry of Production.
According to the official historians there was much
better co-ordination at the centre than could be observed
by the public. (67) Nevertheless, so strong was the
pressure for improvements that Churchill agreed in
February 1942 to set up a Ministry of Production. On
paper this had vast responsibilities; in practice it was
more concerned with to Anglo-US co-operation than with
domestic war production. The idea of a super-ministry to
"concert and supervise the activities of the production
departments" (as Churchill expressed it to Parliament)
was therefore not completely realised.(68) However, the
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existence of a strong public lobby for more centralised
economic planning in wartime also had other consequences:
the pro-planning feeling during the war was not entirely
restricted to the immediate war effort; from an early
stage adverse comparisons were being made between wartime
planning with full employment and peacetime laissez-faire
policy with unemployment.(69)
Increased pressure on war production, falling capacity
to import, and labour shortages hastened the contraction
of the civilian sector after the fall of France.
Restrictions on civilian output were accompanied by
rationing and 'disinflationary' financial policies. There
were further developments in subsidies and price controls
(utility schemes, for example, were partly a means of
economising on raw materials, partly a means of making
price control more effective by homogenising output).
The year 1941 was a turning point in financial policy,
marked by the first publication of a National Income
White Paper, (70) based on the estimation of an
'inflationary gap'. The aim of the budget was to use a
combination of taxation, deferred payments to labour and
capital, and voluntary savings schemes to close the gap.
It was sometimes argued that the civilian economy should
simply be treated as a residual after the requirements of
the war production and the armed forces had been met.
But the majority view in the government was that
austerity measures carried too far would endanger morale,
lower the efficiency of war production and threaten the
reconstruction of a healthy peacetime economy. Even so,
the contraction of inessential industries was carried too
far in some cases: later in the war it proved far more
difficult to reflate industries as war production
declined than it had been to contract them at the height
of the crisis; this problem particularly affected the
textile industry, which had problems in regaining its
labour force after the war.
Following the German occupation of the Low Countries
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and Norway, coastal and internal transport systems were
directly menaced by German forces. Later, the Battle of
the Atlantic threatened vital imports. To deal with these
perils, special administrative techniques and
organisations were developed: the total capacity of the
transport system was calculated; import programmes and
transport budgets were drawn up; a Ministry of War
Transport was set up in May 1941. At first these
efforts were tentative and inaccurate, but by the end of
the war they were accurate; as they had to be, since
demands on transport continually rose, while (with the
exception of shipping where US production made a big
improvement in the end) few resources could be put to
investment. The result was a steady movement towards the
comprehensive planning and integration of transport, an
achievement which no doubt influenced the Labour
government's thinking when it came to set up the British
Transport Commission after the war.
Alliance with the US made possible a more intense
concentration of British resources into the fighting
forces and their equipment. Once the limits on importing
capacity had been overcome (by winning the Battle of the
Atlantic), and more efficient organisation had eliminated
the worst bottlenecks in the domestic economy, the main
constraint on the war effort was the number of people
available - rather than any financial or material lack.
This determined the peak of war production and armed
forces, which was reached in 1943.
According to E.A.G.Robinson, "the golden rule of all
planning is that it must be done in terms of the scarcest
of all resources".(71) This rule propelled the manpower
budget to the centre of economic planning: "It was, in
fact, the only method the War Cabinet ever possessed of
determining the balance of the whole war economy by a
central and direct allocation of physical resources among
the various sectors". (72) How did manpower planning
work? Once the War Cabinet had agreed a manpower budget,
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departments discussed the revision of programmes in line
with their allocations of labour. When this was complete
the Ministry of Labour drew up instructions to all its
offices. The day-to-day mechanics of the system was a
series of 'preference lists', which determined the order
in which different vacancies were to be filled. Labour
exchanges dealt with details of mobility, skills and
individual problems. Allocations were most easily met
for the forces and war production industries. The least
successful part of the manpower budgets was the attempt,
in the latter part of the war, to expand less essential
industries. Some industries had special labour problems,
notably the coal industry, which had shed labour after
the fall of France when the demand for coal fell suddenly
as exports to the continent ceased. Later it proved very
difficult to get workers to enter the industry
voluntarily, and the government finally resorted to
industrial conscription by ballot in 1944. But labour
direction of this kind was used very sparingly for fear
of provoking opposition. Shortage of labour in the
mining industry remained a crucial problem in the
immediate post-war years. Towards the end of the war it
was sometimes assumed that manpower budgets would
continue to play a central role in post-war economic
policy. In the event, however, the decline of labour
controls undermined the government's ability centrally
to determine the allocation of labour, and was a factor
which threw doubt onto the whole idea of economic
planning after the war.
Later in the war, the basic industries underpinning
both military and civilian production ran into
intractable problems. As with civilian industries, the
government tried to curtail the basic industries without
endangering the war effort by going too far. Not much
attention could be given to what the post-war position
would be, and it was difficult to know when the war
would end, and therefore whether wear and tear would
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overtake an industry and cause breakdown in the war
effort. An exception was agriculture, a basic industry
in which investment and productivity did increase during
the war. Real output rose by over 30%, while output per
worker rose by about 10-15%.(73) In other industries
there were some gains of a less tangible kind, such as
more efficient management: in the war production sector
the pressure to execute large-scale programmes quickly
led to the introduction of new production techniques.
Even in the contracted civilian sector the urge for
efficiency was felt in terms of more standardisation and
reduction of waste. But these gains were often only
relevant to wartime conditions. It is much easier to
measure the costs and problems resulting from the war
than to quantify any offsetting gains.(74)
VI
To sum up, the period between the fall of France and
Pearl Harbour was one in which the various aspects of
economic policy developed rapidly, and the beginnings of
the fully developed wartime planning system can be
discerned in the numerous actions of carried out by the
coalition government. A further period was needed for
planning to become comprehensive and fully effective.
The pressure of priorities had to be overcome.
Experience in the operation of controls and the
construction of an intricate machinery for economic
administration to replace the market economy still had to
be acquired. But after an initial period in which goals
were unclear and determination lacking, the British war
economy was heading for an effort which was more intense,
in relation to Britain's resources, than that of the US
or Germany.
The grand strategy of the war agreed by the allies in
1942 was divided into three stages:
Stage ! culminating in the defeat of Germany,
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Stage l! running from the defeat of Germany to
the defeat of Japan,
Stage III to be the period from the defeat of
Japan to 'settled peacetime conditions'.
In joint planning Stage III was the 'transitional
period', although to some extent it overlapped Stage II
because war production began to run down. In practice
the end of Stage I came into sight with the D-Day
landings, and the peak of mobilisation in the British war
economy had already been passed, in 1943; redistribution
of resources from the war sector to the civilian sector
was increasingly a theme of economic policy in the last
two years of the war. War production industries,
shipping and manpower policies were affected. The
anticipated problems of the balance of payments also
returned to the central area of policy-making. The main
aims of transitional planning were the restoration of
exports, capital equipment and living standards. The
central feature of policy-making continued to be the
manpower budget: it was estimated that so much labour
would become available after each phase of the war was
complete, and this formed the starting point for plans to
restore the civilian economy and begin work on the most
urgent reconstruction projects.(75) Other techniques of
wartime planning were also used in transitional planning:
shipping space was allocated to timber imports for the
post-war building programme; control over factory space
was used to promote the redistribution of industry;
export groups formed early in the war were reactivated.
Transitional planning was affected by three areas of




Germany and Japan, Britain's economic
the United States, and the domestic
The decision of the Labour Party to
seek a general election brought one of these issues to a
head before the end of the war with Japan. The first use
of nuclear weapons ended Stage II after three months,
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instead of an expected 18 months. In the relationship
with the US, the key issue was the future of Lend-Lease:
the government had been hoping for a continuation of
Lend-Lease in Stage III; at first it seemed that the
Americans had agreed, but the atmosphere in Washington
changed after the death of Roosevelt and the defeat of
Germany (which followed in quick succession); in the
event Lend-Lease was abruptly terminated at the end of
Stage II. Together, these unexpected events falsified
most of the key assumptions on which planners had been
basing their ideas for an orderly transition to peacetime
conditions. It has been said that 'war is the unfolding
of miscalculations', and this certainly sums up the
situation in British wartime economic policy at the end
of the second world war. Therefore, the Labour
government formed just before the end of the war had to
implement a policy of economic planning in conditions
that were different from both those that had been
anticipated in the policy debates of the 1930's and those
that had been prophesied for transitional planning
purposes.
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Chapter 2
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION DISCUSSIONS 1943-5
There were strong reasons for economic planning to become
an important theme of economic policy in the immediate
post-war years under the Labour governments; but it is
also important to assess how far the basis for the
development of post-war economic policy had already been
laid, in wartime,
discussions of









when the coalition government and the
coalition started serious post-war
reconstruction even before the peak of war mobilisation
in 1943. Although the War Cabinet under Churchill was
reluctant to be distracted from the concerns of the war,
it had to take some further action once it had agreed to
publish
services
the report on Social
in December 1942.(2)
insurance and allied
Thus, in early 1943 the
Cabinet set up a Reconstruction Priorities Committee,
composed of senior ministers, (3) to put together and
assess all the reconstruction schemes.(4) As some view
of the future of economic policy was central to this
task, the Reconstruction Priorities committee appointed
an official Committee on Post-war Employment with terms
of reference drawn up by the Economic Section of the
Cabinet Office. (5) The committee presented its report in
January 1944 and this represented, according to Keynes,
"a revolution in official opinion". (6) After further
detailed ministerial and official discussions, the white
paper on Employment Policy was published in May 1944.
Much of the white paper, following principles about
reconstruction planning laid down by the Cabinet in
October 1943, dealt with the transitional period rather
than the long-term future of economic policy. (7)
Churchill wanted to confine reconstruction planning to
problems of the transition as far as possible. (8) He
argued against fostering any political debate not closely
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connected with the war, fearing that it would threaten
the stability of the coalition government and the morale
of troops and workers in the period leading up to the
invasion of Europe.(9) But pressures to settle the long-
term future of economic policy were strong. Some
transitional problems were bound up with long-term
problems, as Morrison pointed out in a Cabinet
meeting.(10) Also, Beveridge was following up his work on
Social insurance and allied services by preparing an
unofficial report on employment policy, which was
eventually published as Full employment in a free society
in November 1944.(11) Beveridge had already embarrassed
the government by stirring up public discussion on the
politically controversial question of social insurance,
and the War Cabinet had found it necessary to damp down
discussion of this topic in the armed forces.(12) Public
debate on the issue of how to bring about full employment
was much more likely to affect the morale of troops and
workers, but given the general level of interest in the
idea of full employment there was no way that it could be
evaded. Bevin wrote later that 'the one question' put to
himself and Churchill by soldiers, when they went to
Portsmouth just before D-Day, was: "Ernie, when we have
done this job for you are we going back on the dole?".
"No you are not", Bevin replied.(13) The publication of
Employment policy a few days before must have been a boon
in these circumstances, but was it the product of a
strong consensus which the Attlee governments later
merely had to consolidate?
I
The Cabinet made employment policy a major priority of
reconstruction planning at the beginning of 1943,(14) but
to form a plausible policy entailed the exploration of
political differences within the coalition. Conflicts
were difficult to contain, because employment policy
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could not easily be separated from much broader issues of
economic policy, a point which was made explicit in the
report of the Committee on Post-war Employment: "•••full
employment, while being a major objective •••will have to
be pursued concurrently with other aims such as national
security, the preservation of personal liberty and
initiative, the achievement of a rising output and
standard of living, the progressive development of
education, housing and other social services, the
avoidance of inflation, and the encouragement of
international co-operation." (15) In February 1944,
Churchill formally minuted that he regarded the provision
of full employment "as our principal aim in the years
after the war",(16) but given the formidable list of
other objectives, and the possibilities for conflict
among them, there was still plenty of room for technical
and ideological argument as the reconstruction discussion
proceeded.
The restoration of Britain's position in the
international economy was arguably the most important and
difficult problem of post-war reconstruction, in that a
large part of the resources available for pursuing other
objectives depended on developments beyond the direct
control of any British government. As the report of the
Committee on Post-war Employment put it: 'we cannot
predict the exact lie of the land when the earthquake has
not yet subsided,.(17) It was well known, however, that
the foundations of Britain's international position had
cracked. During the war exports had fallen to 1/3 of the
prewar volume; much overseas investment had been
liquidated; there had been adverse changes in the terms
of trade; a huge sterling debt had built up. On top of
this it was estimated that a full employment economy
would require a higher level of imports than before the
war. Moreover, it was recognised that it would be
difficult to stabilise employment in Britain if other
countries, especially the United States, did not adopt a
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similar employment policy. This was crucial because




export demand. The view of most economists,
in the analyses of the Economic Section, was
main part of the solution would be the
recreation of a multilateral trading system, with new
international institutions to guarantee its
stability. (18) This aim was basic to the report of the
Committee on Post-war Employment and Employment Policy;
however, it required the co-operation of the United
States, and the influence of liberal trade philosophy in
US policy-making circles was an unknown quantity. There
was pressure in the US for the British Empire to be
opened up to US exporters, and the Cabinet expected the
US government to want fully convertible sterling and an
end to Imperial Preference,(19) though it was not as
certain that the US would repeal its own tariffs. A
further problem for Britain was that any return to a
liberal international economy would have to be preceded
by a transitional period in which essential imports would
be maintained, it was hoped, by a continuation of Lend-
Lease or US financial aid on a large scale.
Uncertainty about the intentions of US policy-makers
strengthened the forces in Britain that looked on import
regulation or 'planned trade' (i.e. in practice,
bilateral trade agreements) as a complement to internal
policies of full employment. For example, T. Balogh
advanced the sceptical argument that while separate
nation states existed there would be little chance,
within a liberal multilateral trading system, of
concerting economic policies to maintain full
employment.(20) Though more sanguine about the prospects
Keynes certainly recognised the necessity of a siege
economy in the event that the US would not play the
multilateralist game; however,
disagreeable alternative. (21)
discussions, in 1943-4, on
he regarded this as a very
In the War Cabinet's
the future of commercial
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policy (22) and 'Overseas resources and liabilities,(23)
the multilateralists were opposed by two groups: those
(such as Beaverbrook) who wanted to base economic
strategy on the Empire, and those (for example Cripps)
who wanted to retain the option of bilateral trade
agreements as part of economic planning. One group saw
multilateralism as a threat to the Empire; the other saw
it as a threat to a future socialist economic policy.
The multilateralists carried the day, with the proviso
that countries should be able to restrict imports in the
event of an adverse balance of payments, (24) but their
aims could only be realised through the successful
conclusion of international talks and an effective
performance by exporters after the war. The close
connection made between the future of external economic
policy and domestic reconstruction in these discussions
is shown by the fact that when the Cabinet discussed
post-war financial commitments and social insurance in
July 1944,(25) some ministers argued that the post-war
situation should be clearer before the government
committed itself, and in particular that exports would
have to be satisfactory to support the scheme. Although
there was a counter-argument that social security would
make a positive contribution to industrial efficiency, it
was decided to postpone the publication of a social
insurance scheme.
So, increasing exports and restoring a stable and
expanding liberal international economy became two major
aims of the coalition government. A careful reading of
the Foreword of Employment policy shows that full
employment was seen as dependent on the achievement of
these aims. Thus, if the government could create,
'through collaboration between the nations, conditions of
international trade which will make it possible for all
countries to pursue policies of full employment to their
mutual advantage', and if 'by these means the necessary
expansion of our external trade can be assured', then,
63
the government believed, 'widespread unemployment can be
prevented by a policy for maintaining total internal
expenditure'. However, all that could be said about
collaboration between the nations was that talks with
other countries were proceeding. This uncertainty
provided fertile ground for those who argued that some
other basis would have to be found for external economic
policy if reconstruction aims were to be achieved, and
also for those who argued the opposite: that domestic
aims should not be pitched too high. On both counts, the
extent of the wartime consensus must be qualifiedj and
the polarisation of opinion that occurred when these
choices were faced in practice by the Attlee governments
shows that it is wrong to say that the wartime consensus
provided an adequate basis for later 'consolidation'.
The central employment policy idea in the report of
the Committee on Post-war Employment and the white paper
was the maintenance of total internal demand. However,
in the wartime discussions a strong emphasis was placed
on the need to remove structural rigidities as a
condition for the success of this policy. A change in the
structure of demand without sufficient mobility of
resources between industries or areas might result in
"continued unemployment in one part of the system, and a
tendency to rising prices in another". (26) The problem
was to find the right balance between policies of moving
workers to jobs and moving jobs to workers. (27) During
the war much stress had been laid on the latter policy,
but the report warned ministers "not to hold out large
and unjustified hopes regarding the amount of employment
likely to be afforded in any particular area by new
establishments or industries". (28) Nevertheless, the
committee recommended special measures to deal with
structural change in the transition, especially in former
depressed areas, where the 'grave possibility' of a re-
emergence of structural unemployment existed. (29)
Moreover, the policy adopted in the transition would
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'largely determine the extent to which the Development
Areas will remain a serious problem in subsequent
years,.(30) Ministers were told that the government's
control over scarce resources would allow it to steer
industry towards the former depressed areas.(31) (It can
be noted here that Hugh Dalton, as President of the Board








policy of directing new factories
depressed areas at the end of the
the Committee on Post-war Employment
of all new factories was 'wholly
Neither did it favour restricting
areas, as the Barlow Report had
the long-term the government was
recommended to use financial measures, similar to those
of the pre-war Special Areas policy, to induce firms to
move to less attractive areas.(35) The committee hoped
that industrialists might be prepared to consult with
future governments about the location of their
factories.(36) It also recommended a 'really progressive
planning policy' as regards infrastructure: i.e.
modernisation of public services, improvement of
amenities, better services and 'living conditions
generally'. This could provide employment in the short-
term, and 'In the long run, measures of this kind might
well prove the most effective of all in restoring a well-
balanced and progressive community,.(37)
On these structural questions it is difficult to
decide whether official opinion was mildly in support of
the 'practical socialism' which Dalton was already
attempting to implement at the Board of Trade, or whether
it was looking backwards to the policies of the National
Government. Subsequent ministerial discussions about
structural problems displayed similar equivocation. More
emphasis was put on the problems of rehabilitating the
former depressed areas than on promoting mobility from
them, and it was agreed that the wartime regulations that
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had enabled the government
should be made permanent in
disagreement about how to
to take 'work to workers'
some form, but there was











direction', similar to those exercised during the war,
but he was vigorously resisted. Even the requirement that
the Board of Trade be notified about the location of new
factories called forth the fear that enterprise would be
discouraged, though the purpose was simply to gather
information about changes in the balance of industry. In
this atmosphere it was not possible for Dalton to get the
powers he wanted to prevent firms from locating in
congested areas. (39) Labour ministers generally wanted
the government to prepare for a positive role in
industrial location and environmental planning. Bevin's
view was that private enterprise should be given the
chance to prove that it could work in harmony with post-
war economic policy aims but, 'whatever steps became
necessary should be taken to prevent unemployment,.(40)
It could be argued that this followed from the general
principles of the policy to which the coalition was
committed, and the Labour ministers raised the question,
for example, whether the compromise policy on
distribution of industry which was eventually agreed by
the Cabinet would be sufficient to carry out the
undertakings given in Employment Policy.(41) On
environmental policy, the Cabinet accepted that progress
on planning legislation was necessary to implement a
policy of 'positive national planning', for the reasons
given by the Committee on Post-war Employment, quoted
above. (42) As in the case of industrial location, there
was a need for swift action; (43) for example, the
housing programme might be delayed if local authorities
did not have new powers.(44) But, once again, the issue
became stalled in the reconstruction discussions. At one
stage Bevin stated that he wanted nationalisation of
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land, a policy of Labour Party conferences which went
against the 'realistic' line adopted by his
colleagues. (45) According to Michael Foot, 'The question
of the ownership of land was the real rock on which the
Coalition was broken,.(46) This may be an exaggeration,
but the issue was clearly controversial. Both on
distribution of industry and environmental planning
measures, therefore, the extent of coalition consensus is
open to question.
There was yet a further condition set for the
successful operation of employment policy by maintaining
internal demand: increasing industrial efficiency. This
was not in the original remit of the Committee on Post-
war Employment, but the Treasury insisted on its
inclusion.(47) Subsequently, the committee argued that
industrial efficiency was crucial to the new economic
policy for several reasons. First, with liberal
international trade full employment could be maintained
without devaluation and lowered living standards only if
exports were made competitive through increasing
efficiency. Second, if wages rose with full employment,
as seemed likely, then efficiency would have to keep up
if an inflationary wage-price spiral was to be avoided.
Productivity was therefore such an important issue that
the committee's report stated: 'Full employment and
industrial efficiency are•••the two parts of a programme
designed to secure the greatest volume of goods and
services from the country's resources,.(48) The problem
was to improve the efficiency of industry 'as a
whole,.(49) However, apart from proposals to provide tax







the committee recommended that particular
should be studied: new processes in some
had made their structure out-of-date; some
required concentration to reduce surplus
The committee thought that re-structuring
achieved through competition as far as
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possible, but past experience showed that this could lead
to prolonged malaise. Therefore, re-organisation might
require compulsory purchase arrangements: in short,
nationalisation.(50) The report admitted: 'There are
political and practical objections to such a course, but
without such ultimate powers especially in the early
post-war years, desirable plans of re-organisation may be
frustrated. ,(51)
Lionel Robbins, the Economic Section's representative
on the committee, thought that the report's 'efficiency'
recommendations were restrictionist. Most of the
proposals just outlined were, indeed, very similar to the
rationalisation policy of the National Government of the
1930's, which had become discredited because it tended to
increase the degree of monopoly without necessarily
improving industrial efficiency. Robbins felt, more than
many of his colleagues, that monopoly was a malign
influence on economic development, and argued in a
dissenting note attached to the committee's report for an
anti-monopoly policy based on the principle that
monopolistic organisation should be allowed only where it
was demonstrably in the public interest.(52) But where
there was a technical case for monopoly, Robbins also
made clear his own preference for public ownership. (53)
Of course, the Labour Party also favoured nationalisation
as a means to achieve greater efficiency in 'basic'
industries, and this was frequently linked, in Labour
writings, to economic planning and full employment. To
Labour ministers such as Morrison, nationalisation was
strongly justified by the argument of efficiency:
industries could be restructured and technical change
introduced without the negative effects of monopoly.(54)
Furthermore, it was also believed in the Economic
that public monopolies could be made to




towards public ownership was, then, not confined to the
Labour Party but it was firmly resisted by Conservative
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ministers during reconstruction planning. In 1944
Lyttleton, the Minister of Production, complained to
Wool ton, the Minister of Reconstruction, that the
Reconstruction Committee was tackling subjects outside
the scope of Churchill's guidelines for reconstruction
planning, laid down in 1943, instancing a discussion on
bringing the electricity supply industry into public
ownership. Woolton, not yet a member of the Conservative
Party, replied that in some cases decisions could not be
postponed until after the war. (56) Later, Morrison tried
to argue that the issue of electricity nationalisation
'need not be the subject of party politics,.(57)
However, with the exception of Cable and Wireless, which
was taken over for strategic reasons, no firm proposals
for the nationalisation of any industry emerged from
reconstruction planning. Attlee unsuccessfully proposed
the following passage for inclusion in the white paper:
" in the post-war period this country will inevitably
depend upon a mixed economy, neither wholly subject to
State regulation nor wholly ruled by private enterprise,
and the extent to which either one of these principles
gains or loses ground to the other will depend on the
will of the post-war electorate expressed at the
polls". (58) Although Attlee was unsuccessful in getting
an explicit mention of the mixed economy. it was agreed
that statements in the draft implying that there would be
no changes in the future composition of ownership of the
means of production should be deleted. (59) Nevertheless,
as Addison observes, "The coalition partners were able to
work together on the finance of post-war industry, and to
some extent on its control, but the sticking point was
always reached when the question of nationalisation was
raised". (60)
One prominent proposal on industrial effiency of the
Committee on Post-war Employment was that the supervision
of military contracts could be used to investigate
whether there were any special reasons why efficiency in
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the former depressed areas was backward. This possibility
arose because it had been agreed that a larger volume of
military orders than in inter-war years would continue
for at least 10 years after the war. The departments
concerned were against using military contracts in this
way, but the committee thought it 'fundamental' to the
future of development areas. This 'solid block' of
industrial orders would affect the basic industries,
would continue for a long time, and would call for the
use of the highest of industrial skills. The committee
called this a policy of temporary 'preference and
technical nursing' .(61) As shown above in the case of
distribution of industry policy, the committee was
generally against the use of government departments to
supervise or control industry in the future; but to have
left matters there would have meant that little in the
way of government action could be recommended on the need
for industrial efficiency, a ticklish problem with the
political tide flowing in the direction of greater state
intervention. Military production was one area where
state supervision was traditionally acceptable, on the
grounds of public expenditure control if for no other
reason. The theme of military production was also taken




Aircraft Production, was responsible
large slice of war production, and






factories in competition with private
He jus~tified this by arguing that private
enterprise had been shown to be lacking in the past, for
example in the build-up of production for rearmament in
the 1930's. But this idea was opposed on the grounds
that it would be wrong to have government factories
competing with private factories, and the same objection
was raised to the idea that the government should operate
its own factories in Development Areas as part of
regional policy.(62)
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In the white paper the government avoided all these
areas of controversy. It indicated that a policy of tax
relief had already been announced, and commented other
schemes to improve industrial efficiency were 'under









'benefit all alike', by 'sustaining the demand for goods
and services of all kinds,.(64) This vague approach to
the problem of how to increase industrial efficiency is
another indication of the lack of agreement within the
coalition, because the reason that it could not be
tackled was that there was no consensus on how to deal
with questions of public ownership and the mixed economy.
The Committee on Post-war Employment recognised that
when employment was high, wages were likely to rise; at
worst there could be a wage-price spiral with no extra
output or employment. At the start of a recession this
would pose a dilemma: whether to promote inflationary
increases in expenditure to maintain employment, or to
control expenditure at the possible cost of reducing
employment. This problem would clearly be exacerbated if
there was no means of promoting a rise in industrial
Also there would be external complications





Wages and prices were, in the both the
the Committee on post-war Employment and the
regarded as very important and inextricably
The committee recommended, however, that




fixing of wages, at least until other methods had proved
unworkable; it saw some merit in the state making a limit
to wage rises within which bargaining could take place,
and outside which there would be a central review, but
was hopeful that no drastic changes would be needed.(66)
By the time the white paper was being drafted, however,
the biggest strikes of the war were under way, in
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engineering. This, in wartime, was
prospects of wage stability under
indeed, there were growing fears about what might happen
when wartime arbitration machinery for industrial
disputes disappeared.(6S) Nevertheless, ministers never
seriously questioned the principle that free collective
bargaining should continue to be the basis for
determining the price of labour.(69) This was one area
where there was a firm consensus.
The basis of wartime wage stabilisation was the policy
of stabilising prices, in which the main element was food
subsidies. It was agreed that the wartime policy would
continue in the transitional period,(70) but difficulties
were seen with insulating the internal price level by
means of subsidies in the longer-term: exports could
become undervalued; there could be problems with meeting
internal demand with artificially low prices. However,
in the transitional period prices should be allowed to
rise slowly, with subsidies preventing any sharp rises.
The continuing importance of price stability was
underlined by Sir Wilfrid Eady in a letter to Sir Richard
Hopkins dated April 24 1944: "The present wave of strikes
is an indication of the difficult temper of labour. They
are not Trotsky strikes,(71) but strikes for more money",
and he predicted that with the reduction of overtime
after the war, wage pressures might grow. He therefore
saw the continuation of the wartime price stabilisation
policy as a necessity in the short term, as well as "An
understanding with Mr Bevin - and possibly with the
TUC".(72) This policy was not controversial among
ministers, except insofar as it was entangled with the
general question of the future of controls, which is
dealt with in detail below. But it did become
later, in 1947, when policy-makers were
an unenviable choice of problems: the
controversial
faced with
possibility of economic, social and political tensions if
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prices were allowed to rise, or the possibility of
subsidies getting out of control with rising import
prices.
On price stabilisation in the longer-term the white
paper stated that the government was prepared to do what
it could, but made no specific commitments;(73) rather,
it would be the 'duty of both sides of industry' to
prevent rises in prices by considering them
'together,.(74) In essence the government, through the
white paper, asked trade unions and employers





discovered to maximise sectional money incomes (whether
wages or profits), in the interest of increasing overall
output and employment. There was also the implication
that organisations of workers and employers should become
stronger and more centralised. In this respect, the
policy depended on the development of a greater potential
to exercise monopoly power in order to prevent its actual
use - a view which seems extraordinarily naive in
retrospect, though it followed quite naturally from
prewar optimism about industrial co-operation in economic
planning, and from wartime tripartite collaboration.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Post-war Employment had
also recognised that monopolies could work against both
employment and efficiency. It pointed out that the war
itself had increased the degree of industrial
organisation, and that there were dangers of abuse in the
current situation. (75) (Indeed, before the end of the
war the government had problems with a price ring in the
aluminium industry, affecting the costs of its emergency
housing programme). (76) The committee believed that
wartime controls had minimised such tendenCies, but there
were conflicting departmental views on what should follow
controls.(77) Some wanted to outlaw monopolies that could
be proved to be against the public interest; others
wanted a less permisSive policy to outlaw all monopolies
except those that could be proved to be in the public
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interest. There was also a view that nothing should be
done to jeopardise co-operation between government and
industry, even though this tended to reinforce industrial
organisation from which restrictive practices could
develop. The committee made no specific recommendations,
leaving it up to ministers to decide between the diverse
views, while stressing that a decision was urgently
needed.(78) In this case, the discussion in the
Committee on Post-war Employment reflected strong
ministerial differences through various departmental
views. For example, in ministerial discussions Dalton
wanted a simple and direct anti-monopoly policy, (79)
while Cripps took the view that restrictions would be
'essential to any planned economy,.(80) Others thought
that industrial organisation had positive functions as
well as harmful effects. Outside interests, when
consulted, generally preferred 'self-government', or
voluntary restraint, to the imposition of
legislation.(81) I~ the light of these differences, it
is not surprising that ministers agreed that the white
paper should have only a brief and general reference to
monopoly. (82) All that was promised was that the
government would seek information and 'take appropiate
they worked
whole,.(83)
action' to check restrictive practices where
'to the detriment of the country as a
Domestic and international cartels, were studied by Hugh
Gaitskell and G.C. Allen at the Board of Trade (84)), but
the form of words in the white paper was a disappointing
outcome for those who thought that restrictive practices
were a very important issue. When the reform of
restrictive practices was discussed again there was
little support for any precisely defined law. Draft
heads for a bill were discussed, but inconclusively.(85)
Once more, there were limitations to the degree of
consensus achieved, though in this case the differences
between Labour ministers were probably as great as those
between the different parties in the coalition.
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lmving examined the discussion of various conditions for
employment policy, it is now necessary to appraise how
the central problem of maintaining internal demand was
dealt with in the reconstruction discussions. The
Committee on Post-war Employment divided total monetary
demand into five familiar categories:(86)
(1) Private domestic investment;
(2) Public domestic investment;
(3) Personal consumption expenditure;
(4) Public current expenditure;
(5) The foreign balance.
Each category was scrutinised to see how much it was
likely to vary, and how it could be controlled. A
general reservation was that the government's power to
influence aggregate demand was uneven: the parts of the
economy where depression was most likely to originate
were those most difficult for the government to
control. (87) Of crucial importance, a report by the
Central Statistical Office showed that about one-half of
pre-war fluctuations in total expenditure were accounted
for by changes in capital expenditure. (88) Within this,
private capital expenditure was an item liable to
'spontaneous' fluctuations. When it came to influencing
this aspect of capital investment the committee stated:
'The possibilities of direct control by the state of the
capital expenditure of the vast mass of private firms are
clearly very limited.' Moreover, there could be 'no
question of attempting to control compulsorily the timing
of the capital expenditure of particular private
firms. ,(89) Some Labour ministers felt that to accept
this would tie the hands of a future government. Cripps,
for one, objected to these negative recommendations,
envisaging that there would continue to be close contact












pressed this point, but wrote: "we shall never make an
omelette without breaking eggs".(90) Beaverbrook, at the
War Cabinet meeting in May 1944 which agreed to publish
the white paper, also insisted that proposals to




other item 'most likely to fluctuate spontaneously' and
also the most difficult of all to control.(92) This
posed the problems of influencing structural adjustment
and industrial efficiency already mentioned; because, 'an
increase in one part of total expenditure can only within
limits offset a decrease in another'. In particular a
decrease in demand for the output of important export
industries would have to be met with an increase in other
exports as quickly as possible because an internal
reflation would lead to inflation if 'too vigOrous,.(93)
stimulate private capital investment
enough, though he wanted firms to be
incentives, as against the corporatist
by Cripps.(91) The foreign balance was
There was no difference between the report of the
Committee on Post-war Employment and the white paper on
these points. The white paper freely admitted that it
was 'highly inconvenient' that the most volatile
components of total expenditure also happened to be the
most difficult to control. (94) 'Everything possible' had
to be done to limit 'dangerous swings' in private
expenditure, but success would possibly be 'particularly
difficult to achieve' .(95) Like the report of the
Committee on Post-war Employment, the white paper
suggested that large firms might be persuaded voluntarily
to plan their capital expenditure to conform with a
general stabilisation POlicy.(96) Yet the most obvious





number of the most
namely public
capital-intensive
for reasons already discussed, not
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mentioned in Employment policy, although it was in the
minds of Labour ministers. The white paper only made the
oblique suggestion that: 'Forward planning may have to be
carried down to the industries which supply the primary
needs of public investment,.(97) The government's policy
on the control of private investment was, as Brook
observed to Woolton, "nothing more .•• than a pious hope
that private enterprise will follow the government's
lead".(98)
Given that private investment could not be directly
controlled, some emphasis was given to the continued use
of monetary policy as an. investment regulator. The
Committee on Post-war Employment thought that in the
future a reduction of interest rates might be used to
increase investment. An 'extreme theoretical
possibility' was that the state itself could undertake a
'much larger part of total investment by lending at
nominal rates of interest. ,(99) This corresponded to
Keynes's view that there would have to be a 'somewhat
comprehensive socialisation of investment' to secure an
approximation to full employment.(100) But the committee
did not pursue this point in their report, regarding it
as too speculative. For the transitional period the
government was definite that the rate of interest could
not be allowed to determine the volume of investment,
because with a vast backlog of capital investment
projects there might be a steep rise in interest rates.
'The government are determined to avoid dear
for•••urgent reconstruction needs,.(lOl) This
money
implied
that for a number of years the government would continue
directly to determine the volume and priorities of
investment as a whole. Although the coalition would not
allow interest rates to influence the volume of




the possibility of influencing capital
by varying interest rates would be 'kept in
Once again this vague phrasing reflected a
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division of opinion, concerning the effectiveness of
interest rates as a governor of investment, and the role
of interest rates in Britain's external economic
relations. However, experience with monetary policy
since the end of the gold standard was invoked in the
white paper to show that it would be possible to operate
a 'monetary policy designed to promote stable
empIOyment,.(103)
Private investment could also be influenced by
taxation policy. The Committee on Post-war Employment
thought that since taxes would probably be high for a
number of years, the government could consider reducing
them selectively to aid industrial efficiency (this was
done after the war with depreciation allowances), but it
was 'neither desirable nor practicable' to vary
industrial taxes for purpose of employment policy. (104)
Tax schemes to promote investment at the start of a
depression were mentioned as a possibility in the white
paper, but it was also stated that further study and
accumulation of experience would be needed, and other
methods would have to be looked at.(105)
As against all the problems of influencing private
capital expenditure (let alone the foreign balance) the
Committee on post-war Employment had much more hope that
public capital expenditure could be controlled in the
interests of employment policy, provided that four
obstacles could be removed: (106)
(a) the larger part of public investment was undertaken
by thousands of local authorities, public utilities and
similar bodies;
(b) diverse bodies would have to be prepared to invest
'contra-cyclically', which might often seem against good
financial sense from the viewpoint of a particular
industry involved;
(c) some public expenditure could not be subject to the
'psychological' reactions of governments to changing
economic conditions;
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(d) projects required time to set up and implement.
This impressive list of obstacles had to be overcome in
such a way that the government could alter the volume
and structure of public investment promptly. As the
white paper stated: 'the crucial moment for intervention
is at the first onset of depression'; otherwise greater
intervention would be needed, and it might not be so
effective. (107) This suggested that the authorities
needed to be very alert to the possibilities of future
slumps. Good foresight would be needed, and a stock of
'off-the-shelf' projects.(108) The Committee on Post-war
Employment argued that variation of public investment was
so important that, if necessary, the government would
have to consider ways of controlling it more closely.
The current system was not adequate because most of the
existing forms of control were negative. These were
adequate to restrain expenditure, but not to ensure that
in a recession new projects would be undertaken. Also,
because of the scale of variation that might be required,
there might have to be changes in the relations between
government and local authorities. But if these
difficulties could be overcome the committee concluded
that the effect on aggregate demand would be great. (109)
Some members of the committee made two qualifications.
First, after the transition period there might have to be
a switch from capital investment to consumption in the
interests of a balanced economy; if deflationary forces
then emerged it might be undesirable to increase the
level of public investment. Second, the main objective of
the building programme, which would form a large part of
public investment, was to maintain a steady level of
building activity over a long period; the achievement of
many of the social and economic aims of reconstruction
planning depended on this. Clearly, the use of the
building programme as an economic regulator might
conflict with this publicly-stated policy.(110)
The nub of the policy was that the timing and volume
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of public investment should be carefully planned to
offset unavoidable fluctuations in private investment.
There was some scepticism about whether increasing public
investment could adequately offset falls in private
investment. In addition the policy meant subordinating
public investment to the moods of business confidence,
which might not appeal to the public authorities which
had to do careful planning. For example, how could local
authorities justify postponing socially useful projects
in times of boom? There was also opposition to the idea
that government departments should be subject to economic
policy in this way. The Admiralty put up a very stiff





used as an economic
similar to that which was
made in other quarters about the building programme, was
that there should be a steady level of naval
construction, related to military objectives, rather than
a 'contra-cyclical' variation.(ll2)
Therefore, whether accelerating or holding back
programmes, difficulties could be foreseen. Schemes for
planning a 'shelf' of public investment were discussed,
including the preparations of plans for different periods
ahead, and rough estimates of the employment effects of
different kinds of capital investment project. (ll3)
However, many officials were far from convinced by these
schemes. Among the doubters was Sir Wilfrid Eady, who was
accused by Norman Brook of making 'wrecking amendments'
to the draft on this and other issues. Eady objected: "I
don't regard it as satisfactory that a State Paper of
this importance should contain two major proposals, on
the variation of public expenditure and on the variation
of insurance contributions, which all the officials
concerned believe impractical or at best far less
effective for their designed purpose than is claimed for
them". (114)
Despite these doubts and objections, the white paper
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echoed the Committee on Post-war Employment in placing
the main burden of employment policy on the control of
public investment. It was envisaged that the machinery of
assembling and co-ordinating the investment plans of
public authorities would enable the government to set an
annual target for the whole volume of public works. In
the light of what has been said about internal doubts
about the policy, however,
white paper itself listed
it is significant that the
some of the difficulties
involved in using public investment as a stabilising
mechanism. This produced a general effect which Keynes,. ....according to Eady, had compared to the holes 1n a Gruyere
cheese, "but without the surrounding cheese".(115)
However, the conclusion remained: compared with other
methods, public investment could be 'used more directly
as an instrument of employment POlicy,.(116)
Nevertheless, the Committee on Post-war Employment
felt that, even with a well-designed policy to control
public investment,
control of private
should be done by
it was necessary to look also at the
consumption. It recommended that this
influencing the level of incomes, and
not the consumption of particular goods, in order to
preserve freedom of choice in consumption. At the same
time it saw 'many political difficulties in a system
which links increased personal incomes with a budgetary
deficit', and therefore recommended that some kind of
'automatic' regulator should be operated. (117) To this
end the committee was particularly attracted to the
Economic Section's scheme for varying social insurance
contributions in relation to an index of employment: 'We
are•••impressed by the great psychological value of a
scheme of this kind in bringing home to the great mass of
the public exactly what a policy of maintaining
employment demands - a conscious effort by the whole
community not to drift with the ebb and flow of the
economic tide as in the past, but to set itself to reduce
such fluctuations to a minimum.' This view can be
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contrasted with Anderson's use of a similar maritime
metaphor in a letter to Ramsay MacDonald in 1931 (see
above, p.22). However, very important objections to the
scheme for varying social insurance payments were that it
would not act quickly enough or powerfully enough as a
consumption stabiliser. MacDougall of the Prime Minister's
Statistical Section wrote a paper about variations of
social insurance contribution variations in 1920-1
concluding that the effects would be 'too slow'. Meade,
the scheme's main supporter, replied that it could be
speeded up.(ll8) But the more solid objection concerned
the scale of effect. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General
and Churchill's scientific adviser, wanted to put more
stress on variations of taxation. He thought that this
was the only instrument with sufficient power which could
be used quickly. It had been estimated that national
income was subject to fluctuations of about 7% around the
mean and Cherwell made a rough calculation showing that
all the stabilisation proposals to be included in the
white paper would account for less than half this
variation. He wrote to Woolton: " I consider it a
great mistake not to make more of variations in taxation,
which is by far the strongest weapon at our disposal, and
without which it may well not be possible to solve the
unemployment problem - or to show that it can be
solved. ,,(119)
Although there were powerful theoretical and practical
arguments for the variation of taxation, the whole issue
was given a minor reference in the white paper. (120)










that such a use of taxes was
fraught with 'political dangers' and should not even be
mentioned in the white paper.(121) It was feared that
parties would vary taxes for electoral advantage, using
economic stabilisation as an excuse. This might lead to
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an economic danger: 'political' variation of taxation
might have a pro-cyclical rather than a stabilising
effect. In fact, the idea that the trade cycle would be
replaced by a 'policy cycle' was foreseen as a




of doubts about the variation of taxation for
economic policy aims the white paper depended
on 'thermostatic' variation of social insurance
contributions for the stabilisation of consumption.
However, in light of the arguments that took place inside
the government it can be concluded that the idea of a
social insurance thermostat was included as an heuristic
device rather than as a practical proposal.
The Committee on Post-war Employment was specifically
asked to look at the budgetary implications of employment
policy. This boiled down to the question of whether the
policy involved dangerous tendencies to increasing public
debt. The committee pointed out that this problem only
applied to public expenditure which earned no monetary
return (e.g. expenditure on school buildings as against,
say, houses for rent) and would be a danger only if the
debt grew faster than national income. A special problem
was foreseen for the transition, when it was anticipated
that there would probably be a continuing budget deficit,
despite the kind of inflationary pressures which would
normally dictate a budget surplus. If deflationary
conditions emerged at the end of the transition it might
be necessary to continue a deficit, which would lead to
confidence problems. Further problems would ensue if
stagnation turned out to be chronic, but on this point
the committee broke off its speculations. (Keynes
commented that this part of the report had 'the air of
having been written some years before the rest of the
report', because it did not take into account the
operation of the multiplier, and consequent effects on
government revenue). (123) The white paper cautiously
stated that the proposals did not involve deliberate
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planning for budget deficits in times of depression, and
presumed that the budget would be balanced over a period
of several years.(124)
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from
this examination of the discussions about maintaining
aggregate demand is the simple one that it was not yet
clear how the five main elements of demand could be
controlled. Various officials and politicians had their
own ideas about what would be effective, but any bold
idea tended to generate controversy. Therefore the whole
discussion, and the outcome in the white paper, was more
tentative than it is sometimes made to appear in
retrospect. A good example of the problem is that,
during the tortuous efforts to draft the white paper,
Cherwell argued that it should include a breakdown of the
relative significance of the different instruments in the
stabilisation of national income as a whole, but he was
forced to withdraw this idea because of opposition from
the Chancellor,5irJohn Anderson.(125) Judged as an attempt
to establish a basis for planning the national income, a
result that the Keynesians were hoping for,(126) the
discussions on the long-term future of economic policy
were inconclusive. The consensus did not extend far
beyond an agreed statement of aims; the question of means
was left to be resolved by practical experiment in the
future, because of technical and ideological
disagreements. Experienced politicians probably never
doubted that there would be serious disagreements about
the long-term policy. There were rumblings of discontent
in the political parties, and during 1944 pressure was
put on Labour ministers to break with the coalition at
the end of the war. (127) What had been agreed, however,
was sufficient for Churchill and Bevin, without fear of
easy contradiction, to reassure the troops departing for




How much consensus was there on the more pressing
problems of the transitional period? The primary brief
of the Committee on Post-war Employment was to look at
policy for the long-term, but of the transition it
stated: '•••unless these problems are satisfactorily
solved, our long-run position may be permanently
affected. Moreover, our judgement of the moment at which
it would be appropiate to introduce some of the permanent
measures which have been proposed must depend in some
degree upon an appreciation of the forces which will be
dominant in the period of transition: (128) The first
important feature of the transition would be 'a vast
transformation' of the structure of demand. This
contained the danger of frictional unemployment, with
possible long-term consequences. The second feature would
be a high level of money demand. The combination
presented a potent inflationary danger: either
consumption or investment demand could lead to general
inflation. Another major problem would be to ensure that
enough resources were put into exports, rather than being
sucked into domestic capital investment or consumption by
the high pressure of demand.(129) In demobilisation plans
the Cabinet agreed to make exports the top priority,
(though it was agreed that it would be unwise to make
public mention of this).(130) The main production
priorities listed after military requirements were
exports, capital re-equipment, consumer necessities, and
house-building - which added up to a formidable total.
Realising this, the committee pointed out that
structural maladjustments could be created or exacerbated
during the transition, leading to difficulties when
recessionary forces emerged. Ministers were therefore
cautioned to place the least possible 'distorting' forces
on the economy during the transition. To put the problem
in perspective, when the Cabinet discussed manpower in
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the first year after the defeat of Germany, in July 1944,
it was estimated that there would be a 1.75 million
person shortfall
objectives. (131)
for meeting the government's main
The committee particularly urged
ministers to avoid over-expansion of 'certain investment
industries', in a way that would require consumption to
be severely limited.(132) This was a reference to the
building programme, the size of the projected total
labour force for which had been publicly announced during
1943(133) despite fierce tussles in the Reconstruction
Priorities Committee and the Cabinet. (134) The building
programme continued to cause misgivings among
and politicians. The question was taken up
Reconstruction Committee again during 1944.





building labour force was not scaled down from 1.25 to
1.00 million (this was the actual figure for 1938; Bevin
had originally proposed 1.4 million), then there would be
unemployment in the industry after a few years.(135) But
departments
the promise
objected that this would mean going back
in the white paper. (136) In
on
the
Reconstruction Committee discussion it was stated that
the figures had been 'carefully calculated', and the
total was reaffirmed.(137) Events after the war showed
that the figures had not been carefully calculated: no
allowance had been made for expanded demand in the
building materials industries; there were difficulties in
reaching the manpower target; and there were shortages of
a number of materials.
Given the character of the transition,
on Post-war Employment pointed out that
total demand could not be used to





therefore, first stress will need to be placed on removal
of production bottlenecks in the form of shortages of key
workers,
speeding
lack of factory space or raw materials; and
up of any necessary retooling,.(138) In other
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words, a policy of increasing supplies to match an
existing high level of demand. The committee also
recommended action to direct industry into any area that
threatened to become depressed, as well as promoting
occupational and geographical mobility.
On the problems of the transition generally the
committee concluded: 'The position •••is clearly one which
calls for control', although it could be predicted that
there would be 'considerable opposition to the retention
of controls in any form'; also, there would be
difficulties in holding prices and in setting criteria
for allocations of resources 'once the single test of war
is no longer applicable'. Furthermore, controls could be
overdone: they might damage 'spontaneous' forces of
expansion; in short, private business. Nevertheless, the
committee was firm in its assertion that there was no
alternative: controls could be loosened if too tight, but
would be difficult to re-establish once dismantled. (139)
Towards the end of the war the earlier assumptions
about the need for controls were relaxed, because of
changing expectations about what conditions would be like
in the transition. At the same time there was increasing
ideological conflict over the future of controls. At the
beginning of 1944 even John Jewkes, who was later so
sweeping in his opposition to controls, wrote in his
draft for the white paper: "the necessary guidance and
control will be maintained as long as it is
necessary".(140) But how long would this be? According to
the white paper, 'The plans for ••• [the] transition
period must be extremely flexible; for no-one can yet
know when the war with Germany will come to an end or how
long thereafter Japanese resistance will continue,.(141)
This was the typical tenor of wartime planning, by nature
short-term and flexible. Planning was not made easier by
the knowledge that demobilisation and reconversion
required the machinery of economic policy to cope with
bigger changes in the pattern of employment and output
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than any that had occurred during war mobilisation, a
point often
planning.
made by those involved in transitional
quicker
Moreover, the earlier the end to the war, the
'the vast transformation' of the economy would
have to take place, and the
the change would be.
more difficult and
(142) An informalunpredictable
official Committee on Controls was set up to study the
problems that could arise. The development of its work
illustrates the way that official thinking was changing.
In 1943, when reconstruction planning began in earnest,
it was assumed that Stage II (i.e. the period from the
defeat of Germany to the defeat of Japan) would start in
1944 and last for two years. Under this assumption the
war would be going on at a much reduced level during most
of the transition. The picture began to change when the
Committee on Controls was asked by Woolton, at the end of
1944, to estimate the effect on existing plans of
'various hypotheses', including ones that Stage II would
last six months or 18 months instead of 2 years.(143) In
fact, the committee was overtaken by events and still
revising its main report when the war ended in August
1945.(144)
The most important point which the committee had to
study was whether there would be continuing labour
scarcity or heavy unemployment in the transition. If
there was unemployment - and there were early fears that
there might be localised unemployment before the end of
the war with Japan(145» - it was predicted that pressure
to remove all controls would grow. The committee had
trouble with getting hold of statistics, so only rough
guesses could be made in most cases, but it concluded
that there would not be any major problem of unemployment
provided that raw materials and stocks were
sufficient. (146) While it had been assumed that Stage II
would last two years, it had been expected that the main
purpose of economic controls in the very early part of
the transition would be to stop a premature resurgence of
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civilian production. (147) (In practice the opposite
difficulty was more significant: in switching production
to high priority goods for civil consumption there were
difficulties in getting workers to move from high-wage
This resulted from the
civilian industries, such as
and building materials. (148)
fact that wartime manpower
munitions work to low-wage
textiles, food-processing
planning had been dependent on wage incentives more than
on labour controls.) When it became clear that there
would be an early end to the war, however, some economic
advisers - and the official Committee on Controls - drew
the conclusion that controls could be relaxed much more
quickly, on the grounds that there would be less need to
keep a balance between munitions production and civilian
production. In a note by Bridges on a draft report of the
Committee on Controls, circulated to ministers in
September 1944, there was a reference to the assumption
that Stage II would last 18 months instead of 2 years:
"the most probable result of the new assumption is that
the process of relaxing control may begin earlier in the
transition and proceed more rapidly".(149)
Later, this point was taken to an extreme in the
office of the Minister of Reconstruction, by Woolton's
economic adviser John Jewkes. In a paper entitled
'Economdc policy in the transition: dated 11/10/44, he
argued that if the war was shorter there would be a
danger of 'heavy frictional unemployment', and a need to
'get people into jobs at all costs'. To this end
controls should be relaxed 'courageously' and quickly;
Jewkes thought that most raw materials could be released
from control within six months. Controls might impede
the development of the economy when there was no longer a
reason to have any power over what businessmen decided to
produce. Instead, "all post-war plans should be based
upon the assumption that we shall return to the
conditions and organisation existing before the war",




point. Jewkes recognised that there were risks
policy that he recommended, but thought that
frictional unemployment with controls was a more
disagreeable alternative than the risk of confusion and
inflation without controls: "so long as economic
resources are available, the right way to prevent
inflation is to expand production". It is this last point
that reveals the fatal flaw in Jewkes' argument; as it




controls were therefore necessary. Jewkes
his views were unpopular, but suggested
"opinions of ministers on this subject
quickly in the next month or two".(150) Not long after
this Brook 'agreed to release' Jewkes, who returned to
academic life.(151)
Leaving aside such ideologically motivated arguments
for relaxing controls, a more practical question
concerned not whether it would be desirable to retain a
control, but whether it would be possible to resist
pressure for relaxation. A related difficulty was that
if one type of control was abandoned, then pressure might
grow to get rid of others. (152) Labour controls were seen
as the most likely source of problems in this respect.
The possibility that labour controls would have to be
abandoned was seen by some as a crucial limitation on the
future use of controls, because the manpower budget had
been central to economic planning during the war. In the
transition the government had to try to keep a balance
between domestic consumption, capital investment and
export output, and this was the sort of overall balance
that had been achieved by manpower budgeting during the
war. (153) Some went as far as to say that a manpower
budget, and hence any kind of overall economic planning,
was impossible without labour controls. Other disagreed:
Ely Devons, for example, wrote a paper in which he
expressed scepticism about the supposed importance of
labour controls in the war effort, while the official
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Committee on Controls concluded that materials controls
would be most important after the war. (154) However, the
operation of materials controls would not be easy. The
'unprogrammed' diversity and complexity of the peacetime
economy might make the administrative allocation of
materials very complicated. (155) Furthermore, as the task
of administering controls became more complicated, it was
expected that most of the temporary civil servants
running the controls would want to return to peacetime
jobs immediately the war ended. (156) Moreover, problems
of equity would arise from the continued use of the
regional organisations, which were partly staffed by
leading local businessmen.(157)
But perhaps the biggest difficulty of all in assessing
the potential role of controls in the transition was that
the officials concerned were unable to say exactly how
controls could be used to attain the government's most
important objectives; in particular this applied to the
building programme and the export drive. For many
reasons, the building programme had a very high priority
in reconstruction plans; for example, Woolton thought
that housing was the most important reconstruction
problem, and Churchill ordered that the housing programme
should be carried out on the lines of a military
operation. (158) However, the building industry was a
difficult area for the use of economic controls; relevant
wartime experience was lacking because the industry had
been severely contracted during the war as building had
been restricted to military projects and little else. An
official Committee on the Control of Building was set up
in late 1943 to examine the problems. At first there was
some argument about whether controls would be necessary
at all, since it was suggested that 30,OOO-odd building
firms might compete among themselves and keep costs
down, (159) but in the end it was agreed that controls
would be needed to prevent building resources 'leaking'
into repairs, and to enforce an allocation between house
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and factory-building in line with the government's
priorities. There was, also, a need to balance the
regional distribution of building. Therefore, it was
concluded that control of building should be based on a
system of building licences. Nevertheless, it was
recognised at the same time that there would be great
difficulties in operating such a system.(160) The
committee might have been much more sceptical if its
terms of reference had been wider and it had dealt with
the gamut of problems facing the building programme,
including how to overcome prospective shortages of raw
materials and labour.
The problems of the export industries were also
particularly difficult. As stated in Employment policy,
it would be up to the industries themselves to make the
most of their opportunities to recover markets and find
fresh outlets for their products. But it had also been
agreed that export industries' claims for resources freed
from war purposes would have a high priority.(161) And as
with the building programme, the export drive was
sometimes compared to a military campaign, implying that
the government would take any necessary measures to
achieve it.(162) In return, the government expected firms
to co-operate by earmarking a high proportion of their
output for exports, rather than taking the easy route of
selling on the home market where demand would be
high. (163) But there were already doubts about whether
this policy would be adequate. Meade wrote to Brook in
August 1944, calling for a general re-appraisal, because
no-one had said how controls could be used to stimulate
exports. Meade recommended a policy of devaluation to
encourage exports, purchase tax to discourage home
consumption and reduction of Excess Profits Tax to
energise firms. He was critical that the informal
Committee on Controls had looked at every type of control
except financial ones, whereas he anticipated that
physical controls would weaken, and that the Treasury was
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"coming right back into the centre of things". The
proposal to use Purchase Tax as a weapon in export policy
brought forth the argument from the Customs and Excise
that this would not raise exports. But, as Jewkes
pointed out in a paper on this issue, there was the
'rather terrifying fact' that although the government had
announced that exports would take priority over the
domestic market, 'It is generally admitted that it would
be extremely difficult through the use of physical
controls to divert effort into the export trade'. Jewkes
asked the pertinent question: if the use of Purchase Tax
was rejected, what was the alternative?(164)
With this degree of doubt and confusion,
surprising that it proved very difficult to




policy on the future of controls. The first intention
was to publish a white paper economic controls, but the
project was scrapped when it became clear that, as Arnold
Plant wrote, 'it is the use of the machinery we are
defending in the White Paper, not the manner in which the
machinery is used.' (165) If so, the issue hardly
required another white paper, since the principle of
retaining controls had already been established. Also,
the difficulties of specifying how controls would be used
were compounded by ideological questions which became
prominent as the propect of a 'return to normality' came
nearer. When it came to drafting the legislation for the
transitional powers, and making a public statement about
the future of controls, there were disagreements in the
Cabinet about various phrases. Some were said to imply
indefinite retention of controls; others were said to
imply that there would be a swift return to pre-war
laissez-faire. (166) In the end, Churchill made a short
statement to Parliament on November 16th 1944, in which
he simply said that the use of controls would be dealt
with 'in a severely practical manner ••• Theoretical,
ideological or partisan tendencies either way should be
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excluded, and the governing consideration in every case
should be the public interest'.
Such woolly phrases barely concealed the mutual
suspicions within the coalition. As early as March 1944,
after Morrison had suggested in a speech that
reconstruction Bills might be passed in a very general
form and be elaborated by delegated legislation,
Churchill warned about a possible break-up of the
coalition. (167) In August, Bevin had complained that
there was too much emphasis on relaxation in the report





as Woolton had prompted the committee to
'goodly batch' of relaxations. (169» After
statement, in March 1945, there was some hard
the cabinet when Bevin inveighed against a
press campaign decrying controls in general and labour
controls in particular. In reply, Lyttelton claimed that
'official Conservative leaders' were not to blamej
Woolton said that industrialists agreed with the need for
controls; financial circles also agreed, according to
Anderson; Churchill simply blamed the press for what he
admitted was a 'poisonous political atmosphere. ,(170)
This exchange took place shortly before the break-up of
the coalition. After the departure of the Labour
ministers, the uncertainty did not lessen. In a letter
to A.J. Johnston, secretary to the Committee on Controls,
written during the brief tenure of the Caretaker
government, D.N. Chester suggested that the atmosphere in
Whitehall was 'somewhat feverish, not quite certain
whether it is the bogey of inflation or the bogey of
general unemployment which must be crusaded against';
perhaps, thought Chester, civil servants were just
reluctant to admit that the economy might work without
them.
that
On the work of the committee, Chester
it would probably be a mistake to put in
suggested
detailed
comments on the different controls, "especially in view
of the changing political situation".(171)
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From an examination of public statements of the
coalition it might seem that there was a solid commitment
to the use of controls to achieve transitional
objectives. When the internal discussions are studied,
however, the extent of this commitment is much less
certain. The internal doubts and confusions had very
important consequences for the incoming Labour
government, which sought to achieve the agreed targets in
the building programme and other spheres, which was bound
to intensify inflationary pressure. Even before the end
of the war there were many who had arrived at a view
similar to that expressed by a member of the Economic
Section, R.C. Tress, when he pointed out that it was not
difficult to foresee that inflationary pressure was
likely 'to persist beyond the transitional period into
the early years that will follow'. Therefore, aggregate
demand would have to be dampened down by whatever means
were available. Consequently, Tress argued,
'It is folly to go ahead encouraging heavy
programmes of capital development, private or
public, after the war (including housing once the
strongest claims have ceased to be pressing), when
a drying up in the flow of investment opportunities
relative to the supply of saving will later be the
principal threat to the maintenance of a high and
stable level of employment. Moreover, the people
of this country will have just fought and won a
seven-years' war, and they may rightly claim some
immediate comfort rather than be called upon to
give further hostages to the future,.(172)
In this chapter it has been shown that the 1943-5
discussions on long-term and short-term future of
economic policy were inconclusive in many ways, and that
the wartime consensus was therefore limited. The
disagreements over Employment Policy can be exaggerated,
just as the role of consensus has often been inflated in
the past. But it is reasonable to conclude that the
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reconstruction 'consensus' was more important as a means
of maintaining morale than as a basis for enduring
political change. It was sufficient to reassure troops
and workers that they would not find themselves in dole
queues after the war, but there was as yet little
agreement about how to reconcile the conflicting
objectives of economic policy. Conservative and Labour
ministers still viewed the future of economic policy in
radically different ways; this fact was concealed by the
vague and ambiguous language of the white paper, but
becomes evident from an examination of the internal
discussions. Moreover, the short-term policy for the
transitional period was also controversial. The
existence of a movement for 'return to normalcy' can be
detected very clearly, and in itself was a symptom of
conflicting views, because there was an equally strong
feeling at each end of the political spectrum that
retaining controls or sweeping them away would set the
pace for the development of economic policy in the long-
term.
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THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S FIRST STEPS, 1945-6
For the 1945 general election campaign, Labour did not
make major additions to the reconstruction aims that had
been agreed by the coalition government, but offered to
the electorate the prospect of a government determined to
carry through those aims. As shown in the last chapter,
it was on questions of how to implement reconstruction
plans, in the short and the long-term, that the coalition
consensus was weakest. Apart from the aim of high and
stable employment, the greatest significance of
Employment policy was that it announced a period of
political and administrative experiment, which would have
been necessary under any government. What could not be
established without a general election was how radical
these experiments would be, since there were complex
ideological and technical disputes arguments within the
coalition. In these circumstances the argument that the
Conservatives could not be trusted to carry through
reconstruction programmes proved to be a powerful one,
and Labour's manifesto Let us face the future stated that
Labour would: 'plan from the ground up - giving an
rapprop'iate place to constructive enterprise and private~
endeavour in the national plan, but dealing decisively
with those interests which would use high-sounding talk
about economic freedom to put themselves and their wishes
above those of the whole nation,.(l) While it suggested
that a Labour government was prepared to take radical
steps if necessary, the manifesto did not move far beyond
such generalities. Moreover, during the early months of
the government there was 'little or no parliamentary
discussion of central Planning,.(2)
Internal discussions about economic planning did,
however, begin soon after Labour carne to power. New
ministerial and official planning machinery was set up,
and before the end of 1945 there was also a hurriedly
prepared Economic Survey for 1946. The lack of
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parliamentary or other public discussion of these
developments is explained by the desire to avoid the
possibility of planning becoming discredited during the
turmoil of reconversion. The lack of publicity did not
prevent a sharp decline in public confidence in the
government during the crisis year of 1947, when a number
of weaknesses and errors of judgement in the steps taken
to develop the policy during 1945 and 1946 contributed to
the difficulties of overcoming the fuel and
convertibility crises; though they did not, as the
government's opponents alleged, actually cause the crises
I
Stafford Cripps, the new President of the Board of Trade,
set the pace in making proposals about economic planning
in the first weeks after the government came to power. He
suggested that there should be a National Plan and
proposed moving the Economic Section into the Board of
Trade, which he saw as the future super-ministry of
economic policy.(3) Instead it was decided to continue
with the tried and tested machinery of the lord
President's Committee. Herbert Morrison, the new Lord
President, became the minister responsible for overall
co-ordination of economic policy, and he thought it
better to leave the Economic Section attached to the
Cabinet Office.(4) One weakness of this arrangement was
that Morrison had other important duties apart from the
co-ordination of economic policy. No new arrangements
were made for obtaining expert economic advice on
planning, so James Meade - now the head of the Economic
Section - became responsible for making initial
proposals. On the administrative side an inter-
departmental Steering Committee on Economic Development
(ED) was established, the members of which were the
permanent secretaries of the main economic
departments.(5) The ED committee was answerable, in the
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first instance, to a 'nucleus' of ministers from the Lord
President's Committee: Dalton, Morrison, Cripps, and
Bevin. At first this body was called the Lord
President's (Industrial) Committee, but was later renamed
to the Ministerial Economic Planning committee (MEP). The
formal responsibility of the MEP was to exercise, on the
Cabinet's behalf, 'a general oversight over economic
planning'; though it met infrequently.(6) On the face of
it this central machinery should have been authoritative,
but in the light of the subsequent failure of the Lord
President's committee to get a grip on a number of key
problems, a crucial weakness was that the Prime Minister
remained outside the economic policy-making machinery. At
one point it was proposed that Attlee should chair the
key economic committee,(7) but in the event he did not
get directly involved in economic policy committees until
the two major crises of 1947.
When it came to establishing the groundwork for
economic planning in the short-term, the government faced
the very difficult problems of implementation that
officials had been struggling with unsuccessfully towards
the end of the war. After the formation of the Labour
government, official discussions about the use of
economic controls continued along much the same lines as
previously. There was still confusion about the
conditions in which the controls would have to be
applied: a Board of Trade official complained that the
Ministry of Labour was suggesting at one moment that
there would acute shortages, at another that there would
be considerable unemployment during reconversion. (8)
Also, it was still not clear how the controls could be
used. It was assumed that labour controls would
virtually disappear, and that production controls would
become more important, buttressed by raw material
controls. But officials pointed out that it could be
seen as an arbitrary action if the government attempted
to withhold raw materials from a firm as a sanction to
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support production controls, and that the court actions
that might follow would be highly divisive and unpopular.
At a meeting of officials held on 6/9/45 the following
conclusion was drawn: "production controls, unsupported
by other forms of control, would be almost impossible to
enforce, and Ministers should not be led to suppose the
contrary". (9) D.N. Chester pointed out once again that,
in reporting to ministers, officials had not answered two
major questions: how labour could be distributed properly
between industries, and how a proper balance between
output for export and the domestic market could be
achieved. (lO) Moreover, apart from problems about how
they would be used, the effectiveness of controls was
already being reduced by the desire of wartime civil
service 'temporaries' to return to prewar occupations,
and by the government's policy of persuading departments,
in Dalton's words,
as possible. (11)
to 'disgorge' extra staff as
The Ministry of Supply wrote
quickly
to the
secretary of the official Committee on Controls that its
controls had already been weakened by the end of August
1945.(12) The disruption caused by the rapid turnover and
loss of staff at this time can be imagined, and the
records show many signs of it.(13)
It was against this background that the LP(I)
committee agreed that whole system of controls should be
retained for the time being. (14) Thus the decisions of
the wartime coalition were reaffirmed; but,
significantly, no new studies of how controls could be
used were begun. Not until the Autumn of 1947 was the
system of controls again reviewed as a whole. Indeed, far
from attempting to strengthen the operation of controls,
the accent was on relaxation. Morrison proposed an
enquiry into reducing irksome controls at the end of 1945
because it was thought that some departments might be
reluctant to follow the principle that controls should be
retained only where a need could be proved. The LPC
agreed to this approach, though some ministers felt that
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insufficient publicity had been given to the fact that
many controls had already been relaxed. (15) Later, it was
reported that relaxations in controls could be made
fairly easily and were, in fact, being actively pursued
by departments.(16) From this it is clear that the new
Labour government did not make any major change in the
policy for the use of controls. Morrison did express a
wish to use controls to promote economic expansion (an
attitude which economic advisers tried to disabuse him
of),(17) but no special measures were taken to strengthen




only significant exception to this conclusion
there was some resistance to the relaxation
is
of
labour controls. In wartime discussions about the future
of controls it had been assumed that the government would
maintain the whole system of controls, and that the
abandonment of any part would weaken the whole structure.
At the same time it was assumed that it would not be
practical to use labour direction. For example, 'full'
labour direction was used in an attempt to expand
textiles production towards the end of the war, but only
about one quarter of the workers initially nominated for
direction actually entered the industry. The basic
reason was that munitions industries paid better wages,
and often had better conditions of work as well.(18) As
expected, general pressure against labour controls
emerged immediately the war ended. Some ministers and
departments resisted this, claiming that it would be
impossible to carry out the government's policies if
labour controls were relaxed. For example, the Minister
of Health, Aneurin Bevan, wanted more workers to be
directed into the building materials industries, a key
bottleneck in the housing programme; and the Ministry of
Food argued that labour controls would be essential to
keep workers in its low-paid industries.(19) Cripps, in
October 1945, also argued for the expanded use of labour
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controls: "I must make it clear that, except to a very
limited extent, I cannot make good, by production
controls on raw material, the loss of direct control over
labour". In this he was echoing the views of officials,
but arrived at a different conclusion , in that he wanted
to expand the categories of workers who could be
directed, and to use powers to direct workers back to
their pre-war occupations in 'undermanned' industries
such as cotton, foundries, jute and housing fitments.
Indeed, the Ministry of Labour was called on to 'take the
lead' in 'moulding the national economy,.(20)
The Ministry of Labour under George Isaacs, rather
than taking the lead in applying labour controls, piled
on the pressure for relaxation by indicating that, even
if the government did not formally remove the controls,
it would not actively enforce them. Attempts that were
made to direct people in this period met with some
resistance from workers. In one case mentioned in the
internal discussion, direction of labour into the
building materials industry led to a strike. On another
occasion a magistrate gave a courtroom lecture on the
need to allow people the freedom to choose their own
occupation. (21) The possibility of the judiciary
rejecting the continued use of government economic
controls had been foreseen in the wartime discussion
about the future of controls, and was the main reason why
there was special transitional powers legislation after
the war; even so, experience showed that direction of
labour was a particularly difficult area. By the end of
1945 Morrison felt that the government was being
stampeded into a premature decision to remove labour
controls. Bevin had to use his great influence as former
Minister of Labour and chairman of the Cabinet's Manpower
requirements committee to create a compromise in which
controls to retain labour would be kept in key areas such
as coal and agriculture. (22)
A general question raised by all this was whether
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labour controls were necessary for economic planning. As
an official in the Lord President's office put it:
'Labour controls go to the root of things ••• The large
issue here (though I am not persuaded that in existing
circumstances it is altogether profitable to discuss it)
seems to be - how far does it make sense to think that
you can have a "planned economy" if you cannot plan the
allocation of manpower as one of the resources on which
the economy depends?,(23) There are many other papers and
reports dating from from this early period of the Labour
government in which officials expressed scepticism about
the possibility of planning without labour direction.
The building programme was an important case in point: it
was thought that the combination of building licences and
raw material controls would be ineffective to attain the
government's goals, yet the Ministry of Works was said to
be afraid to use labour direction for fear of a 'Gestapo'
image. (24) More generally, the official Steering
committee on Economic Development felt that it must warn
the government that it could not expect any precise,
accurate outcome to its plans for 1946 without the use of
labour controls.(25) In the event, Labour direction was
largely discontinued by the end of 1945, being replaced
by a requirement for workers to seek jobs through Labour
Exchanges; this facilitated persuasion, though it was
widely disregarded. Also, there were still Essential Work
Orders covering some groups of workers in coal,
agriculture and building, but this could not solve the
many problems of undermanning, and the government had to
weigh up whether this measure acted as a disincentive to
recruitment in these industries.
The early discussions on controls, therefore, do not
suggest that the government intended to rely on them for
the implementation of economic planning in the long-term,
or even that it was determined to use them with wartime
rigour during the transition. Therefore, it is important
to examine what other means of implementing plans were
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also being discussed. For example, not everyone agreed
that labour controls were the essence of economic
planning, though anti-planners found it convenient to
argue this. D.N Chester wrote a memo to Morrison
informing him that the Economic Section agreed
labour controls should be relaxed and arguing that
was not incompatible with a 'broad economic





controls had been so important during the war - despite
their limitations - was that vast and rapid
redistribution of labour had been required. In more
normal times, when economic changes would be slower, it
would be possible to use wage incentives or other means
similar to normal market mechanisms to create the desired
distribution of Labour. (26) This advice pointed to the
importance of wages policy in the long-term, though it
was of little comfort to the government in the immediate
circumstances of the transition.
During
discussions
1945-6 there were a also a number of
putin the Lord President's committee that
relations between government and industry in the context
of economic planning. Some ministers in the government
wished to promote industrial efficiency and re-
organisation through tripartite machinery set up to
review major private sector industries as well as through
the nationalisation programme. Cripps was intent on a
policy of setting up industrial 'working parties'
consisting of representatives of employers and trade
unions with a neutral chairman, an approach which had
been generally agreed with the TUC and FBI/BEC. The
records of discussions in the LPC show that, as in the
wartime discussions on restrictive practices and
industrial efficiency, other ministers had doubts about
such a policy because one or other sectional interest
might come to dominate the tripartite machinery. Cripps'
proposal that the working party approach be adopted by
all departments for the industries they sponsored was
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rejected; instead the decision about the precise form of
machinery for industrial reorganisation was left to each
individual minister. (27) It was eventually agreed that
there should be new legislation to set up Industrial
Development Councils, an extension of the 'working party'




to the setting up of
and there was concerted
IDC's. (28) So, this
tripartist approach to economic planning ran into trouble
- at first because of divisions in the government and
later because of opposition from outside.
The most successful part of the early efforts to
develop a policy of economic planning was the work which
led to the series of Economic Surveys. Proposals on this
were made by J.E. Meade, who recommended that the work on
national income estimation already underway in the
Central Statistical Office, Economic Section and Treasury
should continue, with two significant additions. First,
it should be applied to the current situation of general
scarcity in the transition period as well as to the
expected long-term problem of general depression. Second,
the Economic Survey should look at the 'real' factors
underlying the monetary aggregates used in national
income and expenditure analysis. In this way both
monetary and real aspects of the 'inflationary gap' could
be examined; the possibilities of closing the gap could
be considered by the ED committee and sent to ministers
for decision.(29) Meade's proposals were first put into
effect in the unpublished 1946 Economic Survey (its
'planning considerations' are examined in detail below).
Labour leaders had always intended that economic planning
would be open to public discussion, but the government
was in two minds about the publication of the 1946
Economic Survey. At the first meeting of the MEP,
Morrison said that some things could be achieved by
controls, but public helpfulness was paramount;(30) the
1946 Economic Survey was, however, a rushed effort, and
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the future was uncertain; planning might be discredited
if it was published and turned out to be wide of the
mark. Cripps went further, arguing that the government
had as yet formulated no plan; he proposed that the
government should simply announce that it was continuing
the exceptional wartime policy into peacetime - this
became the agreed line.(31)
At the first meeting of the MEP it was also agreed to
prepare a long-term version of the Economic Survey.
year 1950 was chosen because it was expected




there was argument about publication: Morrison thought it
would help industrialists with forward planning; Cripps
objected because reliable estimates of raw materials
supplies, the basis for sound long-term forecasts, were
non-existent. Any forecasts given would therefore have to
be on the pessimistic side, and industrialists might be
better off without them because they might plan to do
less than they could if supplies improved. Conversely,
optimistic targets might lead to industrialists
attempting too much, which would also discredit planning.
Once again, Morrison accepted these arguments.(33)
A more important controversy resulted from Morrison's
suggestion that future Economic Surveys should be
published in conjunction with the Budget. Dalton saw
problems with making a close link between economic
planning
taxation
and budget policy, arguing that
could not be given the wide advance
changes in
publicity
that planning should have, and that such information was
not, in fact, needed.(34) (Dalton did not even mention
planning in his first Budget, in October 1945.)(35) There
were several further discussions on this point, in which
Meade advocated that the timing of planning documents
should coincide with the financial year, whereas Dalton
held that it should be the calendar year, keeping the
economic planning debate away from the budget debate.(36)
This opposition to the integration of different aspects
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of economic policy reflected both Dalton's
'departmentalist' approach to economic policy, (37) and
the opposition of Treasury officials to a link between
budget policy and broad aims of economic policy. The MEP
discussion on the 1946 Economic Survey provides evidence
that the Treasury under Dalton was not yet 'Keynesian'.
II
The early discussions on economic planning show that the
new Labour government faced the kind of uncertainties and
difficulties in the transitional period that had been
anticipated in wartime. The prognostications of
officials, conveyed in the report of the Economic Survey
working party, did not underestimate the problems that
the government had to face, although the 1946 Economic
Survey was hurriedly prepared. (3S) Several departments
indicated that their returns were provisional. For
example, the Ministry of Fuel and Power stated that
without an ambitious recruiting programme to get more
miners its returns were a 'pious hope,.(39) Also, the
Survey was drawn up before the completion of the loan
negotiations with the United States; so, on the balance
of payments it was possible to make only the 'estimates
deemed advisable' at that stage in the negotiations; (40)
proposals for the import programme were made on the basis
of pessimistic assumptions about the outcome of the
talks, a decision justified by events.
With their report to ministers the officials submitted
a set of 'Planning considerations', divided simply into
measures to increase or to allocate resources. (41) The
two main ways in which resources could be increased in
the short term were higher imports or increases in the
total labour supply available for civilian production.
On higher imports, the officials were adamant that any
attempt 'to enlarge supplies by means of overseas
borrowing, even if practicable, is largely to be
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avoided,.(42) In theory, yet more Sterling Area debt
could be built up, but the officials suggested that
import programmes should be tailored to the requirement
of equilibrium in the external balance of current
payments (excluding military commitments) by mid-
1947.(43) As for increasing resources through expanding
the labour supply it was pointed out that the forecasts
in the Survey already embodied some assumptions that
might require action to make them valid: for example,
keeping more women in the workforce and ensuring that
unemployment did
depressed areas.
not continue to develop in the former
(This was the problem of 'patches' of
unemployment developing during reconversion. Although
unemployment overall was at a very low level of 2%, there
were spots where unemployment was already much higher,
e.g. in Wales it was at 9%). While both these policies
would increase national income to some extent, the
overall gap between requirements and supplies was still
very large.(44) In short, the 1946 Economic Survey report
held out little hope of increasing resources through
higher imports or a larger total labour supply. Therefore
the officials recommended reductions in the government's
current expenditure, especially the armed forces, through
faster demobilisation. This would allow an increase in
national income and, insofar as overseas expenditure was
involved, any reduction would also help the balance of
payments. Expenditure on the armed forces included an
element for supplies, and here the officials suggested
that use of stocks and postponement of re-equipment would
allow further releases of labour and raw materials and
productive capacity.(45)
On exports the report advised: 'It would be dangerous
deliberately to lower the export target', although it was
admitted that the attainment of the export target
provided 'a most difficult administrative problem and
achievement of the target will continue to
problematical as long as there is a large volume of
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unsatisfied home demand'. Here the official planners saw
a dilemma: any attempt to restrict supplies for domestic
consumption would have unavoidable and complex reactions
on exports, because there were few 'pure' export
industries; therefore it was difficult to withhold
resources from the production of goods for domestic
consumption and transfer them to the production of
exports. (46) Besides, it was pointed out that government
controls were at their weakest in restraining domestic
consumption directly, except in the fields of food and
clothing, where programming and rationing were still
relatively complete. Furthermore, 'Measures to control
supply may be impossible effectively to operate against a
background of free labour movement and will do nothing
to effect an equitable distribution'. In the light of
this, the officials placed some emphasis on the use of
fiscal measures to restrain personal consumption outside
the elements of consumption demand already controlled by
rationing. (47) But, in general, any large cuts in
personal consumption contained the danger of damaging
incentives to work as well as the possibility of indirect
adverse effects on exports. Therefore the report
recommended a policy of holding steady the current levels
of personal consumption in key areas under government
control, rather than making a modest increase, as had
been assumed previously in adding up the requirements for
1946.(48)
Another point at which restraint could be exercised
was over private and public capital investment. It was
specifically pointed out that the housing programme was
the major part of the public outlay and, as was shown in
the last chapter, there were already severe doubts about
the scale and practicality of this programme. (49) The
1946 Survey report argued that, 'At a time when demands
for current supplies are so very urgent, the case for
postponing long-term projects is strong, particularly
when an easier situation can be foreseen in the not-too-
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distant future. On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true
that in many parts of the economy restoration of supplies
to the levels, and at prices, assumed will not be
possible unless a substantial amount of deferred capital
expenditure is undertaken'. However, the officials
recommended that a 10% overall cut would probably not
damage essential capital needs.(50) The report accepted
that in reconstruction planning a building programme had
been adopted which set a target for the build-up of the
labour force in the building and civil engineering
industries to a point above their 1939 level by the end
of 1946, and this figure had not been altered by the
Labour government. This ambitious target was cennected
with the housing programme in particular, but also
involved war damage repairs, work in the development
areas (e.g. factory building and infrastructure) and many
activities 'conducive to industrial efficiency'.
'Nevertheless', the report concluded, 'the question may
be raised whether we should build up the building labour
force so quickly as these figures assume'. (51)
The general conclusion of the 'Planning
considerations' in the 1946 Economic Survey report was
that closing the gap would require a number of actions;
no single element of national income could 'bear the
whole brunt of the reduction needed to close the gap
between target national income and expenditure,.(52) It
was also pointed out that in the absence of government
action to close the gap it be closed by haphazard
distribution; but the officials thought that the
recommendations in the report should, if followed, secure
the government's main priorities. A version of the
report was first discussed by ministers as early as
September 1945 at the Lord President's committee, where
the continuity with wartime practice was stressed,
because it was called the '7th Economic Survey,.(53)
Dalton summed up simply: there was a need to increase
exports, to cut imports and reduce military expenditure
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overseas. Ministerial discussions came to a head in
early 1946, and the minutes of the MEP committee show
that ministers placed the main stress on manpower policy.
Dalton said that the 1946 Survey revealed a conflict
between military and reconstruction priorities, and he
proposed that drastic cuts should be made in the armed
forces, stating that a decision on this was vital.(54)
Broadly speaking, ministers accepted the arguments in
the officials' report. A significant exception was the
contention that too many resources were being committed
to the building programme. Morrison's political adviser
E.M. Nicholson wrote to him on 18/1/46: "Any suggestion
that the building programme might be slowed up could not
possibly be defended in Parliament and must be resisted".
Morrison noted his agreement in the margin of the letter.
(55) Two main lines of attack on the problem were
adopted: reducing the armed forces faster, and reviewing
the level of investment.(56) Thus the ministers accepted
the main policy recommendations of the officials.
III
During the 1947 convertibility crisis a criticism often
made was that there had been a lack of planning in 1946,
and that the government had allowed the crisis to develop
unchecked. The argument was developed most coherently by
Roy Harrod in Are these hardships necessary. He charged
that ambitious programmes had been started 'without a
proper calculation of whether our own saving plus the
foreign credits would suffice to see them through,.(57)
His main criticism concerned 'excess c~pital outlay', but
it was also an important part of his argument that the
government had failed to plan the spending of the Loans.
Was there any truth in this? Half-yearly import
programmes were drawn up by the Treasury and
by various committees before being





Treasury control over foreign exchange probably ensured
tighter central control over imports than over most other
aspects of economic policy at this time. True, there was
some criticism of the machinery for controlling imports
thought that the Treasury's technique of
Meade
import
when this was first discussed at the end of 1945.
programming was a 'hole and corner'
this criticism was concerned more
affair. However,
with a desire to
integrate economic policy as a whole than a fear that the
Treasury was squandering foreign exchange. (59)
The principles on which the import programmes for 1946
were based do not support the idea that there was a lack
of planning. For the first half of 1946 a 'neutral'
import programme was drawn up, holding the different
aspects of imports steady. In the event, imports for the
first half of 1946 were less than programmed, due to a
world shortage of food supplies and a steel strike in the
United States. In the second half year the import
programme began to take account of the coming problems of
convertibility. The Treasury was insistent that trade
must be balanced by mid-1947 (i.e. by the time of
convertibility), except for military requirements. (60)
Did anything happen during 1946, after the Loan had been
agreed, to change the situation? In July 1946 the MEP
considered the dollar import programme to be followed if
the United States finally approved the Loan, and it
agreed to buy some extra food, tobacco, raw materials,
and petrol. More fruit was to be imported, to add variety
to the national diet. The increase in imports was small
($40m on top of the $55Om food import programme), and was
judged to be justified by the success so far in the
export programme.(61) This is hardly evidence that the
government squandered the loans. On the import side,
then, it appears that Harrod's case is not really upheld.
There was planning of imports, and the problem of what to
buy with the US and Canadian LoanSwas taken into account.
It is ironic that in 1947 the government came under
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attack for 'squandering' the dollar loan; in 1946 it was
criticised in the press for not providing enough freedom
of choice of imported consumer goods, especially those
that involved dollar expenditure. Newspaper proprietors
were not disinterested, because they were pressing for
more imports of newsprint. Ministers' frustration about
press criticisms is vividly illustrated by the following
quotation from the minutes of the Lord President's
committee: "It would be worth pointing out to the
newspaper proprietors that they ought not to use the
additional space which larger dollar imports of newsprint
would give them to criticise the government for not
importing larger quantities of other dollar commodities,
such as petrol". It was also suggested that newspaper
proprietors themselves should be pressed to give the
public 'greater freedom of choice,.(62)
On the export side there was no formal export
programme; rather, there was a series of informal
agreements about 'export ratios' which were based on the
policy agreed before the end of the war. At first there
was no attempt to direct exports to any particular
country, the aim was to provide at least a 'trickle' of
all types of commodities for export to all markets,
rather than to create any priorities about what to export
and where to export to.(63) As mentioned above in
connection with changes in the import programme, the
government was at first pleased with the progress being
made, which was better than expected. In October 1946
the picture began to change. Dalton informed the MEP
that the US and Canadian credits were being spent too
fast, and that serious difficulties would be created as a
result of sterling becoming convertible before other
'soft' currencies. Morrison's view was that, "the
situation was extremely serious and unless it was dealt
with adequately, there was a risk that the country would
be faced with a disaster comparable to that of 1931".(64)
The MEP's subsequent discussion on exports marked a
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turning point in policy. A provisional export target was
set, and it was agreed to examine the structure of
exports, because exporters were running into raw
materials problems. Also, the question was raised as to
whether there should be guidance of exports to particular
countries. An official Working Party on the Guidance of
Exports was set up to 'consider all questions arising in
relation to the implementation of the policy of expanding
UK exports to certain 'hard' currency markets'. Thus,
well before the convertibility crisis, the government set
about tackling the balance of payments problem that could
be foreseen. In these first discussions of export
guidance an issue arose which was to have long-term
significance in the attempt to apply techniques of
economic planning to export policy. Rootes motors wanted
extra steel allocations for the production of MG Midget
sports-cars which, it was thought, would be a success in
the US market.(65) There were several problems here:
Steel was in very short supply, and there were many
competing demands. Could the government be sure, if it
allocated the steel, that the firm would have the success
it expected? The difficulty was that the government would
have to decide on a question of commercial judgement.
Moreover, other firms would inevitably complain that they
had been treated inequitably.
Whatever the difficulties, the evidence from the
records of import and export policy during 1946 show that
the government did apply central planning techniques to
imports, and kept a close eye on export policy. Of all
the aspects of economic planning, the calculation of how
to spend the dollar loans was probably the most carefully
scrutinised, and most effectively controlled. What became
clear later was that the use of these dollars as the date
of sterling convertibility approached was not completely
under the control of the British government, but the
convertibility crisis of 1947 does not bear out Harrod's
argument that there had been a lack of planning in the
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government's own dollar expenditure. If there was a lack
of planning it concerned the failure to deal effectively
with various symptoms of inflationary pressure in the
domestic economy.
IV
According to the 1946 Economic Survey the most effective
way of increasing the national income as a whole, and
thereby reducing the inflationary pressures of the
transitional period, was to cut the armed forces and
supply industries at a faster rate. On this issue,
foreign and defence policies intersected with the
byproblems of economic planning, and it was dealt with
Cabinet committees on Defence and Manpower Requirements,
chaired by Attlee and Bevin respectively. The Defence
committee had to deal with the argument put forward by
the Service chiefs, that faster demobilisation would
require a reduction of foreign policy commitments; either
that, or assumptions had to be made that existing
commitments would not entail a use of military power.
Here the Chiefs of Staff stressed the uncertainty of the
short-term outlook.(66) For their part, ministers argued
that a balance had to be struck between the extent to
which Britain's future prosperity depended upon a
clearing up the international situation in the coming
year or upon an additional build-up of productive
capacity. Bevin expressed concern about the world
situation, but in Dalton's view: 'The whole picture of
defence manpower and expenditure appeared out of scale,
and if there was no quick drop, particularly abroad, in
the expenditure, he could not promise anything but
economic disaster. ,(67)
It was agreed in January 1946 that the armed forces
should be cut faster. New ceilings were fixed for the
armed forces on the assumption that there would be no
trouble in India or Palestine. This would have reduced
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the projected manpower gap in the 1946 Economic Survey to
600,000 as against the original gap of over 1.3m.(68)
After the decision on defence cuts a 'reassuring' picture
emerged, (69) and this was the basis of the government's
subsequent optimism about inflationary pressure, which
had a particularly strong effect on the question of the
investment review recommended by officials, which is
discussed below. A crucial limitation of the proposed
cuts, however, was that the biggest reductions were
scheduled for the second half of 1946, so the economic
effects were bound to be delayed.(70) Growing problems in
Palestine, India and the Far East, and commitments to the
occupation of Germany were the main reasons for
resistance to implementing the cuts earlier. During 1946
the cuts were progressively scaled down. (71) It is not
possible to say what contribution this made to the
subsequent problems of inflationary pressure and the
Table 1.















Source: Feinstein, C.H. National income, expenditure and
output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965, 1972, Table 57.
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balance of payments, but on this point the government
clearly did not follow a very important aspect of the
1946 Economic Survey policy.
The difficulties caused by any shortfall in the total
labour supply available for civilian production were
exacerbated by having no means, once the use of labour
direction was discarded, of achieving a better
distribution of labour between industries, especially in
some key industries: mining, textiles, building and
agriculture. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Food
had opposed the immediate scrapping of labour controls,
but also argued that there was an urgent·need for some
kind of wages policy. (72) This indicates the close
connection between the waning of labour controls and the
rise of wages policy. There were, however, several major
problems with the use of wage incentives to redistribute
the labour force. The wage differentials required to
correct the 'maldistribution' could upset traditional
differentials, and might threaten a wage price spiral.
Also there were few ways for the government to alter the
price of labour in private industries in order to
distribute labour in conformity with its priorities. To
the Economic Section wage incentives were the only





effective way to solve labour 'maldistribution'.
'if coalminers were paid like millionaires, even
servants might be induced to go down the
Wartime experience supported the idea that labour could
be redistributed quickly by relative wage changes: most
wartime recruitment had been voluntary. But there was
always the fear that raising wages could lead to general
inflation, and this was clearly a strong possibility in
the transitional period when the level of monetary demand
(or, at least, potential demand) remained high, while the
support for controls was waning. The Economic Section
speculated about wage rises linked with the price index,
and about the possibility of reductions in some wages to
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offset increases in others.(73) But there were more
fundamental issues: in the prevailing circumstances of
rationing and scarcity, if people had higher wages would
they simply work fewer hours? It was estimated that by the
end of 1945, average working hours had returned to the
pre-war 1eve1.
Ministers and officials nevertheless discussed wages
policy thoughout 1946. A sub-committee of the ED
committee produced a report recommending against any
state fixing of wages, though recognising a need for
radical changes in wage-fixing in an era of full
employment. This was virtually an echo of the
recommendations of the 1944 report of the Committee on
Post-war
this line.
Employment and Ministers broadly agreed with
At this stage, nobody advocated compulsory
wage fixing by the state, though there was a general
feeling that the government would probably have to
intervene future. (74)
(ml,," .. ,..f ~I q,ntt 1b,..r) ofin the Shlnwell~wan~ed a policy
minimum wages in low-paid industries, higher wages in
'unattractive' industries and a principle that wage rises
must be accompanied by productivity increases (this
latter point was basic to nearly every discussion of the
question, but not the former two points). Morrison was
more cautious, wanting a period of public education after
which he hoped trade unions and employers would welcome
increased guidance from the government. For the
immediate future the LPC accepted Isaacs' proposal for a
consultative 'National Industrial Conference', which was
duly held on 17th July 1946.(75)
After this conference the LPC again discussed wages
policy. A further report from the official working party
was considered, in which it was predicted that there
would be slow-down in wage rises, and a period of
stability, as the post-war round of bargaining came to an
end. There were some 'threatening' rises, but the
Minister of Labour felt that on the whole trade unions
had been less ruthless in taking advantage of labour
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shortages to raise wages than employers had been in
cutting wages during unemployment before the war. Once
again the discussion came round to the view that there
would have to be 'positive' intervention in wage fixing,
but it was agreed that a public statement should be made
stressing government non-intervention. Cripps
nevertheless insisted that there was a need to break with
the rigid wage pattern of the past which in his view was
'incompatible with the existing economic situation,.(76)
Thus, both labour controls and wages policy were found
to be inadequate general solutions to the restructuring
of the labour force in the prevailing inflationary
conditions. Both were politically unacceptable and
unenforceable. Raising wages to get people into
industries, although it had been successful during the
war, was seen as potentially inflationary as well as
probably ineffective. Two other avenues were explored~
the first was to control the distribution of consumption
goods in such a way that higher earnings would be made
effective in some key industries. The other was
generally to 'disinflate' the economy by financial means
so that relative wage changes could work without
threatening inflation. The investigation into ways of
providing workers with incentives arose out of the
deliberations of the Lord President's committee, and was
centred on mining, which was the most important supply
bottleneck to break. Could some way be found to induce
miners to work longer hours, and to reduce absenteeism?
Shinwell believed that a wider range of consumer goods
available in mining areas, for example apples and other
non-rationed goods, would achieve this. There were
doubts, but it was agreed to set up a special committee
to look into incentive schemes.(77)
Before examining the incentives discussion, a brief
digression on the problems of the mining industry is in
order. At the very first meeting of the Lord President's
Committee under Labour there was a discussion about the
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prospective deficit in the coal budget.(78) In October
1945 Morrison told the LPC that the coal problem had to
be tackled with the 'utmost vigour' .(79) The records of
the LPC show Morrison pressing time after time for
action. The Minister of Fuel and Power, Shinwell,
replied time after time that matters were getting
better.(80) On one occasion, in fact, it was minuted that
Shinwell had done much to halt the decline of output that
had become a feature of the industry,(81) but this was
false optimism. Many different possible solutions to the
coal problem were examined in the LPC discussions(82) but
none was without difficulties. At first it was hoped
that more machinery could be applied in pits or in open-
cast mining; however, the opportunities for this were
limited; in one case an ambitious scheme for new open
cast mining ran into environmental objections, (83) and
there were problems with the open-cast mining machinery
itself. (84) It was hoped that the prospect of
nationalisation would transform labour relations in the
industry, but there was little sign of this.(85) Indeed
the recently-formed NUM wanted reforms which the
government feared would lead to a lower output from the
existing labour force. At the same time there were ever-
rising demands for power which were very difficult to
control. (86) Furthermore, with the transport system in a
run-down state it was a problem to ensure that existing
stocks were distributed to users.(87) What the campaign
to increase supplies of coal came down to in the end was
the need to persuade the existing workforce to work
longer hours, or to persuade other workers to join the
industry.
This was where the 'incentives to production' scheme
came in. It was proposed that a list of 'priority'
areas, industries or groups of workers should be drawn
up, and that extra rations should be delivered to the
areas in which those workers lived, or that 'luxury'
goods should be displayed in canteens. (The 'extra
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rations' were scarce foods like fresh fruit. The 'luxury
goods' were consumer durables like radios and bicycles).
It was suggested that workers with good output records
Trade,
might
could earn a priority certificate which would entitle
them to buy luxury goods displayed in canteens. (88)
These proposals aroused fierce opposition. The Board of
in reply to a request for a list of goods that
be used for incentive purposes, argued that to
include prams (a luxury good) would be an unacceptable
of social discrimination, and the officialform
respondent wrote: "I know you will
implying that I regard this scheme
not take this list as
••• as a fruitful
problems". (89) Themethod of overcoming these •••
Ministry of Food questioned the fairness of treating one
group of workers as an elite, objecting to the inclusion
of jam and other rationed foods in the list of 'extra
rations,.(90) A principle of Fair Shares had been laid
down very firmly during the war; moreover, one of the
principles for the operation of controls agreed in the
reonstruction discussion was that Fair Shares would
continue to operate in conditions of post-war scarcity.
The Ministry of Labour also denounced the idea of
providing incentives through the redirection of goods as
'psychologically unsound'. Indeed, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the whole incentives discussion
was viewed with contempt by the offiCials involved. The
upshot of the incentives discussion was that a 'crude and
was adopted, for the mining areas
goods would be diverted to mining areas
where, because of the geographical isolation of mining
communities, it could be guaranteed that extra goods
would be exchanged for miners wages rather than
satisfying more general demand. Since it was inevitable
that it would become known that this diversion was taking
place, it was proposed in the LPC that an announcement
should be made that miners had previously been getting




Above all, this discussion indicates the lack of room
to manoeuvre that the government felt in 1946 when
tackling key bottlenecks. 'Surely anything is worth
trying' , was the despairing comment made by Chantler of
the Economic Section, in the face of the criticisms of
the incentive schemes. (93) Discussions in the LPC had a
similar air of desperation. As in wartime the Lord
President's committee was the centre of week-to-week
consideration of economic policy, and there were monthly
reviews of stock statistics provided by the Central
month about the
so ministers were reminded every
difficult stocks position and the
Statistical Office,
critical state of coal production. Yet there was an air
of paralysis: bizarre discussions about the relation
between the re-opening of greyhound tracks and miners'
absenteeism, and fulminations against minor 'inessential'
use of labour and raw materials replaced the drive to
attack the fundamental problems.(94) The conclusion
must be that the government made a major mistake in not
switching its energies to tackling the problems of
allocation once it found it impossible to improve the
outlook for supplies. The 'crude and quick' measures
probably made very little difference to supplies, and had
the disadvantage that they stirred up doubts and
dissensions among officials and ministers. But, the idea
was firmly implanted that the aim of economic planning
was expansion, so all the effort went in this direction,





arising from the 1946 Economic Survey
government agreed that investment
scrutinised. The officials had
recommended a 10% overall cut, and an Investment Working
Party under the official Economic Development committee
looked into this question. (95) The scrutiny resulted in
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the re-iteration of a number of arguments familiar from
wartime discussions, pointing to the difficulties of
central co-ordination and implementation of investment
control. Chief among these were that investment projects
initiated by central government would be the easiest to
control, and that local authority and private investment
could be restrained only crudely by building controls.
The Treasury suggested to the IWP that "for most purposes
a clear division may be drawn between the 'physical'
aspects and the financial aspects of investment. It is
further assumed that the physical side will be the
principal preoccupation of the Investment Working Party".
This example of Treasury isolationism piqued some members
of the Economic Section, but otherwise there was little
energy in the 1946 investment review.(96) Following the
Cabinet's decision to cut the armed forces more quickly,
ministers believed that inflationary pressure would be
relieved without cuts in investment. (97) When the
Ministerial Economic Planning committee considered the
control of investment in April 1946 it was said that the
first version of the 1946 Economic Survey had exaggerated
the manpower gap, and the committee would therefore want
to 'wait and see' about investment cuts.(98) During the
official scrutiny of investment the Ministry of Labour
commented: 'A review of the current manpower pOSition,
which shows increases on the supply side and reductions
on the requirements side, suggests that there is now no
need for cutting investment in 1946 at all,.(99)
Another combination of expectations which worked
against the idea of investment cuts was that the
transitional period would quickly turn into recession,
and that it would prove to be difficult in practice to
stimulate reflationary investment. At this time the
Economic Section were still busy studying how to
stimulate the economy in the event of a recession. (100)
A recession in the United States economy was seen as the
main danger. Economic controls there had been quickly
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scrapped after the war. Output, prices and employment
were all rising, and there were 'remarkable' increases in
consumption of non-durables. A.J. Brown of the Economic
Section reported that deflation seemed some way off, but
concluded: "Prospects for full employment in the long-
run, without a great change in the extent of government
are not very bright". (101) J.C.R. Dow alsointervention,
wrote a paper about the possible magnitude of a future
depression, stressing the historical instability of the
US economy. (102)
There was, then, an expectation of recession, but
wartime studies had revealed the administrative and





private and public investment, and these
during 1945 by D.N. Chester's studies on
local and
investment, showing how decentralised decision-making was
for most public investment. (103) These expectations
affected ministerial decisions on investment projects
coming up for consideration in 1946. There was the
possibility of putting some projects on a 'shelf', ready
to take up the slack in any recession; but if nothing was
done to get projects actually underway, then they might
only reinforce inflationary pressures in the next phase
of the economic cycle, rather than contributing to
reflation. On this argument it seemed to be prudent to
allow some projects to go ahead even if insufficient
resources were available to carry them forward rapidly in
the short-term. Not that it would be accurate to suggest
that ministers ignored the fact that the economy was
currently short of resources and highly inflationary.
For example, it was agreed that only projects which were
most economically justifiable should be given the green
light.(104) Also, in line with official studies it was
seen as particularly important to keep a firm hand on
those investment projects over which the central
government had direct control. To this end, Morrison
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argued that road-building plans should not be publicly
announced because
flexibility,.(105)




reinforced each other: thus there was a decision to go
ahead with the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Scheme,
rather than to put it on the 'shelf', because of the need
to increase electricity supplies; this scheme clearly had
important implications for regional development as
well. (106) In other cases the justification for going
ahead was not so clear: it was agreed to proceed with the
project for the Forth road bridge because Scottish
feeling could not be ignored, even though the economic
arguments for it were thought to be not strong.(107)
Another important factor working against the idea of
investment cuts was the fear of a re-emergence of
regional unemployment. It will be recalled that the 1944
report of the Committee on Post-war Employment placed
great stress on the building houses, factories and
infrastructure in the former depressed areas, both as a
means of providing employment and of restoring a balanced
community. In 1945 an Economic Section writer commented
that insufficient action had been taken on distribution
of industry policy to solve the pre-war problem of
structural unemployment. (108) Also, as early as June
1946, while reconversion was still going on, Harold
Macmillan criticised, in Parliament, an 'alarming rise in
unemployment', by which he meant the emergence of patches
of unemployment in former black-spots such as South Wales
and Scotland. (109) To tackle this problem, which the
government took very seriously, a complex set of
difficulties had to be faced. For a start, there was a
lack of skilled building labour in the Development Areas,
even though structural unemployment was reappearing.(110)
In the LPC it was suggested that only a limited amount of
people in the development areas could be employed on
building,(lll) yet it was clear that a lack of
infrastructure was one of the major factors in creating
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the regional economic imbalance.
government had to take action
Paradoxically, the
to overcome labour
formershortages and redistribute resources to the
depressed areas even though they were again experiencing
significant unemployment. Dalton, who played a leading
role in regional policy during the reconstruction
discussions, argued that unless the machinery for dealing
with problems of the Development Areas was improved there
would be a repetition of the inter-war pattern of
unemployment. (112) It was therefore agreed to set up a
special sub-committee of the LPC to deal with
distribution of industry questions, which involved it in
such problems as uneven distribution of raw materials,
affecting Scotland in particular.(113) Generally, in the
South of Britain there was not enough labour to match the
available supplies of raw materials, whereas in Scotland
the reverse was the case, and this was seen as the main
factor leading to a higher level of unemployment
there.(114) A panel set up by this committee was, for a
some time, the only ministerial committee regularly
scrutinising investment projects. Since its main purpose
was to encourage investment in the Development Areas
while holding back projects in areas of labour shortage,
this was a cause for irritation among officials who
wanted reductions in overall investment.
The government therefore took a strong line on
regional policy, but economic advisers and other
officials who wanted to deflate the global total of
investment had little sympathy with this priority. An
Economic Section study on reconversion in the regions,
written in 1946, was dubious about directing more
materials into the Development Areas, arguing that labour
mobility away from them was 'the only immediate
solution,.(115) Thus, there were signs of a retreat by
officials from the view that had been so firmly stated in
the recontruction discussions, that a determined policy
would be needed to prevent the resurgence of the pre-war
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pattern of regional unemployment. All this underlines
the fact that unemployment, even in a time of severe
inflationary pressure, was still regarded as one of the
main problems of economic policy, though at this time it
was seen through the prism of regional policy. The
general difficulty was that what was needed to make a
more even distribution of materials, and hence of
employment in the longer-term, were bound to intensify
the problems of inflationary pressure in the short-term.
These problems were manifest in an acute form in the
building programme, which was central to investment and
regional policies. There were shortages
materials and delays in carrying through




Survey the problems of the building programme were
thought to be particularly complex, and perhaps
intractable. ~e area of difficulty that had been
identified before the end of the war was the possibility
that controls could not prevent resources from escaping
into less essential types of building. This fear was
confirmed soon after the end of the war: there were early
signs of a black market in building materials. In
Birmingham the housing authority was "said to be short of
labour, while contractors have both the labour and the
materials required for black market operations". (116)
The situation was made worse than it might have been by
an elementary planning blunder: the massive planned
expansion of the construction labour force was not
matched by a planned expansion of the building materials
industries. This was pointed out by D.N. Chester in
October 1945 (117) (Earlier, in 1944, a Ministry of
Production report on reconversion had estimated that in
mid-1944 the building materials industries were operating
at less than 60% of the 1938 level, and that there was a
'substantial gap' to be bridged, but little appears to
have been done about it.)(118) Chester claimed to
Morrison that the Economic Section had already complained
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about this error. In any event, it was to cost the
government a lot of effort in 1946, when emergency
measures had to be taken to try to expand the building
materials industries, and ensure an orderly distribution
of resources.
There were also shortfalls in general building labour.
This led to many discussions about labour control in the
Lord President's Comadttee in 1945-6. It was suggested
that Essential Work Orders (to keep people on a job)
should be used for the most urgent work. But there was
disagreement about where the problem lay; some said it
would be better to have improved machinery for deciding
competing claims for labour (e.g. factories vs houses
within the building programme), rather than use labour
controls. Besides, there were doubts about whether EWO's
would work in practice. (119) However, finally it was
agreed to use them for particular housing and factory
schemes. (120) It was also agreed to set up new central
machinery for the building programme: a Ministry of
Works 'HQ' committee was set up to co-ordinate the
building and civil engineering programme. (121) But these
measures could not solve all the problems of the building
programme. The shortages were too numerous. Indeed, it
was sometimes argued that there was little point in
taking extraordinary measures to get labour into the
building industry when there was such a shortage of
materials that workers would have a very low level of
productivity. Lack of bricks and other building
materials, of steel, of timber, of castings, of oils and
paints, all took a toll of productivity in the building
programme, despite the efforts that were made to overcome
them. (122) These problems were compounded by the fact
that there was a form of 'licence inflation' in the
building programme during 1946, which was the result of
the issue of building licences without due heed to their
impact on total resources. Shortages, the black market,
planning blunders and licence inflation had the result
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that far more buildings were started than could be
completed in a reasonable period. (123) The situation in
the building programme, in short, was a symptom of
general inflationary pressure, and indicates that the
ministers were too sanguine when they decided, at the
beginning of 1946, that the measures they had agreed
would reduce inflationary pressure and obviate the need
for investment cuts.
The building programme was not the only part of the
economy to experience 'licence inflation', something very
similar happened in steel, where the relationship between
supplies and allocations got out of control by the end of
1946. At the end of war there was an optimistic report
from the Ministry of Supply, claiming, "steel is now in
adequate supply over a large part of the field".(124) But
by mid-1946 it was clear that a number of problems were
developing. Domestic output of steel was about equal to
the average in the 1930's, but overall requirements were
increasing while imports were very scarce, mainly because
of strikes in the United States. In this situation it







departments were no longer steering deliveries, and the
market now consisted of a large number of small users,
whereas in wartime departments had dealt mainly with
large users who then passed their allocations of steel to





'M-form' system, which licensed the end-use
Some were in favour of a looser system of
for example a broad allocation to whole




government would not be able to secure
it required if the M-form system was
variety of end-uses made the licensing
system harder to operate, but not all end-uses had equal
priority. (125) By the end of 1946, just before the next
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round of steel allocations, Frank Lee, permanent
secretary to the Ministry of Supply was insisting that
there was 'no short cut' to solving the problems of steel
supply. True, in a letter to Brook at this time Lee also
said that the general situation was improving, but he
cautioned that there was little hope of any relief from
imports of steel, and there was a possibility that
planned allocations would have to be cut. It was agreed
that Morrison should be informed 'in general terms about
the difficulties which seem to lie ahead' .(126) What
emerged later was that the steel allocations system had
virtually broken down, and the combination of supply
problems and 'licence inflation' was to be a major
headache in the following year.
In general, then, the government did not succeed in
closing the 'real' gap in resources which had been
calculated in the 1946 Economic Survey. For various
reasons it did not manage to increase the total resources
available, and it also failed to take a firm grip on the
problems of allocation which developed as a result. In
the context of the developing steel shortage R.S. Sayers
of the Economic Section made the following general
comment:
'••• although the problems of control vary, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that the need for
tightening various controls does have one common
origin: we have put the label "Essential" on too
many objectives. We have to ration coal, timber,
building materials, steel and (in effect)
aluminium, and for all of them every use seems to
be linked with some general commitment - housing
policy, the export drive, etc ••• Is not the common
root of much of the trouble an excess of total
money demand for consumption plus
investment plus government service? Would not the
specific problems all be eased if some general




This type of argument, for control of monetary demand
through financial policy, was an important theme of
economic advice during 1946, and was essentially
to find expression in the
presented as an alternative to tightening up controls,
which the government had certainly been reluctant to do.
The earliest serious discussion of inflationary pressure
took place in July 1946, the main analysis being made by
Meade. After discussion of Meade's paper it was agreed
to examine the cost of living index and the prospects for
reducing subsidies appreciably in 1947. This accorded
with Keynes~ advice to prepare 'very secretly and behind
the scenes' to let prices rise.(128) There was a study of
the effects of subsidies and purchase tax policy on the
cost of living.(129) Revision of the Retail Price Index
was discussed, but nothing was done because it was feared
that any revision would show a rise, and this would
possibly lead to wage pressure in itself.(130) Nothing
much came of any proposals for financial disinflation in
1946, but Meade's paper was used again for the 1947
Budget. His arguments for disinflation are worth
considering in more detail. He began with the point
that, since 1940, the essential bulwark against
inflationary pressure had been direct controls over
expenditure, especially price controls. Even in the
absence of rationing or licensing these effectively
limited total expenditure: 'Those at the head of the
queue who are lucky enough to find any of the price
controlled goods obtain their supplies, while those at
the tail of the queue have to take their money home to
invest in savings certificates'. The alternative would be
to bring the total demand for goods into balance with the
total supply of goods by a fiscal policy, instead of
continuing to dam up demand.(131) Meade thought, in
1946, that this would mean allowing the supply of goods
(especially consumption goods) to increase, without
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reducing taxation. Other techniques could also be used,
such as temporary high rates of purchase tax on selected
goods, to deter some types of consumption (this was later
attempted with electrical goods to try to reduce the
increase in domestic demand for electricity for space
heating and cooking).
Meade gave several reasons for decreasing the reliance
on direct controls. First, price controls were weakening
anyway, with consequent dangers of queues and black
markets. Second, if consumers could not find the goods
they wanted this would be a disincentive to produce,
since additional monetary income would be useless. Third,
'So long as more or less rigid price control is necessary
••• it will be very difficult to bring about ••• changes
in the economic structure'. If there was an increase of
prices and wages in one industry, the demands from other
industries might be irresistable in the prevailing
conditions of overall excess demand, possibly leading to
general inflation. Meade saw this as a 'most serious
obstacle' to planning in a free society. Finally, there
was the 'pure economic cost of managing affairs through
the administrative machine rather than by making some use
of the price mechanism', together with the possibility of
a 'undesirable reaction against the whole idea of State
planning'. (He thought it would be interesting to know
'what proportion of the increase of more than one quarter
of a million in the whole-time non-industrial staff of
the National Government between 1939 and 1946 might be
attributed to this sort of cause,.)(132)
Later in 1946 the argument for a more active financial
policy reappeared in the planning machinery through the
report of a working party chaired by Bernard Gilbert, on
'Wages and prices policy and means of carrying out
planning decisions~ In this report inflationary pressure
was seen as the main problem, and Gilbert's working party
saw it as extremely important to get the pressure down in
order that normal market forces, e.g. wage incentives to
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redistribute labour, could come into operation. It was
firmly stated, however, that wage policy could not
replace labour controls "as a means of implementing
planning decisions, particularly in the prevailing
conditions of inflationary pressure". The general
conclusion was that planning would have to be limited to
influencing the economy through gradual changes; this
required a long-term approach, using mainly financial
instruments once the immediate shortages were past.(133)
In pressing these financial policies it seems clear
with hindsight that members of the Economic Section and
the Treasury were trying to see over the horizon rather
than concentrating on the problems immediately in front
of the government. Arguably, the financial policies that
were advanced could not have worked in the existing
circumstances. Certainly,
to scale down some of
they required the government
its political objectives,
particularly those that involved heavy public investment.
Outside critics such as Harrod advocated this latter
course, and inside advisers were more or less explicit
about it. Certainly, one does not find that economic
advisers told ministers that they should establish a firm
hand over fuel and steel allocations although the signs
that crisis was brewing in these areas were clear, and
the government later had to act. Instead, the argument
that market forces should be re-established as soon as
possible grew stronger as the problems grew greater,
albeit this view was clothed in some of the jargon of
planning.
It would be wrong, though, to suggest that ministers
really wanted to strengthen controls but were somehow
prevented from doing so by officials. Their lack of
determination on this point was shown as early as the
Autumn of 1945, and they were probably afraid that a
firmer use of controls would be a politically unpopular
move, which was undoubtedly true in the case of labour
controls. In the 1945 election campaign economic
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planning had been sold as an expansionist policy which
would be used to carry through reconstruction plans. In
terms of the analysis presented in the 1946 Economic
Survey, however, there was a trade-off between the scale
of the armed forces and the general labour available for
manufacturing and building. Events proved that the
optimism which followed the January 1946 decision to
speed up demobi1isation was not justified, but the
government did not switch its effort to reducing total
demand or ensuring orderly distribution. To the extent
that the government retreated from cutting the armed
forces, as it did, then effective economic planning
required that conflicts between domestic objectives be
resolved by some combination of scaling down other
programmes and tightening controls. If this was not
done, the government clearly risked the possibility of
haphazard distribution. Possibly they preferred to take
this risk rather than make further unpopular restrictive
moves. The risk did not seem as great at the time as it
does with hindsight because of the strong belief - common
to most ministers and officials - that recession was
imminent. The consequences of advocating the replacement
of controls by financial policies and ignoring the
warning symptoms of inflationary pressure would have been
less drastic if this expectation had been proved correct.
As it was, the failure to prepare against possible crises
was particularly disastrous in the short-run.
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Chapter 4
1947: THE ECONOMIC SURVEY AND THE FUEL CRISIS
The publication of the Economic Survey for 1947(1) was
intended to be a great step forward in the policy of
economic planning. Its keynote was the need for co-
operation between the public and the government in the
achievement of economic aims, and the government hoped
that it would be the start of the democratic planning
which the Labour Party had been working towards since the
1930's. In deciding to publish it, ministers evidently
hoped that the worst uncertainties of the transitional
period were past, but they were clearly taking a
considerable political risk, given that they knew about
the internal and external problems that were brewing. In
the event, two major setbacks - the fuel crisis in
February and the convertibility crisis in August - caused
the Economic Survey to be abandoned as a practical basis
for planning in the course of 1947. Paradoxically,
though, the crises forced the government into more
effective economic planning in the short-term. A wave of
emergency planning followed each of the crises as the
government adjusted objectives, formulated priorities,
constructed new policy-making machinery and tightened up
the operation of control systems in a way that it had
avoided doing in 1945-6. This chapter deals mainly with
the discussion around the Economic Survey and the
emergency planning that followed the fuel crisis, and
also attempts to assess opinions about economic planning
in various policy-making centres after the fuel crisis
but before the convertibility crisis. During the first
half of 1947, as well as coping with the fuel crisis and
its after-effects, the government was growing more
concerned about the balance of payments as the date of
convertibility approached and it became evident that
there was an accelerating outflow of reserves. This
threatened a crisis which ministers compared in their
minds to that of 1931. The way that this possibility was
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dealt with, and the response to the convertibility crisis
itself, is dealt with in the next chapter.
I
The procedure for making the 1947 Economic Survey was
much the same as that pioneered in 1946. The initial
document was drawn up by the Economic Section, and was
then discussed by departments and the official Committee
on Economic Development, before being sent to ministers
with a number of 'planning considerations'. The
Ministerial Economic Planning committee was responsible
making specific proposals to the Cabinet. With more at
stake than in. the previous year, the cabinet's
discussions were fuller and more controversial. The
government believed that it now had to take account of a
new situation: because reconversion was largely complete,
the expansion of civil and export employment which had
been in progress since early 1945 was coming to an end.
The officials predicted, in their 'planning
~t"considerations',/.."the economic problems of 1947 are
likely to be dominant in 1948 and probably in 1949".(2)
As in the previous year, the preliminary work on the
Survey had revealed 'gaps' which could be stated in terms
of national income and expenditure or labour and raw
materials. In labour terms, the gap was expected to stand
at 630,000 workers by the end of 1947, unless some policy
changes were made. As the officials put it, this was due
to 'trying to do substantially more than is within our
present capacity,.(3)
To expand briefly the officials' diagnosis of
inflationary pressure, attention can be drawn to three
underlying causes which were identified. First, more
resources were being set aside for defence and exports
than before the war. Second, consumption demand was
higher than before the war as a proportion of national




supported by subsidies, higher rates of
insurance benefits and pensions, and
income through taxation. Thirdly,redistribution of
there were fewer resources than before the war due to a
shorter working week, less efficient capital equipment,
and fewer imports. Despite a higher overall level of
economic activity, the 'over-burdening' of the economy
in all these ways showed in inflationary demand in almost
all sectors, but most significantly in consumption goods.
The inflationary pressure was exacerbated by the wartime
savings 'overhanging' the markets for consumption goods.
Moreover, the effect of subsidies was to allow incomes to
push up the prices of unsubsidised goods. The
difficulty of finding goods on which to spend any extra
earnings was again mentioned
increased productivity.
as a disincentive to
recommendation
stage. (4)
Finding means to increase supplies remained, according
to the officials, 'the most satisfactory way of bringing






the option of borrowing more from abroad to increase the
volume of imports was strongly discouraged. The
officials saw more hope of increasing the total labour
force by attracting more married women and foreign
workers into the labour force, although the use of
foreign workers where they were needed depended on the
provision of more housing, which was a special problem in
itself. There was also the possibility of increased
productivity, but no rapid solution to the general
problem of inflationary pressure could be foreseen coming
from this direction. Mechanisation would take time, and
insofar as it could not be met from imports it would
require the use of scarce labour and materials, lowering
the amount available for consumption or exports. So,
'while labour is short, the manpower which we can afford
to set aside for the production of capital goods is
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limited Any immediate increase in productivity ...
must mainly come through more efficient management,
better deployment of labour, and more intense activity on
the part of the worker in industry, using existing
plant,.(5) Even so, optimism about the prospects for
short-run gains in productivity played an important role
in the subsequent discussions about how much the
government had to do to close the inflationary gap.
On the assumption that supplies would remain severely
constrained, the officials tried to direct ministers'
attention to the problem of reducing overall requirements
and deciding between competing claims. As in 1946, the
importance attached to increasing exports meant that it
would be 'probably unwise' to make any deliberate cut in
the export target, because of the need fully to restore




of demand in the domestic economy
anyway. Given the inviolability of
'If•••military demands cannot be
reduced, the choice is between cuts in consumption and
cuts in investment'. So, the options for reducing demand
centred on the domestic economy; all of them were
unpalatable in varying degrees. If consumption had to
bear the whole brunt of closing the gap, then standards
would fall below the current level, and textiles would
probably suffer particularly badly. If the cuts fell on
investment, there would be more complex consequences.
Investment was divided roughly into building on the one
hand, and metal and engineering industries on the other
hand. If the cuts fell on building, the housing
programme (which occupied about half the building
workforce) would be severely affected. If it fell on
metal and engineering then it would be necessary to
contract the metal and engineering workforce while
maintaining the same level of exports, raising the
proportion of the workforce in those industries engaged
in producing for export. In this latter case, apart from
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the possibility of temporary unemployment and losses to
the workforce (e.g. married women withdrawing to the
home), there were implications for both domestic
industrial re-equipment and the future structure of
exports. The officials noted that, even before any policy
actions, the government was mainly relying on an increase
of engineering exports to sustain and raise the total





to be resolved through a cut in metal and
products going to the domestic
those industries would have to




reached, since an unchanged level of domestic clothing
and other textile consumption would probably cause a
reduction in textile exports.(6) Finally, any restriction
of metal and engineering products going to the home
market would postpone investment, and would entail close
inspection of investment projects. The officials
suggested that priority could go to those projects which
used least labour and would most quickly lead to labour
saving, but there could have been few illusions that this
would be easy to achieve in practice.
Given these uninviting options, the officials reserved
their strongest words for the 'central problem' of
bottlenecks in coal, steel, electricity, timber and
cotton textiles. Shortages of these goods threatened the
whole programme of economic rehabilitation, and
constituted 'an additional reason for some substantial
pruning of investment programmes since the industries
producing metal and engineering products are particularly
large users of steel and power, while industrial building
is also a consumer of steel and timber,.(7) It was
pointed out that these key material shortages meant that
the allocation schemes operated by the government were
still very important: to maintain distribution, to
prevent price inflation, and as 'a potent influence in
determining the general shape of the economy'. Since
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'manpower shortage and particular material shortages are
often closely correlated', it was recommended that the
government should reduce the allocations of scarce
materials in areas where there were also acute shortages
of labour. The main example, left unstated in the
recommendations, was the building programme, which was
chronically short of both labour and materials. Two
further points were made to underline the undesirability
of ,bottlenecks. First, any shortfall in resources might
result pro rata, in reduced exports as well as reduced
deliveries to the domestic market: 'For example, if the
proportion of motor-car exports remains unchanged, a
shortage of sheet steel will reduce exports to an extent
greater than we may desire'. It followed that if
shortages developed then export agreements might require
revision, since these were ratios of output rather than
absolute targets. Second, there was the problem of equity
in the treatment of different firms. In wartime the most
efficient firms in an industry had been selected for
important tasks. In post-war conditions, the officials
pointed out, there was 'a tendency on the part of
industry to expect, and on the part of departments to
apply, a doctrine of equality of treatment'. Therefore
they wanted to know whether 'preference be given to one
firm as against its competitors when there is enough
labour to enable one firm's project to be complete
quickly while, if all started together, none would be
achieved without undue delay?'. The implication was that
the government would suffer criticism either because of
undue delay or because of discriminatory policies. Only
the disappearance of bottlenecks could obviate these
possibilities, and in their 'planning considerations' the
officials made it clear that this would require the
government to stop trying to do too much, particularly in
the field of public investment.
Ministers were, then, given a diagnosis of economic
problems as precise as the existing state of knowledge
155
allowed, and it was made plain that there was a need to
do something decisive about reducing demand if, as seemed
likely, supplies could not be substantially increased.
At first there appeared to be an acceptance of the
officials' view. Morrison's political adviser, E.M.
Nicholson,
transition
commented that the previous idea of the
period as a prelude to equilibrium had been
proved wrong: even after reconversion the economy needed
a 'strong dose' of new short-term adjustments. (8) Cripps
stated that the Economic Survey report had underlined the
main difficulties.(9) The Ministerial Economic Planning
committee, responsible for the 'oversight' of economic
planning, produced a set of proposals which were
presented to the Cabinet, by Cripps,(10) as 'a concerted
plan' of 'interdependent proposals', including proposals
for holding back projects as well as for increasing the
labour supply. In introducing these ideas to the
Cabinet, Cripps stressed that it was urgent to consider
what should be curtailed or postponed because of the
'great and increasing gap' between requirements and
resources. In particular, to reach the export target it
might be necessary to divert some consumer and capital
goods from the domestic economy. From the records of the
subsequent Cabinet discussions, however, it appears that
there was a stubborn hope of finding some way to increase
supplies, and a corresponding reluctance to make cuts in
programmes. Moreover, the Cabinet did not like the
proposals for increasing supplies which were produced by
the MEP. In fact, after five Cabinet meetings, all the
main proposals of the MEP for increasing labour supplies
had been rejected, without any clear alternatives for
achieving the government's economic objectives being
agreed. (11) This situation came about partly because of
scepticism about the realism of the figures in the
Economic Survey report. Critics argued that the picture
painted was too gloomy, and that errors in the Survey
could exaggerate the consequences of not adopting the
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MEP's recommendations. (It will be recalled that the MEP
itself had criticised the 1946 Economic Survey report for
exaggerating the manpower gap, a view which led to the
shelving of the proposed review of investment
programmes).(12) There was also the suggestion that
productivity increases could close the gap to some
extent, without the need for government action. Of
course no-one could say how much error there was in the
report, or how much productivity might increase; the real
significance of these arguments was that they fitted in
with a desire on the part of various ministers to oppose
the measures from the point of view of their departmental
interests. (13)
The MEP's main proposals for increasing the supply of
labour were to postpone the raising of the school leaving
age, to introduce non-military National Service for
women, to make further cuts in the armed forces and to
halt the expanSion of civil service and local authority
manpower. Postponement of the raising of school leaving
age was opposed as inequitable and short-sighted,
hitting working class parents and delaying both the
introduction of an equitable education system and the
long-term economic benefits of a better-educated
workforce. This proposal was therefore rejected. Non-
military National service for women was proposed as an
economically useful form of 'equal treatment'. Wartime
experience had shown, however, that direction of women
was very unpopular, particularly direction away from
home. The proposal was not rejected out of hand, but
after further consideration it was agreed that the scheme
which would be least unpopular would contribute little to
the economy.(14)
The most important and
proposals was that a ceiling
the armed forces and supply
controversial of the MEP
should be put on the size of
industry manpower. After a
review the Ministry of Defence had come to the conclusion
that it required 1,167,000 people for the armed services
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and 450,000 for the supply industries.(15) This was above
the targets agreed at the beginning of 1946,(16) and a
sharp argument was provoked. Dalton, strongly in favour
of reducing the armed forces more quickly, said that
there could be no doubt that a cut in the size of the
armed forces and supply industries would have immediate
effects on output, and this justified some weakening of
the armed forces. The service chiefs were nevertheless
adamant that the post-war 'police' duties of the military
could not be carried out with smaller forces. After
discusion, Dalton suggested a compromise figure of 1.5m
for the combined manpower of the armed forces and supply
industries, but Attlee concluded that the balance of the
argument lay with the Ministry of Defence case, though he
accepted that this meant continuing manpower
shortages. (17)
Of all the MEP's proposals, there was general
agreement on only one: that an attempt should be made to
reduce the size of the civil service, in which there had
been a trend of expansion since the war. Subsequently
Attlee initiated a special enquiry in which departments
were asked to justify the size of their staffs. There was
also concern about the expansion of local authority
manpower, which was mainly due to extra tasks undertaken
as a result of central government policies. On this point
it was also agreed that something should be done,
although the ways to influence local authorities'
recruitment policy were limited, and the implementation
of various policies might be affected if any restrictions
were successful. (18)
The Cabinet's rejection of the MEP's proposals was so
sweeping that it had to be asked whether it would be
advisable to publish an Economic Survey at all, since it
would be embarrassing if it was not be possible to
present clear ideas about how to close the gap. On
another view, though, the disclosure of difficult facts
would provide the basis for appeals for increased
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productivity, wage restraint and longer working hours (at
least, shorter working hours, such as the miners were
demanding, could be resisted).(19) It was finally agreed
that the Economic Survey should be published, and there
was some further discussion on ways to reduce the amount
of labour in non-productive occupations, which allowed
ministers to give vent to their feelings about people
working in occupations they regarded as unpatriotic, such
as sport, entertainment and distribution. The MEP was
asked to look further at this, and to consider
restrictions on mid-week sporting events, which were
thought to be causing absenteeism as well as diversion of
labour and materials from projects of national
importance. (20)
The government rejected the advice in the Economic
Survey report that it should direct its attention mainly
to bringing requirements into line with supplies. In
essence, if Dalton was correct in maintaining that a cut
in the armed forces and supply industries was a measure
that could guarantee an immediate expansionary effect,
then the government had dodged the issue of whether to
reduce its foreign policy commitments or its domestic
aims such as the housing programme. Small wonder that
Nicholson wrote to Bridges, towards the end of the
Cabinet's discussions of the Economic Survey, that there
was "a great danger that ministers may go forward with
the illusion that they are undertaking economic planning
when they are not in fact ready to take any decision
which would make economic planning possible". (21)
In the end, much was left to the possibility that
short-term productivity increases would close the
inflationary gap. This was something which was not under
the government's control, and figures on overall
industrial productivity for 1946 had been called
'disturbing', although not much reliance could be placed
on such estimates. Changes in productivity have always
been difficult to quantify, and the difficulties were
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greater than usual during the transitional period.(22)
So, there
pessimism
was room for a wide range of optimism and
about the outlook. There were certainly some
influential optimists: in April 1947 Meade circulated a
report by private consultants that had 'startling'
conclusions about all kinds of inefficiencies that could
be eliminated by, for example, better O&M techniques. (23)
Others were more cautious, pointing out that productivity
had historically risen at a lower rate than would be
required to overcome the existing problems. The official
Committee on Economic Development took a particular
interest in Rostas~ estimate that productivity had
increased faster in the US than in the UK between 1938-
46.(24) This reinforced the worries of some senior
officials, though as it turned out productivity on
average rose much faster after the war than it had done
between the wars. (25) Indeed, it later became apparent
that there had been a better than expected increase in
productivity during 1947.
This does not alter the fact that the government
failed to decide on measures adequate to close, in real
terms, the inflationary gap which officials predicted on
the basis of existing knowledge. It is pertinent to ask
whether there was subsequently any new emphasis on
financial measures against inflationary pressure. Meade
started advocating the need for a disinflationary budget
surplus and the building of a fund for use in the event
of a recession during 1946, and his ideas were discussed
again during the 1947 budget policy discussion. (26)
During the period of reconversion Dalton had been
sceptical about financial calculations of the
inflationary gap, preferring to err on the side of
inflation, keeping it in check with controls, and taking
the view that the only adequate solution to inflationary
pressure was to produce more goods. (27) But, perhaps
because the possibility of quickly increasing supplies
was remote, Dalton did write in the internal discussion
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that he wanted the 1947-8 budget to show a surplus if
possible. (28) Indeed, Dow suggests that Dalton has been
unfairly criticised for being un-Keynesian in this
period. (29) While Dalton's attitude appears to have been
changing, there were other obstacles to a Keynesian use
of the Budget to combat inflationary pressure. There was







the continuing hope of some senior
that budget policy could be kept
discussions, Bernard Gilbert accused Meade of wanting to
"carry forward" the 1947 Economic Survey in the Budget.
"My own feeling is that global planning is under a cloud
at the moment", wrote Gilbert. (30) He also opposed the
idea of a long-term financial survey covering the years
1947-9.(31) He did advocate a reduction of subsidies,
which was one component of a disinflationary financial
policy aimed at restoring the operation of the forces of
the labour market in particular. But this was well within
the traditional approach to budget-making: subsidies had
risen dramatically since the end of the war, and
threatened
require an
to prolong the period of budget





balance revenue and expenditure. On another occasion,
however, Gilbert wrote that the Budget Committee was
working along Meade's general lines,(32) so his
opposition was qualified. Rather than any opposition
from officials, the most important obstacle to a budget
surplus was the government's manifest reluctance to
reduce its demands on real resources, while at the same
time wanting to avoid the unpopularity, and the practical
problems, of reducing private expenditure. In the wake
of the failure to find means to close the 'real' gap
revealed in the 1947 Economic Survey, there was no
possibility of compensating by the use of the Budget.
The Budget eventually gravitated to the centre of
economic policy during Cripps' Chancellorship, when
conditions were very different. As it was, events
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dictated a tightening of direct controls, albeit
belatedly, and it is hard to imagine that financial
policies could have taken the main strain of inflationary
pressure in these circumstances any more than they could
have done in wartime.
One proof of this is the impact that the fuel crisis
made on the Economic Survey even before it was published.
The crisis began after the main discussions which have
already been described, but before it was due to be
published. In order not to delay publication it was
agreed that the arguments should be qualified rather than
altered. The discussion around the interlinked targets of
coal and steel illustrates the difficulties. The
original figure of 200m tons of coal suddenly seemed
unrealistically high, as did 13m tons of steel. It
seemed more likely that only 180m tons of coal would be
raised in 1947, but if this target was revised, all the
figures based on it also had to be altered, including the
long-term coal target of 230m tons by 1950. Moreover,
anything less than 200m tons would not allow
stockbuilding
possibility of
during 1947 sufficient to avert the
another crisis in the winter of 1947-8.
The upshot of the discussion was that the 200m ton target
should stay, and the target for the size of the mining
workforce was increased to 730,000. The export target was
reduced, however, from 150% to 140% of the 1939 volume,
and the allowance for borrowings from abroad was
increased from £250m to £35Om.(33) These changes are
perhaps the most eloquent proof that the officials had
been correct to stress, in their 'planning
considerations' , the likelihood that supplies would
continue to be constrained, although ministers had not
been ready to act on their analysis. It required the
traumatic shocks of the fuel crisis and the
convertibility crisis to galvanise the government.
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II
Emmanuel Shinwell, Minister of Fuel and Power, may have
been speaking the literal truth when, in the Autumn of
1946, he made his famous remark that everyone was
expecting a fuel crisis except him.(34) The Lord
President's committee papers for 1946 show that the
government were well aware of the danger. Shinwell chose
to take a rosy view of prospects. While others were
canvassing the idea of a compulsory winter fuel-saving
scheme (this was supported by some ministers, the FBI and
the TUe), he insisted on a voluntary scheme. (35) The
difficulties of compulsory fuel allocation were
admittedly great, as subsequent events showed, but
Shinwell's attitude was based on an optimistic view of
the trend of coal output rather than on the problems of
reducing demand. (36) In the Autumn of 1946, in
anticipation of a 4m ton winter shortfall in coal
supplies, there was an investigation of the state of
preparedness for selective cuts. The reply came back from
the Ministry of Fuel and Power that the machinery for
fuel allocations was in good order. But it was not until
early January 1947 that the Cabinet thought it necessary
to do anything about implementing cuts. (37) This was
another example of the government's general reluctance to
take the unpopular course of restrictions on demand, in
this case reinforced by Shinwell, whose hesitations
Gaitskell characterised as going beyond the 'natural
prudence' of a politician avoiding unpopular decisions,
amounting instead to 'sheer weakness and moral
cowardice,.(38)
The first sign of danger came on February 5th, when
the Ministry of Fuel and Power informed Attlee that
freezing conditions had prevented the transport of coal
in several areas.(39) This was significant because low
overall stocks had led to an increased reliance on being
able to transport coal to deficit areas at short notice.
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In this situation, power station operation was more or
less immediately threatened. When Shinwell made his
famous 'Friday afternoon' speech on Feb 7th, stocks in
places like London were down to a few days.(40) As the
extent of the crisis became clear, the government set up
a Fuel Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. This was
seen as being similar to the wartime 'Battle of the
Atlantic' committee which dealt with both long and short-
term aspects of the U-Boat crisis.(41) At the first
meeting of the Fuel Committee on February 12th Attlee
presented a characteristically brief memorandum about the
possible means of avoiding a similar crisis the following
winter. This went through the problems of the supply
side: increasing labour supplies by drafting in foreign
labour; providing better accommodation for miners;
increasing productivity by means inducements (by higher
wages if necessary, and better supplies of consumer
goods); developing substitutes, especially by conversion
from coal to oil. The Prime minister suggested that if
the mining labour force could be built up to 710,000 by
May, this would allow the maximum use to be made of the
Summer period for stockbuilding.(42)
Another economic problem brought to the forefront by
the fuel crisis was the need for more electricity
generating plant. It had long been known that the demand
for electricity was outstripping the nation's generating
capacity. As Wilmot wrote in a note on the problem dated
18/2/47, this was a problem which required a long-term
plan. There was an immediate need to place orders for
the 1950-1 power station programme. There were various
difficulties with the current programme such as conflicts
over export orders and delays in the preparations of
sites for power stations. Lack of housing for workers
was another problem. There were implications for the
allocation of coal and steel if the programme was to go
ahead at full speed.(43)
Another major aspect of the problem was transport.
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The first symptom of the fuel crisis was a breakdown in
transport. One indication of the unpreparedness of the
government is that in the first few days there was fury
about the tardy response of the Railway Executive in
cutting passenger traffic to give priority to coal
traffic. Attlee had to write to the controllers of the
railways: 'I was shocked this morning at the apparent
failure of the Railway Executive Committee to realise the
full gravity of the present emergency,.(44) Alfred
Barnes, the minister of Transport, wrote a letter
lambasting Shinwell.(45) When tempers had cooled, it was
realised that there were simply not enough locomotives
and wagons to move the quantities of coal that were
required. More transport was necessary to distribute
coal so that any interuption would find power stations
and other users with good levels of distributed stocks,
rather than large piles of coal at the pithead. Creating
short-term priorities in rail traffic was no solution:
later, Attlee's adviser Gorell-Barnes informed him that,
'There can be no doubt that last winter the rail embargo
of non-coal traffic caused a great deal of dislocation to
industry - more, probably, than anything else except the
actual electricity breakdown in February,.(46) It could
be foreseen that the situation would get worse over the
coming years; even if the mining industry lifted the coal
the government wanted, there would be difficulties while
the capital equipment of the railways deteriorated.
On the demand side of the problem the Prime Minister
proposed that the main aim of the coming fuel-saving
campaign should be to curtail the use of electricity by
'domestic and non-industrial' consumers.
also have to be made to reduce the use
industrial consumers, but the uncontrolled





cooking, was regarded as a very weak spot in the
government's fuel and power strategy.(47)
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Table 2. Total sales of electricity in Great Britain,
1938, 1945-51
(Thousand million kilowatt hours)
1938 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951-- -- --
Total •••••• 20.4 31.3 34.8 35.9 38.8 40.9 45.5 50.5
Industry ••• 10.3 17.7 17.6 17.6 19.1 20.4 22.9 25.3
Domestic ••• 5.4 8.8 11.7 12.7 13.6 13.7 14.9 16.9
and farms
Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.71
To solve all these problems required some fundamental
rethinking of the planning effort. Attlee's criticism
was blunt: "one of the chief gaps in Government machinery
during the first 18 months after the war has been the
lack of any organisation to see that, even when decisions
were taken to put first things first, these decisions
were made effective". (48) Arguably, part of the reason
for this failure was that the Prime Minister's authority
was not used sufficiently from the start in economic
policy-making. (49) The fuel crisis marked the beginning
of a new stage in this respect. The Prime Ministers'
List of priorities for the expansion of fuel and power
resources was drawn up to 'put first things first' ,(50)
and new machinery was set up to make the policy
effective. Attlee's directive stated that allocations of
labour, materials and other essential supplies, including
building and civil engineering work, should help as far
as possible:
(1) Electricity generating plant required by electricity
undertakings.
(2) Machinery and equipment for deep-mined and open-cast
coal.
(3) Plant and equipment required by gas undertakings.
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(4) Equipment for the coal/oil conversion programme.
(5) Freight locomotives, railway wagons for transport
of coal, and steel rails for essential maintenance
of the permanent way.
This list, known in Whitehall at the time as the PML
priorities, was approved by the Cabinet on 18/3/47.
Atomic energy projects were added to the list later.(51)
To ensure that the policy was carried out a progressing
organisation was set up in the Ministry of Supply,
following Attlee's concern that the ministry of Supply
had effectively divested itself of any responsibility for
civil production. (52) The Fuel Committee also agreed
that 'progressing offices' should be put into plants
making mining machinery, similar to wartime practice in
crucial areas like aircraft production. (53) Of more
wide-ranging importance was the establishment of the
Central Economic Planning Staff, headed by a Chief
Planning Officer. The proposal for such a staff had first
been advanced in November 1945,(54) but it took the fuel
crisis to bring it into existence. This was because, as
Bridges wrote: "Programming work required for fuel, power
and material allocations ••• will give rise to a heavy
volume of work which will have to be handled
centrally".(55) CEPS was initially intended as a central
'progressing' organisation, to ensure that cabinet
economic policy decisions were carried out, especially
the items on the Prime Minister's List.(56) As such it
was at first regarded as a temporary organisation, but it
grew in importance, especially after the convertibility
crisis, when the volume of central programming work
increased again.
Another important piece of central machinery set up
after the fuel crisis was the Fuel Allocations Committee,
an official committee chaired by a junior minister, Hugh
Gaitskell (who had already distinguished himself in
handling the day-to-day problems of the fuel crisis).(57)
Its function was to break down the global fuel
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allocations made by the Fuel Committee into very detailed
decisions. This meant, for example, giving priority to an
ICI Alkali plant and cutting back on iron and steel
production in the case of a special scarce grade of
coal. (58) The value of having a minister to head this
kind of committee was that decisions could be made on the
basis of an immediate authoritative interpretation of the
government's policy. The ability to do this was very
important, given the growing complexity of priorities
which economic policy machinery was expected to handle.
The Fuel Allocations committee became the pattern for the
Export Committee set up after the convertibility
(chaired by Harold Wilson), and also for
crisis
the
restructuring of the Materials Committee (also chaired by
Gaitskell in the first instance).
As with many planning problems, drawing up an outline
for action and setting up new machinery was easier than
executing the policy, as shown by an examination of some
of the activity which followed the initial planning.
This can be divided into problems of supply, of which the
chief was to get a larger and more productive mining
workforce, and problems of demand, which involved trying
to cut down non-industrial use of power and preparing
fuel allocations for the following summer and winter.

















Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.67.
It is very interesting that after all the tribulations
about coal supplies, there was still a degree of
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scepticism about the difficulties of increasing supplies,
on the part of those getting directly involved in the
labyrinth of mining problems for the first time. Attlee
suggested the simple application of 'wartime spirit' to
overcome the problems. (59) Only reluctantly was it
accepted that the scope for expanding coal supplies was
limited. At first it was assumed that Shinwell had not
put enough effort into the task. Not that Shinwell was
the only person to come under critical scrutiny: a
disbelieving assessment was made of the view of Lord
Hyndley, chairman of the National Coal Board, who hela
that there was a limited rate at which new coal face-room
could be created (which, if true, was bound to limit the
effectiveness of new labour, if it could be found). (60)
However, after some argument it was accepted that there
was little hope of greatly increased supplies of coal in
the short-term.
After the first few weeks, in fact, the government's
effort concentrated on a more defensive task, that of
preventing a fall in output. Central to this effort was
the government's relationship with the National Union of
Mineworkers under its Communist leader Arthur Horner. In
March 1947, following a request from Horner, it was
agreed that a delegation of miners should attend a
meeting of the Fuel Committee to submit their proposals
for the industry. Gorell Barnes noted that this meeting
was expected to be 'one of the most crucial for the whole
future of planning and of the country,.(61) At this
'crucial' meeting the miners pressed for a whole series
of reforms, of which the most important was for a 5-day
week. The government was worried that this would lead to
a fall in coal output.(62) Nevertheless, reforms could
not be put off: the miners were well aware of the
strength of their bargaining position. The miners were
told that most of the demands would be conceded, but they
were asked in return that there should not be any fall in
output. In July the government began to believe that
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things were going wrong: output figures were not good,
and there was a suspicion that the miners had gone back
on their undertakings on the 5-day week. The writer of
one brief for Attlee predicted gloomily that it seemed
that there would be 'austerity without end', although he
crossed out the observation that 'it may well be the end
of the government,.(63) During the convertibility crisis
the government tried to get the miners to go back on the
5-day week agreement and accept compulsory Saturday
working, but this was emphatically rejected. At another
meeting with miners' leaders, held the day after the
convertibility of sterling had been suspended, Morrison
pronounced himself 'cross' at the miners' attitude. It
was argued that restrictive practices and absenteeism
continued to be a problem. However, the miners were
adamantly against compulsory Saturday working.(64)

















Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.66.
In these circumstances, the possibilities for averting
a new fuel crisis depended on reducing requirements and
improving distribution rather than increasing supplies,
though the government still aimed to reach the Economic
Survey target of 200m tons, which was regarded as the
minimum for safety. (65) In fact, on coal supplies the
government came back more or less to the same point that
had been reached the previous Autumn, but it now planned
to control the demand side of fuel and power




mentioned, the demand side operation fell into two main
parts: first, an effort to reduce coal and electricity
consumption by domestic and non-industrial consumers;
second, restricted coal allocations to industrial users
for the summer period, in order to build up stocks. Each
was a complicated task.
Rationing the use of fuel by non-industrial consumers
was very difficult, involving such delicate questions as
whether the rich should get a larger ration because they
had larger spaces to heat in their houses than the poor
in theirs. One of the worst political rows of the war had
been caused by a proposal to ration fuel, which was never
implemented, technically on the grounds that the
government might be unable to guarantee the ration. (66)
After the fuel crisis, despite a lengthy internal
discussion, the Cabinet decided not to adopt any
compulsory fuel rationing scheme for non-industrial
users. (67) The other main aspect of the problem of
domestic and non-industrial consumers concerned their
escalating electricity consumption. The possibility of
future winter crises was as much linked with a shortage
of generating capacity as it was with a shortage of coal
output. (68) During the fuel crisis industrial consumers
of electricity were cut off first, because many of the
latter depended on electricity for space heating and
cooking. Moreover, it was important to try to reduce
domestic consumption of electricity in the summer of 1947
as a contribution to coal stock-building. Once again the
problem was what kind of scheme was possible, the problem
being that of enforcement rather than equity in this
case. How could domestic consumers be 'policed' to make
sure that they did not consume more than a certain amount
of power? Compulsion was again rejected. Instead a
voluntary 'Fuel Target' scheme was attempted. (69)
JUdging from the results of a survey conducted by the
Ministry of Fuel and Power later in the year, this was
not very successful. Housewives interviewed after the
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campaign knew little about relative rates of consumption
of electricity or gas by different appliances; they
tended not to read the information sent out by the
government, and often did not know how to compute the
target they were being asked to aim at. Very few were
able to read their meters correctly. (70) 'This aspect of
the fuel economy campaign was an extremely poor effort',
commented CEPS. The government had little success in
trying to influence the behaviour of domestic consumers.
Attlee had originally hoped that most reductions of
consumption of fuel and power could be made to fallon
non-industrial users, but this proved impossible. The
question therefore arose of the basis to be used for
making summer industrial allocations that would allow the
building of adequate stocks for the winter of 1947-8. A
problem which arose out of this provides an interesting
example of one of the general difficulties of economic
planning using controls and techniques inherited from
wartime. The Fuel Committee agreed in April 1947 that the
basis of allocations for summer 1947 should be the
amounts consumed by industries in the same period in
1946, which on average was calculated to be 86.8% of
their current requirements - a case of spurious precision
if there ever was onel(71) But in the case of those
industries which had been urgently expanded since mid-
1946 this basis meant a greater than average reduction
from their current requirements. Significantly, the
policy would have affected the building materials
industry particularly badly, since it had recently been
urgently expanded by means of special measures in
connection with the housing programme, and it depended to
a great extent on the use of coal. The housing programme
had already run into trouble, with far more houses being
started than could be finished in a reasonable time,
because of material and labour shortages. The new fuel
allocations threatened to further delay the finishing of
new houses, even after the rate of new starts had been
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cut down.
There was a strong reaction against the idea of an
unselective cut. As the Ministers of Health and Works
jointly stated at a Cabinet meeting in late April 1947:
'The effect on the building programme would be disastrous
the building materials industries would be
unable to maintain output at the level to which it had
been raised; and all the efforts which had been made to
bring additional labour into the industries would be
frustrated ••• it would be difficult to meet the
criticism that there was a lack of consistency in the
government's economic planning,.(72) But if an exception
was to be made for the housing programme, why not make a
comprehensive 'selective' set of fuel allocations? This
was proposed by some ministers, who felt that a uniform
percentage reduction in coal supplies to all industries
'might produce widespread dislocation'. 'Would it not be
preferable, by a deliberate act of policy, to shut down
some industries altogether and reduce the coal
consumption of others, so that the essential industries
might be assured of their fuel requirements?,.(73) In
reply, Cripps said that he 'had been satisfied that it
would not be possible, in the time available, to work out
the intricate details of a selective scheme designed to
ensure that the available coal was used to the best
advantage in the national interest'. To avoid disrupting
the relation of one industry with another, therefore, he
had taken as a basis the coal consumption in the summer
of 1946, when the 'inter-relation between industries was
fairly satisfactory'. He argued that other industries
had also been expanded, and that the building materials
industries would not fare worse than many others. It
was, however, agreed to review the Fuel committee
decision,(74) and a later meeting agreed that the
building materials industry should be treated as a
special case.(75)
As well as the summer allocations scheme, the
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government had to work out allocations for the following
winter. This was in stark contrast to preparations for
the previous winter, which had been so weak that even if
the winter had not been the coldest since 1881-2 there
would probably have been some dislocation. By the end of
July 1947 detailed plans had been made. Every firm was
to be told at the start of the winter what deliveries it
could expect, based on its own estimates of full
requirements, ignoring its stocks at the start of the




would allocate supplies according to the
importance attached to the industrial group to
firm belonged. (76) This scheme required much
detailed work by departments and the National Coal Board,
collecting estimates of requirements from firms, grouping
them, checking the estimates, aggregating the
requirements and then setting them against the likely
supplies. The scale of the operation can be judged from
the fact that over 40,000 industrial consumers requiring
over 260 tons had to be supplied from over 1000
collieries whose output varied over long and short
periods. (77) Thus, the plan for winter allocations
contained contingencies for excess and deficient supplies
_ the latter being thought more likely.
The problem depended, obviously, not only on whether
the weather was mild the following winter, but also on
how effective the summer campaign of stockbuilding and
restrictions on demand had been, and above all, how
mining output held up. In the event, by the Autumn of
1947 it was realised with great relief that the target of
200m tons which had been set in the 1947 Economic Survey
would almost be reached. Stocks and transport had also
improved considerably. Still, the government was
prepared, with detailed winter allocation and transport
schemes drawn up in detail, operated by the government in
co-operation with the new National Coal Board, with the
approval of trade unions and the goodwill of industry.
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By the Autumn of 1947 the fear of a repetition of the
disaster of February 1947 had faded.(78)
Moreover, electricity supply was another area of
policy where the government felt bouyant by the Autumn of
1947. In March 1947 Attlee had called a special meeting
with the manufacturers of Heavy Electical Plant to
impress on them the urgency of the situation.(79) By
September Wilmot was able to inform Attlee of two
milestones: first, standardisation of turbo-alternator
sets 'in place of individual specifications for every
plant'; second, an arrangement for the Ministry of Supply
to allocate orders among manufacturers to secure maximum
use of capacity. Further standardisation was in
hand. (80) This was at least one step towards meeting the
criticism frequently made, that the government did not do
any long-term planning.(81)
The government moved decisively to head off the
possibility of another fuel crisis, with some success.
The significance of this more determined attitude was
that the policy of extending wartime methods of economic
planning into the transitional period was at last being
implemented rigorously, despite the unpopularity that
might result. During the first half of 1947 this new
firmness was also being applied to other areas of
economic policy, an approach which was welcomed by the
leaderships of both sides of industry. The Federation of
British Industries, one of the two major employers'
organisations, wrote to the Prime Minister in March 1947,
outlining their views on the economic situation and the
remedies they favoured. The FBI saw inflationary
pressure as the main problem, but responded with a call
for more and better planning: a tightening of the
priorities system, better co-ordination at the centre,











economic controls, the FBI wanted simplification, but not
abolition. On taxation, it wanted a shift from direct to
indirect taxes. (82) In light of all the problems that
the government had gone through to get more coal, it is
interesting that the FBI called for a target of 220m
tons, which can be compared with the 200m tons of the
Economic Survey and the 194m tons actually achieved
during 1947. The TUe also supported the call for this
completely unrealistic figure; evidently ministers were
not alone in finding reasons to be over-optimistic about
solving economic problems by dramatic increases in
supplies rather than cutting back on requirements. The
FBI concluded their letter to Attlee thus: "In all that
we have said, we have shown that we accept the necessity
for our national economy to conform to an overall plan".
There was still the crucial question, however, of how the
economy could be made to conform to a plan, and in this
regard it should be noted that the FBI wanted more 'self-
government' by industry, for example in the operation of
controls. Also, they urged the government not to press
ahead with controversial new legislation (i.e. more
nationalisation) at a time of economic crisis.(83)
For its part, the government hoped to establish an
understanding about economic planning with both sides of
industry through a new tripartite body, the Economic
Planning Board. This was designed to work in broad
terms, rather than attempting to carry planning down to
the level of the individual firm.(84) Nevertheless, the
EPB was intended to be an 'executive' body in the sense
that all the people on it were influential policy-makers
or advisers, and it was hoped that its members would go
away and help implement an agreed policy through
government departments and in their respective industrial
organisations. (85) It was also hoped that the EPB would
help the Central Economic Planning Staff to develop a
strong working relationship with industrialists. CEPS was
designed to co-ordinate the implementation of plans by
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departments, and the connection between the EPB and CEPS
meant that problems arising in industry, transmitted
through the employers organisations and the trade unions,
could influence the actions of government through its
central organisation. (86)
The theory of the EPB was easier to formulate than to
operate, because it was questionable how far the FBI or
the TUe had either the power or the desire to act in any
executive role in relation to the government's economic
planning. As already mentioned, the FBI desired more
self-government in the implementation of plans. They
were also under internal pressure from some of their
members not to co-operate with the government, mainly
because of its nationalisation programme. While the FBI
leadership thought that it was their responsibility to
talk to the government, there were clearly limits to what
they would do to enforce government plans. A similar
observation can be made about the TUe. The government
also held talks with the TUe about the economic crisis in
the early part of 1947. On planning generally, ministers
assured a TUe delegation that they were trying to get it
right, and were attempting to stop departments regressing
to the attitudes of 1938 in their approach to economic
policy. The TUe wanted to know why there were to be no
ministers on the Economic Planning Board, which suggests
that they were taking the idea seriously, to the point
where they were critical of the government for not making
the EPB a stronger body. But it also transpired that the
TUe delegation was extremely chary about the idea of
discussing wages in any detail in the EPB. They did not
want any statement made in the EPB that would commit
them, or individual unions, in any specific case of wage
bargaining; this kind of attitude no doubt goes some way
towards explaining why the ministers were not interested
in getting more closely involved.(87)
Thus, the fuel crisis did not lead to a general
rejection of planning. Responsible industrial opinion
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concluded that the situation called for more planning not
less. This was certainly true for the FBI and the TUe.
But it is also significant that the FBI and the TUC, like
the government, appeared to believe that it was possible
to raise coal output very substantially. To the extent
that it was assumed that coal supplies could be greatly
increased, the need to control inflationary pressure by
reducing total demand in real terms was perceived as less
than a necessity. It can be observed, however, that it
would have been an unattractive move for the FBI or the
TUC formally to calIon the government to downgrade
reconstruction plans such as the building programme, even
if they had felt that this was the necessary way to
reduce inflationary pressure.
more popular course of urging
they may well have known to be
Certainly, they chose the
the government to do what
impossible. Furthermore,
despite their general support for planning, both
employers and trade unions jealously guarded their
independence as policy-makers, preferring 'self-
government' to the taking of decisions in tripartite
bodies such as the EPB. As a result, the EPB remained a
consultative body which did not have much influence on
the policies of either side of industry.
The most important change in economic planning
machinery to come out of the fuel crisis was the
formation of the Central Economic Planning Staff, the
conception of which strongly resembled the idea of an
'Economic General Staff', one of the main demands of
economic policy reformers from the 1920's onwards. As
already mentioned, CEPS was set up to 'progress' policy
after the fuel crisis, but it eventually played a much
more wide-ranging role. The establishment of a Central
Economic Planning Staff had been first proposed during
the original internal discussions about economic planning
machinery in 1945, but the idea was not taken up.
Moreover, Morrison explicitly rejected the idea of an
'Economic General Staff' in Parliament as late as
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February 1946.(88) The formation of CEPS, which was
announced by Cripps on 10th March 1947, was therefore a
major change of policy by the government. CEPS had its
own staff of economists, and co-ordinated the work of
Planning Officers assigned to government departments.
The Planning Officers occasionally met as a committee
called EP(O)C.(89)
Before CEPS could establish its wider role in economic
policy-making, several problems had to be resolved.
There
lasting
was an awkward period after Morrison's
until the convertibility crisis, in
illness,
which the
ministerial responsibility for co-ordinating economic
policy was unclear and controversial. (90) In the first
place there was conflict about where CEPS should fit into
the existing central economic policy machinery. The
initial idea was that Edwin Plowden, appointed as Chief
Planning Officer several months after the formation of
CEPS was first announced, should report to Brook in the
Cabinet Office. This upset Morrison's adviser, E.M.
Nicholson,
job of
who had been rejected as a candidate for
Chief Planning Officer. (91) Subsequent
the
to
Plowden's appointment there was a heated exchange between
Bridges and Nicholson about whether CEPS should report to
Nicholson in the Lord President's Office or to the
Cabinet Office. Plowden threatened to resign if assigned
to the Lord President's Office. Morrison thought that
Nicholson was being 'persecuted', but perhaps the main
significance of this unpleasantness was that the Lord
President himself had lost credibility as an economic
minister. The outcome was that there was no change in
the original plan.(92) There was also the question of
the relationship between CEPS and the Treasury. Bridges,
in a letter to Plowden, explained that the Treasury would
only adopt fiscal measures if they had been agreed with
the Chancellor, though the Treasury would certainly co-
operate with CEPS by giving expert advice on the relation
of physical and financial plans. Bridges also proposed
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that Plowden should become a member of the elite Budget
committee. In July 1947 CEPS and the Treasury agreed to
co-operate in studying 'Economic planning and fiscal
measures,.(93) Thus, the Treasury remained politely at
arms length from the new machinery of economic planning,
until the day when CEPS was absorbed into the
Treasury. (94)
The first major task of CEPS was to try to reduce the
adverse effects of the fuel crisis on the aims of the
Economic Survey. It was also expected to fill in the
gaps left by the existing machinery, (i.e. that of the
Fuel Allocations and Materials committees). One such gap
was the planning of winter transport for 1947-8.(95) Big
problems were anticipated, the solution of which required
the kind of administrative apparatus for making transport
budgets that had been set up during the war. In a
discussion in July 1947 it was minuted: "Departmental
organisation for dealing with transport problems had been
largely dissolved since the war".(96) CEPS had to
replace it, and in this a key role was played by the
'Planning Officers' in departments, meeting together
occasionally as EP(O)C. CEPS also looked in a much more
general way at the possibilities of winter shortages,
searching for gaps between programmes and supplies. (97)
Departments were invited to inform CEPS about shortages
affecting their programmes. One proposal was to keep a
detailed 'critical list' of shortages, which would
include such things as "fractional HP motors, nipples for
bicycle wheels", an idea based on the 'designated list'
which had been kept by the Ministry of Production in the
later stages of the war.(98) It was hoped that such a
list would be useful to the Ministry of Labour as a guide
to filling vacancies. (There were few legally enforced
labour controls at this time, but there was still the
requirement for workers to seek jobs through Labour
Exchanges, which allowed the government to try to steer
people into jobs of national importance on a voluntary
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basis).
This type of work was necessary because the programmes
on which the calculations of gaps and the creation of
critical lists were being based were so far out of line
with supplies. Indeed, in June 1947 Gaitskell and Le
Maitre (the latter was a CEPS economist) made clear their
view that requirements and supplies were 'hopelessly' out
of line, showing that programmes were running at about
twice the level of available materials.(99) Records of
the early work of CEPS show that efforts were still being
made to expand supplies in order to close these very wide
gaps. For example, CEPS played an important role in a
campaign to increase of hours of work, making lists of
industries in which this would be desirable. This policy
was the natural successor to previous attempts to
increase overall labour supplies, the possibilities of
which had been more or less exhausted. (100) But here a
planning problem arose which highlighted the problems of
the 'Empty economy': to what extent might the extra
output possible with increased hours of work in one
industry be frustrated by lack of output from some other
industry? More hours worked in mining would require more
explosives; more hours worked in textiles would require
more chemicals, and so on;(101) any extra hours worked
in one industry might simply result in lower productivity
unless careful consideration was given to the levels of
all its inputs. Thus the pattern of CEPS' work following
the fuel crisis provides further confirmation that
inflationary pressures forced a partial reversion to
wartime techniques, involving the re-establishment of
organisation for centralised economic planning that had
been prematurely abandoned by departments in 1945-6: ~ot




Attempts to reinforce the government's ability to carry
through economic planning after the fuel crisis were made
against a background of increasing public criticism of
economic controls in general. There were numerous
stories in the press about bureaucratic restrictions and
obstacles to economic activity, many of which were picked
up by John Jewkes and included in his book Ordeal by
Planning. (102) Ignoring the realities of the economic
situation, critics such as Jewkes (who evidently had
learned nothing by the mistakes he had made while he was
Lord Woolton's adviser) blamed all problems on planning
and controls. At the crudest level, anti-planning
propaganda disseminated a grossly exaggerated idea of the
number of people engaged in controls. At one point
claims were made in Parliament that 2 million people were
involved, a figure which included a large number of local
authority servants who had little or no connection with
central planning. In reply the government produced its
own figures, showing a very different picture (see Table
5).(103) There is room for some scepticism about these
figures, because it was sometimes difficult to define a
control precisely. Even allowing for some
underestimation, though, these figures suggest that the
public, if they believed the critics~ must have had a
grossly inflated view of the extent to which the
government was able to control the economy •
. Still, the government was responsive to criticisms
about the amount of controlsj while it could afford to
brush off the crudest propaganda, it also had to take
account of demands from industry for Simplification and
reduction of controls. Thus, on the 27th of May 1947,
Morrison asked departments if any controls were
superfluous, or could be handed over to trade
associations. The Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply
replied that there was not much scope for handing over
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Table 5. Official estimate of government employees
engaged in operating economic controls, 1947
Total central government employees: 690,000
(inc. Post Office employees)
RATIONING







Building licences and materials 2,000 (Works)
Raw materials - Wool 220 (MAF)
Timber, Flax etc. 3,000 (B of Trade)
Import and export control 500 "
Price control 350 "
Steel 400 (Supply)
6,470
Source: Public Record Office, T 230 18
controls to industry. As long as there was any
discrimination between firms in operating a control,
controls could not be handed over to trade associations.
In industries where there was general opposition to
controls, the trade associations were unwilling to take
them over for fear of criticism. Moreover, in other
cases there were major firms in an industry which did not
belong to the trade association. (104)
Of more significance than the controversies about the
number of personnel involved in the controls or who was
to run them were questions of how they could be used to
obtain the results required of them and whether they were
having any deleterious side effects on economic
development. The government remained undecided about how
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to use controls in crucial respects. In April 1947, for
example, regional controllers asked how material
allocations would be used to enforce export targets, and
were told that 'HQ' had not yet decided what form of
sanction to use.(105) A very important complaint which
came through the regional machinery concerned
departments' use of economic data from 1938 as a
yardstick for material allocations (this was essentially
the same problem that had caused problems in the fuel
allocations machinery). (106) There were alleged to be
problems in the Scottish carpet industry, in which some
firms were experiencing demand far above the 1938 level,
but they could not satisfy it because they could not get
enough raw materials under the current rules. A closely
related problem was that of making allocations to new
firms appearing in an industry. (107) These were
fundamental difficulties with the use of economic
controls, which
term. However,
were bound to grow worse in the longer-
there was still no move towards a
comprehensive
controls. This
overhaul of the system of economic
was probably because there was still a
hope that controls were a temporary expedient; therefore
policy was governed by the simple general principle that
the government wanted to get rid of controls where
possible, while consolidating those that were necessary.
Steel control was one area where consolidation was a






The machinery of steel
the Prime
allocation
centred on the official Materials Committee, to which
departments submitted their requirements for vetting in
terms of the government's priorities, and where the
reconciliation of requirements and supplies was supposed
to take place. But in the course of 1946 it became clear
that the allocation system had virtually broken down, due
to problems both on the supply and the demand sides. On
the supply side, imports of steel were reduced, while on
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the demand side there was 'licence inflation'. Although
the 'M-form' licensing system provided potentially water-
tight central control of the end-uses of steel,
departments had authorised steel orders far in excess of
prospective supplies - and in excess of the departmental
allocations made by the Materials Committee. (108)
In February 1947 the Materials Committee had to make
cuts in steel allocations due to losses in steel output
caused by the fuel crisis, but this should not be allowed
to obscure the fact that steel allocations were already
under pressure, and that the fuel crisis was only the
particular form in which the general crisis broke
out.(109) R.S. Sayers, of the Economic Section, in a
note dealing with the problems of coal and steel had made
this point, before the fuel crisis, when he stated that
the common root of the difficulties was that the
government was
things. (110)












threatened to make the use of steel output in any
allocation period haphazard. In addition there was a
good deal of suspicion between the government and the
steel industry, and especially with the central
organisation of the industry, the British Iron and Steel
Federation, which was largely responsible for
administeung the steel control. In short, the Materials
committee was not on top of policy; it was observed that
the "pattern of deliveries" was being "determined by
steel makers and not by the committee".(lll) One way in
which the government tried to solve the problem of the
backlog was simply to cancel it, and the British Iron and
Steel Federation sent a letter to all users to do this in
early 1947 (14/3/47). Yet the problems of over-
authorisation continued and it was necessary to threaten
to apply sanctions to laggardly departments.(112) The
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minutes of the Materials committee for 1947 show that the
problems of 'deflating' the backlog, and stopping over-
authorisation were very difficult to solve. A report by
Gaitskell concluded that the shortfall would affect the
priority programmes agreed in the wake of the fuel
crisis. (113) This is not surprising when it is realised
that priority programmes were estimated to be taking more
than 40% of total steel allocations, putting intense
pressure on other users of steel and the allocation
system. Priorities always caused problems if they spread
over a large part of total output, although Gaitskell
thought that by August 1947 the priority machinery was
just starting to bite. (114) Just after this, of course,
the convertibility crisis resulted in a further
overloading of the steel distribution machinery, causing
headaches well into 1948.
In its handling of fuel and steel allocations, in
establishing the Prime Minister's List, and in setting up
CEPS the government displayed a new sense of
determination to carry through its policy of economic
planning. The extent of this change of heart from the
indecisiveness of 1946 should not, however, be
exaggerated. Indeed, Morrison's biographers characterise
the period between the fuel crisis and the convertibility
crisis as one of 'drift'. This is clearly inadequate if
the efforts of Gaitskell and Attlee himself, following
the fuel crisis, are taken into account. Nonetheless,
the argument over how CEPS should fit into the central
machinery of government has been described already, and
the conclusion drawn that it was a symptom of Morrison's
decline in authority as an economic minister. Cripps and
other ministers were naturally dissatisfied with
Morrison's handling of the key economic policy job, and
there was also criticism of Attlee's lack of leadership.
Donoughue and Jones suggest that the combined stresses of
the Economic Survey discussion and the fuel crisis caused
Morrison's health to crack. Returning to office after a
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lengthy period of rest, he had great difficulty in re-
establishing any authority after Dalton and the Treasury
had taken over the main responsibility for economic
affairs. (115) The Lord President's Office had become a
backwater, though Morrison was not formally relieved of
his economic duties: it was not until after the
convertibility crisis that firm central direction was re-
established in economic policy.
Meanwhile, Morrison was not disposed to take all the
blame for the previous failures. While easing himself
back into work after his illness, being released from
much of his previous daily grind, he reflected somewhat
bitterly on the performance of the government so far. He
chose the theme of 'Planning for expansion' for a
memorandum which was, especially in its earlier drafts,
severely critical of both ministerial and official
colleagues. (116) His first criticism was that the
government as a whole had not committed itself to the
goals of planning. He believed that the problems of fuel
and power had been underestimated at first; it was only
after the crisis that the Fuel Committee was set up, with
the Prime Minister in the chair, to deal with long-term
'planning for expansion' as well as short-term control of
demand. (117) His second main criticism was that
officials tended to say that 'everything possible is
already being done'. To illustrate both these criticisms
Morrison pointed to the success of the world food crisis
campaign of 1946. On that occasion, as in the aftermath
of the fuel crisis, Attlee had been in charge of policy-
making as chairman of the key committee. Consequently,
the government as a whole had taken part in the measures
to overcome the crisis. Despite official advice that it
would be impossible to expand supplies in the way that
ministers wanted, it had been possible by concerted
action to expand the world grain crop so that the food
shortage had been reduced. Ministers had been 'told at
the time it couldn't be done', and yet it had been
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done. (118)
More criticism came from Hilary Marquand, the
who was given special responsibility
the fuel crisis and Morrison's
Paymaster-General,
for planning after
illness. He was reproachful that the government had not
managed to escape from short-term crises in its economic
planning, pointing out the similarities with wartime.
During the war there had been one crisis after another:
drop forging, internal combustion engines, aircraft and
so on. This had led to a 'priority' mentality which had
now overtaken the Labour government. (119) Morrison's
'Planning for expansion' memo and Marquand's 'Thoughts'
tend to support the idea that the government was in a
state of 'drift' in this period. Despite its more
resolute approach to the specific problems of fuel and
power, and steel allocations, it had no adequate planning
strategy, and this was reflected in a rudderless motion
from crisis to crisis.
These cross-currents among ministers did nothing to
clarify their intentions to officials. Interesting
evidence of changes in official attitudes can be found in
an exchange of letters in June 1947 between two
government
Trade and
economists, Alec Cairncross of the Board of
Ronald Tress of the Economic Section.
Cairncross wrote that Plowden had put to him the question
"which has been troubling all of us for some time. What
is the general philosophy behind the Plan? What is it
that we are trying to do and what system of controls is
needed to do it?".(120) Cairncross thought the
government had three main objectives: "maximum output,
high exports and a measure of economic equality". The
essence of planning was the construction of the various
'Budgets' used for administrative controls, although
there was little idea of what could be done if things did
not turn out the way that was set out in the Budgets.
Any given control was 'a method of taking some of the
sting out of the shortage without necessarily doing much
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to remove the shortage itself much less bring the item
controlled into line with the overall plan'. Any
deterioration of the balance of payments,
to maintain the level of investment would
or any attempt
'justify the
retention of controls which are still regarded as
temporary,.(121) Tress agreed with this and could see no
definite end to the process. The transition period, it
had previously been thought, would be short:
"That view was backed by the national income
forecasters, Stone and Kaldor alike, and the view
is pretty obvious, for example, in the Employment
Policy white paper of 1944. Certainly, when we in
the Economic Section first worked out the form of
the Economic Survey, we consciously sought to adapt
the habits of manpower planning to national income
planning, anticipating an early shift from the
problems of shortage to the problems of
unemployment. Despite the experiences of the last
two years, the Civil Service ••• still holds (or at
least, acts on) that view, with the logical
consequence ••• we must use what machinery we have,
we can't have any new controls and it isn't worth
rationalising the whole structure".(122)
E.A.G. Robinson succinctly expressed the view of planning
which was very widely held among administrators and
economists when he wrote that as far as he was concerned
the main objective of planning was to make planning
un~ecessary.(123) But because the transition period was
proving to be longer than expected, Tress was worried
that the control system might not be neutral in relation
to the "the date of eventual equilibrium", (124) after






discouraged the drive towards
financial policies the dominant
policy, which had been such a
official advice in the previous
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To summarise, the year 1947 began with the discussion
of the Economic Survey. The decision to publish it
sharpened the Cabinet's discussion about ways to
implement the government's programmes, but ministers did
not find plausible ways to close the projected
inflationary gap by action to increase supplies or
decrease requirements. In the end the prospects for
closing the gap depended on an imponderable increase in
productivity. This never became as clear as it might
have done, because no sooner was the main discussion on
the Economic Survey concluded than the the fuel crisis
threw doubt on all its assumptions. The fuel crisis led
to three major changes in economic policy
First, special Cabinet committees were set up




policies for the exapansion of fuel and power resources.
Second, the crisis marked the end of the role of Morrison
as the chief co-ordinator of economic policy and the
downgrading of the Lord President's committee and related
committees (including the Ministerial Economic Planning
committee). Third, it led to the formation of the
Central Economic Planning Staff, which played an
important role in economic policy over the next few
years. A more determined approach was evident in the
aftermath of the fuel crisis, though this did not spread
to the running of economic policy as a whole. As for the
changes in machinery, it took some time for these to
become effective. After Morrison's illness there was
jockeying for leadership among the senior ministers, and
a period of 'drift' in which ministers criticised each
other and the officials. Officials voiced their own
doubts about the goals of the government. Meanwhile,
another economic crisis was in the making: the
convertibility crisis, even more traumatic than the fuel
crisis, shook the government into taking the decisions it
was still reluctant to face.
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Chapter 5
1947: THE CONVERTIBILITY CRISIS
On the 28th of October 1946, Morrison mentioned the
possibility of a '1931' crisis to the Ministerial
Economic Planning committee. (1) The general danger arose
from the fact that the transitional dollar loans which
had been obtained from the United States and Canada after
the sudden end of Lend-Lease in 1945 were small in
relation to the potential demand for dollars from holders
of sterling, especially since the government had been
pressured into an agreement to implement full sterling
convertibility by mid-1947. Starting in the Autumn of
1946, negotiations were held with a number of countries,
in which the government tried to establish the principle
that those sterling balances not written off as war debts
would be voluntarily 'blocked', except for earnings from
current trade. But by the date of convertibility only
about half the total balances were covered by such
gentleman's agreements. At the same time, although
Britain's trade deficit was less than had been forecast
at the time of the negotiation of the Anglo-American
financial agreement, it was nonetheless large in relation
to the dollar reserves. In the end, 'The only safeguard
was the self-restraint of the [sterling] holders,.(2)
Well before the date of convertibility the fragility of
Britain's reserves was obvious. (3) Tension inside the
government grew throughout the first half of 1947 as an
unsustainable outflow of Britain's gold and dollar
reserves gathered pace. There had been rises in import
prices, due to inflation in the United States, and
initially it was thought that this accounted for the
increasing drain. Meanwhile, external critics such as Roy
Harrod accused the government, quite wrongly, of a lack
of planning, or an element of squandering, in its dollar
expenditure. (4) Only later was it established that the
main reason for the acceleration in the outflow was that
sterling balances were rapidly being liquidated despite
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the voluntary blocking agreements: "The current deficit
worsened between 1946 and 1947; but this can explain only
one-fifth of the worsening of the dollar outflow in that
year.,,(5)
There were very powerful reasons for the government to
restore convertibility, but the policy of voluntary
blocks on sterling balances was miSjudged if it was
expected that it could probably succeed: there were even
more powerful reasons why convertibility could not be
sustained. The government was committed to restoring the
international role of sterling as part of the
reconstruction of a multilateral international trading
economy. If there had been no agreement with the
Americans and hence no transitional dollar loan, the
government would have been forced into a siege economy
earlier, with no certainty that liberalisation of trade
would take place later. Such had been the fear of Keynes
and his supporters, which had driven them to accept the
terms of the dollar loans, despite misgivings about their
small size and the early date of convertibility. The
Keynesians' approach to external economic policy was
based on the assumption was that multilateralism would
maximise the total volume of international trade. This
was a constant theme of Economic Section analysiS and
advice,(6) and was obviously attractive to the government
of a country which would depend on visible earnings from
overseas to an even greater extent in the future than in
the past. But in 1947 the practicality of the policy
became questionable because pressures on the sterling
balances were overwhelming. Most of the countries holding
sterling balances were poor (far more so than Britain,
even with the 'austerity' that caused so much grumbling,
though this was not an argument the government felt able
to make very forcefully to the public). To these
countries, their sterling assets 'signified ••• the only
immediate hope of replenishing consumer markets starved
during the war, or of beginning investment programmes on
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which their future progress and, in many cases, their
social stability depended,.(7) This may point to a reason
why the Labour government, once it had realised what was
happening, at first accepted the liquidation of sterling
balances.(8) Certainly, the motives of sterling holders
were less base than those imputed to them by the person
in CEPS who castigated the government for the folly of
'marching way out front alone towards a multilateral
world, in a dollar famine, and getting our pockets
picked for our pains,.(9) Among others, Dalton had
doubts about attempting convertibility in mid-1947 from
the beginning, (10) but he still experienced the
suspension of convertibility on August 20th 1947, as a
'personal humiliation,.(ll) The real significance of the
event in the context of the present analysis, however,
was that it reversed the movement towards the goal of a
multilateral international trading system, a change which
had profound implications for the policy of economic
planning.
I
Though the exact mechanism of the crisis was not
foreseen, the convertibility crisis did not come as such
a shock to the government as it did to most of the
public. The general danger was pointed out to the MEP in
October 1946, and ways of heading off expected balance of
payments difficulties were first discussed in detail in
early May 1947, when the Treasury made proposals for
import cuts which were considered by ad hoc meetings of
ministers and officials.(12) The ministers were not at
all keen on the idea import cuts, which summoned up the
ghosts of 1931. Other ways of avoiding a crisis were
discussed: renewed foreign credits, higher export prices,
stimulation of exports of good dollar-earners such as
textiles,
military
discrimination against dollar imports, cuts in
expenditure, relaxation of controls, and
198
prospects for higher productivity.(13) Characteristic of
the period of 'drift', the discussion was often
speculative rather than practical.(14) One example of the
search for means to avoid future import cuts and a
renewed approach to the United States was the policy of
'sterling area development', which was pushed by Morrison
in his 'Planning for expansion' memorandum, mentioned in
the last chapter. Morrison was critical of officials for
saying that 'everything possible is already being done',
and believed that this negative attitude particularly
affected any proposals for solving economic problems by
expansion of supplies rather than retrenchment of
requirements. In opposition to what he perceived as a
restrictive attitude by the Treasury officials, Morrison
- together with some other ministers - wanted to expand
supplies of imported raw materials from the sterling area
as quickly as possible, in particular through the rapid
exploitation of British colonies in Africa. This had
already begun, in 1946, with the sanctioning of the East
African groundnuts scheme, but further progress of the
policy was slow. Morrison got agreement from the Cabinet
that proposals for sterling area development should be
examined, but little happened until after the
convertibility crisis. (15)
The most palatable solution, for both ministers and
officials, would have been to make the existing policy
work by means of further borrowing from the United
States, but this was a distant possibility dependent on
changes in broad American foreign policy aims. Changes in
US policy towards Europe were already underway, greatly
motivated by the post-war communist advances which were
producing what amounted to a political stampede in
Washington. And American fears did not exclude Britain,
judging by the record of a meeting between the US
ambassador and ~nisters in May 1947. According to the
ambassador, there was a worry in the US that Britain's
econo~c problems would polarise the country, and that
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the Labour government might collapse, leaving a right-
wing government facing a communist-led trade union
movement. (16) Preposterous perhaps,(17) but the Labour
government was not above stirring American fears. Bevin,
for one, was not slow in linking the fight against
communism in Europe with economic aid. An official's
summary of Bevin's thinking about the 'possibilities open
to American policy' (dated 4/6/47, the day before
Marshall's speech about European recovery) shows that he
was prophesying imminent political crisis and civil war
in Europe unless communist plans were countered 'in the
next fortnight'(!). In light of this, Bevin urged that
the US should 'cease to consider our problems and those
of Western Europe in isolation'. He wanted Europe to be
given food on a lend-lease basis. While he specifically
excluded asking for a new dollar loan, the type of aid
Bevin wanted would have helped the balance of payments by
reducing Britain's share of food aid for Europe
including the much resented responsibility for 'feeding
the Germans' - on which dollars were being spent. (18) Not
long after this, at the end of June, there was a meeting
of European foreign ministers which led to the formation
of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation,
and eventually to a massive injection of dollar aid
through the European Recovery Programme. But these
events of May-June 1947 were at the beginning of a long
and uncertain road. Not until November 1947 did the
government decide definitely to seek a new dollar
loan.(19) The OEEC was not formally established until
April 1948, and it was some time after that before the
exact picture of renewed American financial aid for
Britain became clear.
In the Spring of 1947, then, the prospects for new
dollar loans seemed very distant and other remedies
designed to maintain or increase supplies in the face of
a balance of payments crisis were equally conjectural.
The need to discuss import cuts therefore could not be
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avoided, though ministers resisted the initial Treasury
proposal for a £20Om cut; it was trimmed to £150m, and
the official Committee on Economic Development were asked
to examine the implications. The official
replied that they were anxious about a
committee
loss of
nutritional value if food imports were cut to the
proposed extent: expert advisers claimed that the cuts
would lead to a loss of efficiency and falling morale.
Against this, the Treasury worried about 'early disaster'
if the cuts were not big enough. As the discussion wore
on, with external criticism mounting, there was also a
great deal of ministerial nerviousness about public
reaction to import cuts.(20) As a result of these
ministerial and official doubts, the Treasury's proposals
were whittled away to £80m. John Strachey, the Minister
of Food, then put forward the argument that, if a £150m
cut was the minimum required to remove the need for a new
approach to the US for credit, there was little point in
a cut of £8Om, which would have some of the bad effects
without achieving the main objective. (21) Following this,
some import cuts were announced on the 8th of July, just
before the date of convertibility, but these left the
programmed volume of imports higher than in the previous
year; meanwhile, prices had been rising.(22)
II
Convertibility was announced on July 15th 1947. Before
the end of July there were some contradictory public
statements about the economic situation: it was variously
stated that any further import cuts would be minor; that
the solution of balance of payments problems would
require international action; that Britain would have to
help itself. (23) On July 25th, Dalton told the Cabinet
that the reserves position was rapidly deteriorating.(24)
In an atmosphere of rising alarm there was clearly a need
to establish a firm and coherent policy, and this the
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government began to do at the beginning of August. (25)
In fact, of all the economic events between 1945 and
1951, the convertibility crisis caused the most severe
shake-up of policies and policy-making machinery. With
it, the period of 'drift' which followed the failure of
the Economic Survey discussion and the fuel crisis came
to an end. Policy changes at the time of the
convertibility crisis were considered by the Cabinet and
by ad hoc ministerial meetings chaired by Attlee. There
were also ad hoc meetings of senior officials. By this
means a completely new agenda for economic policy was
drawn up.(26) As it became clear that the outflow of
reserves threatened the basis of the existing level of
imports, the whole of Britain's trade practices had to be
examined in the light of which currencies were 'hard' or
'soft': attempting to direct more exports to the former
and obtain more imports from the latter.(27) The crisis
also led to a re-examination of the balance of output
between exports and domestic consumption and investment,
and a key decision was made to initiate a major effort to
control investment - an issue which had previously been
ducked. Decisions taken by the Cabinet at the beginning
of August became the scaffolding for a more comprehensive
form of economic planning than had been attempted since
the end of the war, and the detailed work of creating
priorities and finding the means to implement the
decisions went on for many months. (28)
The convertibility crisis led to a complete overhaul
of policY4making machinery. After the convertibility
crisis all strategy and machinery was examined from the
angle of the balance of payments crisis. Brook wrote to
Attlee: 'For the next six months, and possibly longer,
the needs of our foreign trading will dictate certain
adjustments of our internal economy and will have an
important influence on many of our domestic economic
problems,.(29) It was now realised tha~ one of the
failings of the previous machinery had been inadequate
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integration of domestic and external policy. Brook
recommended setting up a new Cabinet committee, to be
chaired by the Prime Minister, to deal with the whole of
economic planning, both internal and external. In the
event the new Economic Policy Committee did not start to
function until November, but it endured, and was an
fro",
important step away/central economic machinery clustered
around the Lord President's committee under Morrison.
Another important step towards the integration of
different aspects of economic policy was the creation of
the post of Minister for Economic Affairs, which Cripps
moved into from being President of the Board of Trade;
and it was explicitly stated that Cripps would be
responsible for giving 'undivided attention to our
economic problems at home and abroad,.(30)
The crisis also led to some rethinking about the
implementation of policy. Ministerial dissatisfation
about this came to a head shortly after convertibility
had to be suspended on August 20th. Morrison complained,
in a memorandum to the Cabinet: "There are many decisions
other than those of major Ministerial Committees which
are liable not to be followed up".(31) The Cabinet asked
Brook to look into the matter.(32) After this Cabinet




improvements could be made in the existing
for "progressing" decisions,.(33) Normally,
decisions were followed by 'Black-lists',
which were issued for the Cabinet, the LPC and FC
committees. Brook said he could 'consider whether that
technique could conveniently be applied to the work of
other cabinet committees', and also promised that the
Black Lists would in future be more vigorously followed
up.(34)
The Black List procedure dated from 1940. At the
start of the war departments were told that they were
responsible for going through Cabinet conclusions, to
pick out which affected them, and carry out policy;
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ministers would normally also inform their departments of
Cabinet policy, but it would "at the same time, remain
the responsibility of each department, on receipt of the
War Cabinet conclusions addressed to the minister, to
ascertain what action the department is called upon to
take under the Conclusions, and to take the necessary
measures without any further or more specific direction
from this office". (35) This was not enough. In 1940 it
was suggested that the responsible minister should be
named in the Conclusions, and that the Cabinet Secretary
should check on a list that the action was complete. (36)
Such was the origin of the Black Lists.(37) Problems were
easy to foresee: there would practical reasons for not
implementing some policies; long-term programmes would
present difficulties; so would those based on, for
example, 'moral constructs,.(38) Officials faced some of
these problems in 1947. Brook wrote several
comprehensive notes
payments decisions




departmental responsibilities for each aspect of
but he thought that this technique was
applicable only to the immediate following





secretariat could check on specific actions ordered by
the Cabinet and leading Cabinet committees, but they
could not progress a policy. For example, departments
could be chased for reports that had been ordered by a
certain date; but, 'if the Cabinet decides that the
Ministry of Transport should make every effort to
expedite the repair of railway wagons, the Cabinet Office
cannot be expected to ensure that the ministry does all
it can in this direction,.(39)
In short, existing arrangements were inadequate to
deal with wide-ranging policy like economic planning.
Three proposals were made. Firstly, that there should be
'adequate statistical data and an agreed yard-stick by
which progress can be tested'. This led to the
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production of a fortnightly economic bulletin which was
regularly considered by the Cabinet, and was the basis
for regular economic briefs to ministers. (40) Secondly,
it was accepted: 'There must be some central focus, at
the official level, at which progress is regularly
reviewed and shortcomings identified'. It was agreed
that the Central Economic Planning Staff would keep the
statistical data under review. CEPS was to spot which
projects were falling behind and consider how they could
be 'progressed'; and if no steps could be devised,
analyse the implications for the rest of economic
planning. (41) Thirdly, 'there must be an inter-
departmental comadttee at the Ministerial level to which
failures can be reported and remedies recommended,.(42)
This pointed to the need for a successor to the Lord
role until
Committee, which had carried out a similar
the beginning of 1947. After the
President's
convertibility crisis a Production Committee was formed,
which was responsible for this task. Thus, the
convertibility crisis led to a strengthening of the
central machinery for economic planning, in particular
through giving CEPS a comprehensive responsibility for
formulating advice on the implementation of plans.
III
The detailed reformulation of policy at the time of the
convertibility crisis to some extent followed familiar
paths and arrived at familiar conclusions. From the end
of the war manpower policy was dominated by the questions
of whether to use labour controls, and whether to cut the
armed forces faster. In the Summer of 1947 the
government appeared ready to strengthen the rump of
labour controls. To this end there were talks with the
TUe about a 'limited reintroduction' of labour direction
for 'purposes of persuasion', as Isaacs insisted.(43)
The TUe agreed to this, but the idea of renewed labour
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direction aroused extreme indignation when the government
introduced new legislation in Parliament. So vitriolic
was the Opposition's attack that the King wrote to Attlee
that he was 'perplexed' by different interpretations of
the Bill embodying the measures: was it, as the Lord
Chancellor had said, 'a purely legal necessity' to close
loopholes in existing powers or would it
'curtail seriously those liberties which






unsympathetically, asked Attlee 'as my Prime
to explain his true intentions. (44) The
government sent a reassuring reply, and in reality the
government was largely limited to exhortation in trying
to redistribute labour. For example, Attlee wanted
pressure to be put on employers in inessential industries
not to take on labour.(45) There was also the very well
publicised campaign against 'Spivs and drones': people
making a living from black markets. 'Spivs and drones'
were resented by the trade unions, who pointed out that
workers could hardly be expected to accept labour
discipline if the government tolerated corrupt practices.
The government told the TUC that reducing inflationary
pressure was the most effective way to deal with spivs
and drones, so the subsequent public campaign was
probably aimed at keeping the goodwill of the unions.(46)
In fact, the most significant indicator of the
government's intentions was the abolition of the
Cabinet's Manpower Requirements Committee in the reforms
following the crisis; for the first time there was no
central check on the distribution of manpower, and this
shows that the government had no serious intention of re-
introducing
budgets. (47)
Far more significant than the issue of labour controls
was the possibility of reducing the size of the armed
forces as a way of providing relief to inflationary
pressure and reducing overseas expenditure. At the end of
anything like the wartime manpower
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July Dalton proposed that 150,000 out of 500,000 troops
overseas should be brought home by the end of the year.
This again raised questions about overseas commitments,
and set alarm bells ringing in Washington. The Americans
were pressing Britain to retain as much military
influence overseas as possible, and Marshall sent a
message to Bevin on August 2nd warning about the
consequences of withdrawing British troops from Greece





this decision as to future
The option of slowing down the
call-up as an alternative to cuts in the armed forces was
put to the Cabinet on August 5th, but was rejected on the
grounds that it would not have a significant industrial
effect. On August 11th Dalton informed Attlee that he
was still worried about the size of the armed forces,
pointing out that in Bevin's view such a large force was
not needed for foreign policy aims. In a letter to
Attlee, Bevin asked: "•••if the Chiefs of Staff go on as
they are going, will they not ruin the entire prospects
of obtaining an efficient force, and turn the whole
country against them?,,(49)
Alexander, the Chief of Imperial General Staff, did
admit, in a paper to the Defence Committee, that plans
were still 'far beyond the capacity of the country in
this time of economic stress,.(50) Newassumptions were
laid down by Alexander, which accepted that it was not
possible 'to contemplate undertaking a major war until
our economic and industrial strength has recovered';
although, 'the financial limit imposed may prevent us
having the defence forces hitherto considered necessary
on the outbreak of war. ,(51) The aim for 'the next few
critical years' would be to maintain forces at the
minimum level, while at the same time providing
essentials and 'the best possible show of deterrent
strength,.(52) When this policy was considered at the
Defence Committee on September 18th 1947, the Minister of
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Defence saw 'serious risks'; Bevin found it 'difficult to
take an optimistic view of the international situation';
the drift of the discussion was that the danger of war
with Russia made the new assumptions unacceptable. (53)
Nevertheless, on September 30th the Minister of Defence
recommended the Cabinet to 'accept the serious risks and
political consequences involved in reducing the strength
of our armed forces •••". And on October 2nd the Cabinet
agreed. (54)
These decisions on cuts in the armed forces promised
some relief to the balance of payments. Meanwhile, the
new situation further underlined the need for continuous
scrutiny of factors affecting the output of basic raw
materials such as coal and steel. It was not yet clear
that the output of coal was sufficient to avert a new
coal crisis, though the government was well-prepared for
a repeat of the fuel crisis. In fact, Morrison pronounced
himself 'cross' with the miners, when ministers met an
NOM delegation to discuss coal output and working hours
the day after the announcement of the suspension of
convertibility. The government did not waste the
opportunity to press home the imperative need for more
coal. (55) There were also continuing problems with the
supply of steel. The supply of coal and steel were
closely interlinked, and the Fuel Allocations committee
was asked to look into the implications of a new target
of 14m tons of steel announced by the Prime Minister to
Parliament during August. (56)
There was, however, little optimism that the general
effects of the crisis, followed as it had to be by import
cuts and an intensified export drive, could be overcome
by measures to increase supplies. There were important
implications for allocations policy. CEPS was given work
connected with 'adjustments to industry' in the wake of





who met as the Economic
It was suggested that
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this committee should do a co-ordination job similar to
that done by the Ministry of Production in wartime.
Brooks agreed:
of control in
"there is a need for some greater measure
these matters". (57) On September 20th,
EP(O)C was told that "We shall want to expand output
where the whole or a large part is exportable and, in
particular, where it is required under possible future
trade agreements. We shall continue to hope for expansion
of output of items on the Prime Minister's Priority List
and there will be other items of growing internal
importance such as agricultural machinery "common
service" bottlenecks
saves imports." But
and production which definitely
the task of integrating these
different priorities and incorporating them into the
procedures of the administered economy was immense.
Gaitskell set down principles for allocation policy at
this time,(58) and he stressed how difficult allocation
decisions were going to be in the future. On the order
of priorities he agreed that exports were important, but
there were also important domestic priorities such as
steel for machinery that would improve productivity and
output in agriculture, thus saving imports. Gaitskell
was not for putting exports as a priority above
everything else, but he did want to put the the balance
of payments above what he called 'cherished programmes'
(meaning the building programme, especially housing).(59)
He also set out what he thought the chief conflicts in




was a major conflict between building and
for timber there was a conflict between
merchant shipping; for lead there was a
conflict between cable and battery exports on the one
hand and GPO investment and the building programme on
the other.(60) Gaitskell thus became the first minister
to express strong agreement with the view put so often by
officials, and by external critics such as Roy Harrod,
that there was a direct link between the level of exports
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led to tension between him and Bevan long
better-known clash over National Health
Services charges and rearmament.
Conflicts were not limited to problems with the
allocation of real resources. The expectation that
inflationary pressure would increase following the
suspension of convertibility and the approaching
exhaustion of the dollar loans also led to problems with
financial policy. The idea of a supplementary budget for
this purpose was first mooted on August 11th, in the
middle of the balance of payments crisis. An estimate
was made of the additional pressure, and means were
discussed of overcoming it in a special Autumn Budget.
This is well-known as the Budget which led to Dalton's
resignation because of a 'leak' to a journalist about the
contents of the Budget. It is less well known as an
occasion for sharp internal disagreement between Dalton
and the official Budget Committee about the measures for
disinflation. (61) There was no argument about financial
disinflation in principle: in the general policy
discussions preceding the budget it was generally ageed
that the main purpose would be to 'mop up' inflationary
pressure.(62) The early proposals were to double profits
tax and purchase tax. Also, investment controls would be
supplemented by instructions to the Capital issues
commdttee to restrain new financial investment. Where
there was argument between Dalton and the Budget
Committee was on the need to reduce food subsidies, which
had become the most expensive part of the stabilisation
policy introduced in 1940 to prevent wage rises by
keeping the working class cost of living level. After
the end of the war food subsidies had grown very fast,
doubling in amount during 1945-7, due to the rise in
import prices, especially of American Wheat. The food
subsidies were the subject of a powerful campaign in the
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press and among 'expert' opinion, which argued that they
should be reduced.(63)
In a note to Dalton on October 22nd, Bridges conveyed
the view of the Budget Committee that the proposed budget
yield of £22Om, even when account was taken of cuts in
the armed forces and investment, made "a wholly
inadequate contribution to the relief of the inflationary
pressure" , which would have "a serious effect on the
success of the Government's planning policy". Bridges
pointed out that the main structure of economic planning
rested on those items susceptible to effective control:
"planning of imports, planning of investment and fiscal
measures. We are bringing the first two under control,
but if, as we fear, we fall down on the third, the whole
of the inflationary pressure has to be met by the
physical controls, which cannot stand the strain". The
view of the Budget Committee was that the Budget should
deal "openly and resolutely with the subsidies". Cabinet
policy on the subsidies was that they should not increase
any further. The officials thought, instead, that the
estimated £435m figure should be brought down to £300m,
and that the consequent increase of prices "must not be
used as an argument for increase of wages". (64) In
short, working class living standards would have to fall.
While recognising that ministers would face serious
political difficulties in reducing subsidies, Bridges
argued the importance of retaining the confidence of
financial interests: "we have in mind, among other
things, interest rates and the market, which are
important to your financial policy and to the judgement
by other countries of the stability of sterling". Bridges
closed with the comment: "we should, as I know you will
agree, be failing in our duty if we did not tell you
frankly the very strong views that we have all formed on
the merits of this vital question at this crucial
moment". (65)
Dalton's rejoinder was to quote Otto Niemeyer's famous
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remark, made in 1931, "the trouble is that the rich are
too poor and the poor are too rich". This, he presumably
felt, summed up the attitude of the Budget Committee and
the government's external critics, who had been loudly
advocating cuts in food subsidies. He agreed that an
immediate Budget surplus was 'the primary counter to
inflationary pressure'; but pointed out that to produce a
surplus of a given size, '£10 million off here is as good
as £10 million off there'. Apart from this, different
types of cut would have very different results. Dalton
was convinced that a cut in food subsidies would worsen
the relative position of the poorest families, and would
produce the 'maximum political commotion among Government
supporters'. It could be argued that there would be
beneficial economic effects: reductions in subsidies
might 'stimulate workers to work harder, because their
food will cost them more'; but this policy of
disinflation through rising prices might equally induce
pressure for higher wages or welfare payments. In short,
cutting food subsidies combined the worst of all worlds
from Dalton's point of view. One of his last actions as
Chancellor was to exorcise the ghosts of 1931 by
rejecting the Budget Committee's 'strong views'. The
government did not change its policy on food subsidies
for the time being. (66)
IV
Keynes, defending the onerous terms of the dollar loans
against critics in 1946, pictured the alternative to
borrowing dollars and setting up a liberal trading system
as follows: Britain would have to 'build up a separate
economic bloc which excludes Canada and consists of
countries to whom we already owe more than we can pay, on
the basis of their agreement to lend us money they have
only
not got, and buy/from us and one another goods we are
unable to supply,.(67) This was the counterpart in the
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international economy of inflationary pressure and the
administered economy at home. Nevertheless, after the
convertibility crisis some degree of siege economy with
stronger economic controls became inevitable. This had
been predicted early in 1947 by O.S. Franks, in a series
of controversial lectures, published as Central planning
and controls in war and peace, in which he argued that
balance of payments difficulties would require central
economic direction for at least a decade. (68)
The August convertibility crisis resolved the
conflicts within economic policy in favour of tightening
up rather than relaxing economic controls. The bleak
economic outlook demanded a firmer approach to all the
problems that had been raised as objections to the use of
controls in the past. This did not remove the
difficulties of using direct controls to balance the
economy between production for domestic purposes and
exports, which had been raised by officials from the time
of the reconstruction discussions onwards, but it did
at least temporarily - change the atmosphere in which the
issues were studied. The resulting policy had many
elements of a siege economy. Exchange controls were
tightened, to limit capital movements from Britain and
from the sterling area as a whole, and a special Dollar
Drain committee was set up to pursue this policy.(69)
There were measures of discrimination to favour trade
within the Sterling Area. Bilateral deals were concluded
whereby Britain provided some scarce materials (which
would otherwise have been obtained with scarce dollars)
in exchange for dollar-saving imports. For obvious
reasons, the government wanted to export as little coal
and steel as possible, but made some concessions to
secure vital imports or for political reasons. Such
bilateral negotiations were supervised centrally by an
Overseas Negotiation Committee. (70) The possibility of
colonial development as a means of breaking the
bottlenecks of raw material supplies was looked at more
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seriously, as was the potential for expanding domestic
import-saving activities, especially in agriculture. In
these and other ways economic policy became more
autarkic after the convertibility crisis. But the most
important element of balance of payments policy continued
to be the export drive, with a renewed stress on
increasing dollar earnings. To this extent the
government was relying on discriminating against the
dollar area while exports to the dollar area were not
being discriminated against. This had become the only
realistic policy in the prevailing dollar shortage, and












examined comprehensively as a form of economic planning
in international trade. This account, however, deals
mainly with the export drive, which was closely inter-
related with investment policy, with the problems of
bottlenecks in supplies from the basic industries, and
thus with the issues of balancing the whole economy.
Moreover, the fate of export policy was central to the
policy discussions during the next reserves crisis,
during 1949, which led to devaluation. Nevertheless, it
is important to say something about import policy
immediately after the convertibility crisis. Senior
officials regarded this as central to economic planning
because it was susceptible to control, but this was less
true than they thought. When it came to implementing the
import cuts that were agreed by the Cabinet during the
crisis, it turned out that a large part of the food
import programme was covered by long-term contracts that
were difficult to cancel. There was a flurry of letters
between senior civil servants in the autumn of 1947 about
'difficulties' with the Ministry of Food, which had been
fiercely resisting cuts in the food programme. But the
real difficulty lay in the fact that assumptions about
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Table 6. Balance of payments, current account, 1945-51
(£M.)
Exports & Visible Invisible Current
Imports re-exports balance balance balance
1945 700 450 -250 -620 -870
1946 1,063 960 -103 -127 -230
1947 1,541 1,180 -361 -20 -381
1948 1,790 1,639 -151 177 26
1949 2,000 1,863 -137 136 -1
1950 2,312 2,261 -51 358 307
1951 3,424 2,735 -689 320 -369
Source: Feinstein, C.H. National income, expenditure and
output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965, 1972, Table 37
the level of imports on which the long-term contracts had
been based had been overtaken by events. Whereas the
contracts had originally seemed a good way of reducing
the costs of the import programme, it now had to be
accepted that, because of the difficulties of cancelling
them, the savings of hard currency expenditure "within
the period covered by the [August] Cabinet decision
cannot possibly be achieved,
rest of this year".(72) Thus,
and certainly not for the
not only was it difficult
to reduce the volume of imports, but the savings thereby
made would not be as great as had been hoped. The need
for success in the export drive was in consequence that
much greater.
From the reconstruction discussions to the
convertibility crisis, the main aim of export policy had
been to establish voluntary 'export ratios' with firms,
using techniques described by D.H. Robertson as "the
characteristic English processes of jollying along - of
encouragements which are not quite promises, frowns which
are not quite prohibitions, understandings which were not
quite agreements. ,,(73) There had been a policy of
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providing at least a 'trickle' of goods of all kinds for
export,(74) with only preliminary moves towards the
guidance of exports to particular markets. (75) The
suspension of convertibility gave a new twist to the
situation. With the exhaustion of the US loan imminent,
and only a distant and uncertain prospect of renewed
borrowing, it was necessary not just to increase the
total volume and value of exports, but also to change the
pattern. Since the convertibility crisis was
fundamentally a 'dollar shortage', exports to the dollar
area were particularly important. There was an attempt
to optimise foreign exchange earnings in
by setting criteria for 'desirable and




particular types of exports over a short period. This
represented a complete change of export policy, for which
Cripps, as President of the Board of Trade, was mainly
responsible. For the first time a formal export programme
was produced, by a new inter-departmental Exports
Committee. This was a committee of officials chaired by
a junior minister, very similar in concept to the Fuel
Allocations committee chaired by Gaitskell~ in this case
the chairman was Harold Wilson.(77) The Exports Committee
quickly produced an export programme acceptable to the
Cabinet. On September 12th, Cripps gathered a large
number of leading businessmen in Central Hall in London,
and put the government's new policy to them directly.
Cripps believed in the power of exhortation, but a
question raised by the new export policy was how far it
would require enforcement, something about which there
had been indecision since the reconstruction discussions.
In the first instance the Exports Committee was
responsible for discussing implementation of the export
programme, and in some of its early meetings it examined
such matters as sanctions through raw materials controls
to keep firms to agreed targets.(78) After a short time,
though, Wilson's committee concentrated on constructing
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and monitoring the export programme, leaving the question
of implementation to a new Export (Plans) (Official)
Committee. (79) In its terms of reference the Export
(Plans) Committee was given a very broad area of
interest, but the topiCS it considered most fundamental
were guidance and incentives. Because the new export
programme laid great stress on engineering exports, which
were expected to be relatively easy to increase, and
because the administrative controls over steel allocation
were still relatively strong, the committee felt that the
Ministry of Supply would be the department most affected
by any attempt to enforce the export programme by raw
material sanctions or other means. (80)
This picture changed during the autumn because the
government decided that it would be unrealistic to expect
such a rapid increase in engineering exports as had been
proposed in the initial export programme. Controls over
the use of steel were supposed to be complete, but the
government was still struggling to get the steel
distribution sytem under control. To the extent that
total steel supply was still constrained (the shortage of
dollars had not made things any easier), any attempt
dramatically to increase engineering exports would be a
factor making the steel allocation scheme yet more
problematical. Thus, although Gaitskell had claimed at
the start of August that the priority system was
beginning to bite on raw material allocations, after the
convertibility crisis it was said that there was a need
to get the co-operation of the steel industry to secure
priority orders for exports or import-saving, which
suggests that there were still problems.(81) On September
19th 1947, the Materials Committee carried out re-
adjustment of allocations for the export programme. (82)
But continuing difficulties with steel supplies and the
competing demands of public and private investment
programmes led Wilson to inform the Production Committee
in mid-November that shortfalls in steel would require
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revisions of the initial export targets.(83) The decision
to draw back from pushing engineering exports led to
complaints that the home market was being allowed too
much in the way of investment in plant and machinery:
'Can we better afford to cut these exports or home re-
equipment,?(84) However, there was another point of view:
that exports of engineering goods was a short-sighted
policy, preventing domestic re-equipment while
strengthening competitors. The question of whether too
many or too few capital goods were
continued to be a matter for debate for
being exported
some time.(85)
Meanwhile, the main result of the move away from
engineering exports as a quick solution to the export was
that attention moved to the potential for increasing
textile exports in late 1947, and the Production
Committee took on the task of seeing how they could be
increased.(86) The knotty problem with textiles was that
there would have to be ei.thera larger labour
cut in the clothing ration (a dilemma that




emphasis, the use of raw materials sanctions to enforce
the export programme became less important than had at
first appeared. Officials continued to examine the
problems of export guidance and incentives, but their
approach was, as before, sceptical.(88)
After Cripps '5 Central Hall speech in September, then,
there was a revision of export plans which was completed
by December 1947. The overall export target was slightly
raised.
because
Lower targets were agreed for engineering
This wasof reduced steel allocations.
particularly disappointing because engineering was an
area where it had been expected that quick gains could be
achieved. The overall dollar target was reduced,
correcting what was seen as initial over-optimism about
the potential market. (89) Some targets - textiles in
particular - were increased to make up for reductions in
others. The revised export programme was based on the
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assumptions that there would be no foreign aid; that
imports would be kept at the same level; that steel
supplies would not increase; and that domestic clothes
rationing would stay at the same level. The previous aim
of 160% of 1938 volume by the end of 1948 was regarded as
unrealistic unless more steel supplies were
forthcoming. (90) As to how the programme would be
carried out, an eloquent cutting from the Financial Times
of November 17th 1947 was placed in a Treasury file on
controls: 'The machinery •••for directing exports does not
exist and it would be a major task to create one,.(91)
v
To critics, the test of the government's resolve after
the convertibility crisis was not whether it would
enforce the export programme but whether it would enforce
investment cuts. The Cabinet agreed, on August 1st 1947,
to an investment review. Departmental programmes were to
be cut unless they made a direct contribution to exports
or import-saving. (92) The notion of departmental
'sponsorship' of industries meant that in principle the
whole field of investment, public and private, was
covered by this decision. To carry out the review, an
Investment Programmes Committee was set up, chaired by
Plowden. In order that the work of the IPC should not be
held up by inter-departmental wrangles it was agreed that
the IPC should not be composed of representatives from
all interested departments. (93) Plowden wrote to
departments, asking them to submit new investment
programmes to the IPC, preserving urgent priorities, but
based on an overall cut of 11.5%.(94) The IPC set to
work and produced a report by October 8th. This was
remarkably quick: one indicator of the work involved is
that the Board of Trade alone had to review some 8,000
industrial projects.(95)
The main aim of the exercise was to shift resources
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from investment to exports. The argument of Roy Harrod
and other critics was that cuts in 'excess capital
outlay' (by which they meant the building programme,
especially house-building) would allow a redeployment of
labour and materials which would reduce inflationary
pressure and help the export drive. This was a strongly-
held view among officials. Among ministers it was
supported forthrightly by Gaitskell. Thus, on August
8th, Gaitskell wrote to Morrison asking him to "resist at
all costs" any pressure for an early decision on the
future of the housing programme. Gaitskell was not a
Cabinet minister at this time, but because he had been
increasingly involved with allocations policy he was in a
strong position to argue that the conflict between
building and exports was, "unfortunately, apparent in
many raw materials, and there is no doubt whatever that
the implementing of the new export programme will depend
to some extent on whether we are prepared to cut
building". Gaitskell therefore wanted any decision on
housing to await the outcome of the IPC exercise. (96)
From the start, though, there was some scepticism about
whether 'redeployment' would work. At a CEPS staff
meeting in early September it was reported that the IPC
had discovered few large scale investment projects to
postpone; that curtailment of the housing programme would
not show benefits for some time; and that cutting issues
of building licences would only be effective after about
a year. Also, it was expected that redeployment of
building labour would be slow. Moreover, consumption of
materials would not necessarily be reduced after a cut in
the labour force since there were shortages of materials
in relation to the existing labour force. But the main
problem, to which 'no quick solution' could be seen, was
on the plant and machinery side, where the argument was
about whether capital equipment should be exported or
used for domestic re-equipment. (97) This was a fairly
comprehensive set of drawbacks, which helps to explain
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why there had to be revisions in the export programme
later, and throws some doubt on the reality of the IPC
exercise, as well as on the arguments of
believed that so much could be achieved by
critics who
redeployment.
Despite this, the IPC report was well received by Cripps,
judging by the marginal note he made on it when he first
read it: 'Very good paper, in form and sUbstance. This
is a real start in central planning! ••• The first real
achievement in practical economic planning'. The main
recommendations of the IPC met with general agreement as
they passed rapidly through the hands of all the main
official and ministerial committees concerned with
economic policy, up to the Cabinet.(98) The inevitable
exception concerned the housing programme. The Cabinet
meeting to discuss the IPC report led to a formal
complaint from Bevan to Attlee about the accuracy of
Cabinet conclusions. Bevan claimed to have agreed with
building cuts rather than housing cuts as recorded. (99)
The IPC report dealt with the investment aggregate in
two parts: building, and plant and machinery. Building
was sub-divided into housing and industrial building. The
latter was further broken down into civil engineering
(which included infrastructural works such as road
building), and factory building. The chief aim was an
overall investment cut for the reason already stated, but
the trickiest part of the committee's work was to
preserve the government's priorities by re-balancing
investment within the smaller total.(100) Within the
building programme, for example, housing was not the
simple welfare issue that some critics regarded as
readily disposable. To expand the workforce in key
industries such as mining and agriculture one of the main
things that could be done was to increase the supply of
workers' houses. A decision to put this priority into
the housing programme had been taken after the fuel
crisis, and the balance of payments c~isis only confirmed
the need for it. The IPC recommended that new housing
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starts should be reduced to 5,000 a month, and that these
should be mainly in mining and rural areas. (IOI)
Industrial building was also not without political
significance: there were the aims of regional policy,
which affected factory building and infrastructural work.
Once again, critics such as Harrod would have jettisoned
these, although in doing so the long-term prospects for
breaking the patterns of regional depression would be
jeopardised.(I02) At the same time, pressure groups such
as the FBI were insisting that industrial building should
have precedence over other building such as housing. The
IPC recommended a six month freeze on new industrial
building starts, and postponement of many other projects
- in all areas including Development Areas. Here an
important consideration was that industrial building was
an important user of steel.(103)
In the case of plant and machinery the committee's
decisions were guided by the hope of creating a direct
and qUick-acting connection between cuts in investment,
or reductions in supplies of consumer durables to the
domestic market, and increases in exports. Thus, it
seemed more plausible that exports of plant and machinery
would increase as a result of cuts in domestic re-
equipment than that resources would be redeployed to
export industries after building cuts. But important
programmes such as fuel and power expansion had to be
preserved, and investment that would increase the
efficiency of the export industries themselves had to be
taken into account. The outcome was a complex set of
recommendations. Some were concerned with restrictions
on deliveries of goods such as cars and passenger service
vehicles and light vans to the domestic market, in the
hope of encouraging exports. There were other
recommendations to curtail production of capital
equipment such as steam locomotives and railways
carriages, though not waggons. Allocations of steel and
timber for maintenance of the railways permanent way were
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reduced. The allocation of raw materials for many other
investment programmes was to be reduced or reviewed,
though the building of new power stations and hydro-
electric schemes was to go ahead for at least another two
years.(104) The difficulties that the committee found in
coming to a conclusion on many issues connected with
plant and machinery were reflected in the fact that not
all its recommendations were firm ones, further studies
were called for in a number of cases.
In their comment on the first IPC report, CEPS and the
Economic Section thought that the building
recommendations should be 'accepted and implemented
rigorously and without delay'. They were not so clear
about those on plant and machinery:
'The key factor is steel. Prospective steel
supplies are hedged around with much uncertainty.
There is no less uncertainty about the requirements
of steel for investment and other purposes - a
situation which is not eased by the absence of
quantitative programmes over a large part of the
field. Furthermore, since the [IPC] ••• was
appointed, the government has announced its export
plan, which is heavily weighted on the side of
engineering. This not only makes increased demands
for steel but also imposes severe restrictions on
the flow of capital goods for home
investment,.(105)
In light of the difficult steel prospects, it was
suggested that the balance of the export programme should
be looked at again, with a view to reducing the emphasis
on engineering. In particular, it was proposed that a
shift towards textiles would mean that the choice would
be between consumption and
equipment and exports. (106)
exports rather than re-
It was these considerations
that led to a supplementary IPC report in early 1948, and
to a new export programme, so the interlinked efforts of
the Exports Committee and the Investment Programmes
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Committee were only a first attempt at solving the
problems posed by the convertibility crisis. (107) In
fact,
that
the IPC report was the opening shot in a
lasted well into 1948. With so many
campaign
different
programmes and notions of priorities at stake, and a set
of recommendations that clearly required re-adjustment,
there were angry rejoinders from many directions. The
main ones concerned the electriCity programme, the
housing programme and the Development Areas. Following
the appraisal of the IPC report by various committees it
was decided to publish a 'suitably edited' version of the
IPC report, which became Capital investment in 1948.(108)
Many of the subsequent battles about the report took
place around what should or should not be included in
this document.
One extraordinary dispute occurred because the
chairman of the British Electicity Authority (who was
Walter Citrine, previously TUC General Secretary) wanted
it to be known that he regarded the government's attitude
to long-term investment in electricity supply as
irresponsible. In this he was backed by Gaitskell, who
had succeeded Shinwell as the Minister of Fuel and Power.
Citrine contrived with Gaitskell to insert a paragraph in
the draft white paper, stating that the BEA had protested
about the proposed cuts in the post-1951 construction
programme. '!bere was then a heated discussion about
whether a protest originating from the head of a
socialised industry could be included in a public
statement of government policy. (109) The offending
paragraph was struck out. But the dispute showed that
difficulties could arise between the head of a socialised
industry and a government in the course of
investment, contrary to the view that
relatively easy to control the volume





industries. In reality the heads of nationalised
industries were in a strong position to push against any
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policy regarded as not in the industry's interest
especially when the backing of the minister of the
sponsoring department could be obtained, and when a
complex set of priorities made it difficult to resolve
government policy into consistent principles.




1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
138.5 186.0 245.9 197.7 198.2 194.8
Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, II.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.116
One of the main objectives of the IPC exercise, as
already mentioned, was to shift building labour into
occupations which would make a more direct contribution
to the export drive. To this end lower labour ceilings
were established for the building programme. The
Ministry of Works strongly resisted the idea of putting
definite figures for labour ceilings in the White paper.
On the face of it this was because of uncertainty about
whether the ceilings would be met (the use of targets was
generally under attack at this time for this reason), but
in reality it was a rearguard action to preserve the
building programme. (110) It was also argued that the
housing cut proposed by the IPC would result in
unemployment in the construction and building materials
industries, (111) which would further damage the image of
economic planning. On this point the supporters of the
housing programme had a small Success: the housing cuts
were reduced from £200 to f180m. This was nothing like
total victory, but provoked Gorell ~arnes to complain to
Attlee that the government was displaying signs of
weakness, "coming on top of what has widely been regarded
as an inadequate Autumn budget". However, Cripps did
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insist, when there was further argument over how specific
the figures in the published programme should be, that
there should be no glossing over the objective of
shifting resources into export industries.(112)
Despite these internal wrangles, the government was
determined that the public face of investment cuts should
be set hard. One reason for this was clearly expressed
at an official meeting about the 1948 dollar programme:
"We are much more likely to get assistance if we show our
determination to put our own affairs in order."(14/10/47)
This was a reference to the growing prospect of ERP
aid,(113) and raises the question of whether the real
significance of the investment review was that it was a
'the first real achievement in economic planning', or a
public relations exercise to fend off critics until a new
dollar loan and economic recovery took the sting out of
their arguments. As a 'real exercise in economic
planning' the IPC certainly achieved the step of moving
from general objectives to a detailed programme.
Moreover, the government insisted that progress on the
recommendations of the IPC should be monitored and
followed up, a job which was given to the IPC itself.
And judging by the packed agendas and numerous documents
produced by the IPC in the following years it was one of
the busiest and most important official committees in the
central economic policy machinery.
Nevertheless, it remained to be seen whether the
political and technical obstacles to implementation of
the IPC report could be solved. This issue will be dealt
with in the next chapter, but there is no doubt that the
government retreated to some extent from the
recommendations of the IPC. On this there is, for
example, the evidence of a brief for a press conference
on the Economic Survey for 1948 (in which account was
taken of the efforts to trim capital expenditure in
1948).(114) It was thought that the press might ask
whether reductions in investment programmes were really
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being made on the scale promised in Capital investment in
1948. A strict answer would have to be "No", the brief




on industrial building was currently higher,
than lower, than in June 1947; (ii) additional
was being released to prevent unemployment in the
building trades ('This has not been announced and the
Ministry of Health is opposed to its announcement');
(iii) it had been decided to permit additional building
licences where unemployment was emerging. A rough
estimate was that this meant an extra £35m on the
building figure in 1948.(115)
VI
During the autumn of 1948 the prospects for borrowing
more dollars became brighter. The government began to
consider how any new loan would be used, and how bad the
situation would be if aid was not forthcoming. At first,
it was assumed that a new loan would just prevent things
from getting any worse. Thus, on January 3rd 1948 Cripps
gave the Economic Policy Committee a comprehensive
account of the economic situation in the light of the
work done on the Economic Survey for 1948, which Cripps
thought revealed a grave situation. (116) The balance of
payments position was worse than had been supposed,
because the 'volume of exports that we are likely to make
to the Western Hemisphere will probably not go as far as
we had hoped in paying for the imports we have been
assuming'. This made Marshall Aid necessary simply in
order to avoid further drastic cuts in imports. More
cuts would mean a drop in 'our already meagre standard of
living' and cuts in raw materials from dollar sources,




one of his most austere moods, thought that
version of the Survey should bring home to
that Marshall Aid would be used for longer-
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term recovery, and would not 'justify any relaxation of
effort or afford any considerable improvement in the
standard of living ••• For American public opinion we
should make it clear that we cannot make any substantial
contribution to European recovery in general without
Marshall Aid,.(118) Even with aid the problems would not
be negligible, Cripps was particularly worried that the
restoration of the balance of payments might take longer
than Marshall Aid could be expected to last.(119) It is
notable that he placed considerable stress on development
of alternative sources of supply: 'our only real hope of
permanent improvement in our balance of payments must lie
in the expansion of the Sterling Area resources in
foodstuffs and raw materials. The development of our
African resources in particular is, therefore, of prime
importance and must be a major consideration in planning
our economic activities,.(120) On the export drive,
Cripps informed the EPC that not only did the targets for
the export programme as a whole have to be achieved, but
the grave situation required a diversion of more goods
towards markets in the western hemisphere. At the same
time, 'The closer examination of the export targets and
the greater knowledge of the limits that will be set by
our steel supplies has shown the difficulty of reaching
some of the targets', which had required the raising of
other targets. (121)
The use of targets had become somewhat
by this time: there were differences of
controversial
views between
ministers and officials about their usefulness. Notes on
progress towards the targets of the Economic Survey for
1947 had been formally abandoned in October 1947, because
they had become an 'unreal' exercise. (122) Nicholson
reported to Morrison on 2/12/47 that a report by the
official Steering Committee on Economic Development on
'targets and their fulfi~,ment' had been dropped. (123)
Never-ending problems with supplies of steel and coal
raised the question of whether realistic targets could be
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set in the 1948 Survey. Cripps felt, in spite of the
general debacle of the 1947 Economic Survey, that the
experience with coal in 1947 showed that targets did
encourage effort, and he recommended that targets for
manpower and output should be set 'wherever possible in
all the fields where production is
The case of problems






mention, because it was regarded as critically important
to the export drive. The question was raised of whether
there should be 'wartime' vigour in the drive for
more textiles. The Ministry of Labour, consistent with
their opposition to wartime vigour in manpower policy,
wanted lower output and manpower targets for textiles in
the Survey. The Board of Trade wanted an ambitious
target of 325,000 for the workforce but conceded that no
date should be set. What lay behind these hesitations was
a lack of direct means to increase the workforce, a
question which was taken up by the Production Committee
during 1948.(125)
Clearly, then, there were problems in every area of
economic policy after the convertibility crisis. Drastic
import cuts would have threatened living standards and
the level of employment; furthermore, they were difficult
to carry out because of the existence of long-term
contracts. Cutting the armed forces meant giving up
overseas commitments, which was opposed by the United
States and caused misgivings in the government. At first
it seemed that quick gains in the export drive could be
made at the expense of domestic investment in plant and
machinery, but this rather dubious course of action was
ruled out by a combination of shortages of steel and
inflexibilities in existing investment programmes. There
were doubts, too, about the efficacy of cutting other
investment in the hope that there would be a quick
redeployment of labour and materials to export purposes.
Finally, the financial pressures resulting from 'Fair
229
Shares' and stabilisation policy threatened to upset
budget policy if inflationary pressures increased.
Thus, the techniques of economic planning provided no
short-cut to reducing the pressures brought about by the
draining of reserves, but the feeling grew that further
dollar loans were a possibility - especially if Britain
was seen to be 'putting its own affairs in order'. There
was still a strong hope that the US government preferred
lending to create international expansion, rather than
forcing Britain into a siege economy. The development of
the crisis policies during the autumn of 1947 should be
seen in this context. This is not to suggest that the
balance of payments and investment policies initiated in
August were not taken seriously: at that time another
dollar loan seemed a long way off, so the necessity for
pursuing the siege economy was real, though it was not
pursued all that far. And in the winter of 1947-8 the
outlook was still very uncertain. Indeed, Attlee was
warned about renewed pressure on dollar reserves in
February 1948. There were also Signs of a recession in
the US economy, and the British economy
face severe internal dislocation and




Attlee's advisers even tentatively mooted
devaluation. (126) As yet there was no definite sign that
1948 would be a year of recovery.
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Chapter 6
RECOVERY, DISINFLATION AND DECONTROL, 1948
During 1947, because of the fuel and convertibility
crises, the government adopted measures that made
economic planning at least potentially more effective.
New priorities were set; the central machinery of
government was changed to improve the co-ordination of
different aspects of policy-making; steps were taken to
make sure that policies were being 'progressed';
allocation systems were scrutinised in order to prevent
haphazard distribution of scarce resources. These were
emergency measures forced on the government by the
crises, which caused a retreat from the idea of 'planning
for expansion', and during the summer and autumn of 1947
it was not clear whether the restrictive policies adopted
at the time of the convertibility crisis would have to be
endured for months or years. In 1948 pessimism continued
for several months; general anxiety about the balance of
payments continued for the first half of the year. But it
gradually became apparent that, for various reasons, the
economic situation was changing for the better. For one
thing, it was discovered that the economy had performed
much better than expected in 1947. Output, productivity
and exports had all risen satisfactorily, and continued
to do so throughout 1948.(1) Also, during 1948 renewed
dollar aid became certain, and apprehension about the
consequences of import restrictions therefore receded.(2)
Thus, Hall was able to inform Attlee on September 15th
1948 that it was now clear how much ERP aid would be
available, and that Britain was 'well on the way to
recovery,.(3) Finally, measures taken by the government
were making some contribution to the economic
improvements. This, then, was the changing background to
continuing internal discussions: about financial policy;
about the relationship between disinflation and decontrol
in the short-term; about the export drive and the future




In a 1948 Economic Section discussion paper, the economy
was compared to a coastline of jutting cliffs and inlets
with sandy beaches. The cliffs represented controls, the
strongest defences against raging waves of excess demand.
The inlets, with congenial, gently sloping sandy beaches,
represented normal markets. With disinflation the tide
of demand would fall; more and more sandy beaches would
be exposed; and at some point waves would no longer dash
against the cliffs.(4) This picture sums up an important
change that took place with economic recovery in 1948: it
became possible once again to contemplate ways to relax
controls and return to the market economy, and with this
came a return to the themes of economic policy advice
that had been pressed rather prematurely in 1945-6. But
the metaphor was invented to suggest the complexity of
the relationship between disinflation and decontrol: it
was no easy task to assess the extent to which conditions
for the normal operation of markets had been restored and
how far there was a need for continuing control.
Nevertheless, the situation was transformed by comparison
with the previous year.
The overture to the strategy of disinflation and
decontrol pursued in 1948-9 began in the Autumn of 1947,
when it still seemed likely that there would have to be
more control rather than less, as inflationary pressure
was expected to rise in the aftermath of the
convertibility crisis. Indeed, it was the prospect of
having to retain controls in the long-term that prompted
a comprehensive review of the whole system; before this
such a review had seemed unecessary because controls were
regarded as temporary. (5) The review was directed by the
Government Organisation Committee (GOC), chaired by
Bridges, set up in October 1947 for the purpose of making
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a general examination of the relations between government
and industry; but the GOC soon turned to the more
immediately practical task of reviewing controls.(6) In
December 1947, Brook wrote of the problems posed by
economic controls, which he feared could affect adversely
the size and integrity of the civil service, and
industrial efficiency. These problems might change from
irritants to dangers if the network of controls had to be
maintained in the long-term; Brook therefore thought that
the review should consider alternatives to controls,
including fiscal measures.(7) At the beginning of 1948,
Bridges described the review by the GOC as forming 'a
single plan for the general overhaul of government
controls,.(8)
The particular question of the effect of controls on
industrial efficiency was dealt with by a special
committee on Controls and Efficiency (CE), chaired by
Bernard Gilbert of the Treasury. The most important part
of its terms of reference was: "To consider the economic
questions arising out of the operation of controls".(9)
In the CE committee the running was made by the permanent
secretary to the Board of Trade, Sir John Woods, who set
out what he regarded as the fundamental flaws of price
controls and materials allocation. In the case of price
controls the main problem was that, even with wide
variations in costs between different firms in an
industry, the least efficient could remain in production,
while most efficient earned 'excess' profits. (In the war
this problem had been tackled by Excess Profits Tax,
which was repealed after the war). The upshot was that
the general level of efficiency was prevented from
rising. Moreover, the sellers' market had virtually
eliminated competition in many industries.(10) In the
case of materials allocation Woods identified two major
problems: first, the calculation of allocations on the
basis of shares of output in a former year (usually 1938)
meant, as with price controls, that the more efficient
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firms could not expand at the expense of the less
efficient; second, there was no easy way to cope with
'new entrants' to an industry. Thus, both price controls
and materials allocation were freezing the structure and
efficiency of industry. To boot, trade associations and
other forms of restrictive practices were thriving.
Finally, there were inefficiencies resulting from the
system of controls itself, which never quite fitted
together. (11) Clearly, price controls and materials
allocation were techniques only suitable for short-term
use, they had to be either modified or abandoned, and the
instincts of senior officials leant towards the latter.





ministers might call for urgent action in a deflationary
situation which "might arise very soon" (15/5/48).
Deflation appeared possible at this time because, from
autumn 1947, it was an objective of budget policy to
produce a substantial surplus of revenue over
expenditure, in order to reduce aggregate demand.(12) In
this situation Bridges thought that two measures would be
possible: "One would be to stimulate greater efficiency
in industry and trade through easing or removing controls
and thus facilitating a reduction of prices [Bridges had
in mind that efficient firms would take advantage of
decontrol to expand their output at the expense of the
less efficient, and that this would lead to price falls].
The other would be to increase the amount of purchasing
power available i.e. to reverse the deflationary trend by
reverting to inflation. The latter would be disastrous,
but there was a real risk of being forced into it if
proposals on the former remedy were not available when
called for". Hall agreed that "clear indications of the
existence of a deflationary trend might well appear
had been to find ways to restore a measure of
in industry, and to enable market forces to
production and efficiency. By mid-1948 the
had changed: Bridges told the committee that
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within the next month or two".(13)
Budgetary disinflation (in combination with the
expansion of output that was going on at the same time)
could provide opportunities for relaxing controls. But
the officials adopted a cautious approach because the
danger of open price inflation still could not be
ignored. Decontrol was viewed as a gradual process. The
CE committee tried to identify particular cases where
disinflation might allow the removal of controls. For
example, they studied the boot and shoe industries,
paint, furniture, radios, jam and some housing
components. All the controls associated with these
industries were scrutinised, and various examples were
discussed. Memos were written on the goods most likely
to be affected by disinflation.(14) In addition, the
Economic Section prepared regular reports on 'signs of
deflation' so that departments could immediately take
advantage of any opportunity to relax controls. The
Board of Trade also issued a monthly 'disinflation'
report. (15)
By August 1948 the CE committee decided that its own
enquiries were 'palliative': it co~ld recommend no major
changes to the system of controls, and concluded that "a
great deal of the success of any control-lifting policy
depended on the liveliness of initiative of those
actually in charge of operating the particular controls,
though government policy was, of course, the dominant
factor". (16) The main questions for the future concerned
materials allocation. Was it possible to remove them?
Was it possible to rely on goodwill rather than direction
or the threat of sanctions to achieve export targets?
Studies continued during 1948 on materials allocation,
and the steel distribution scheme in particular. (17) But
it had to be reluctantly concluded that there was a limit
to the process of decontrol. Both the deliberations of
the administrators and the theoretical discussions of the
economists backed up wartime judgements about the central
241
importance of controls over raw materials in the
transition. Although both groups would have preferred to
get rid of more controls, and could bring formidable
arguments to bear in favour of decontrol, conditions were
not yet ripe. (18) In a paper on 'Alternatives to,materials allocations, Dow argued that it was difficult
to remove administrative allocations altogether, or even
to modify the existing controls. Price controls were
difficult to envisage as an alternative to
because while raw materials were scarce,
allocations,
a firm hand
would be needed on all end-products. In another of the
Economic Section's useful hydrological metaphors, Dow
imagined the economy as equivalent to a river system
ending in a delta. Raw materials controls were like a dam
on the higher parts of the system, whereas price controls
and rationing of end-products operated down in the delta
- where the few broad rivers of raw materials turned into
inumerable smaller streams of commodities, whose prices
had by then been formed in complex ways. Therefore,
while there were scarcities there must be administrative
controls, though he thought that raw material prices
could be increased in some cases.(19)
The key raw materials, those allocated by the
Materials Committee, remained relatively unaffected by
the 1948 relaxations of control. (20) But, as the
permanent secretaries on the Controls and Efficiency
committee probably hoped, there was a veritable fashion
for decontrol among those operating the many controls
affecting the 'delta' of the economy. The basis for this
was laid by Cripps when, at the end of October 1947, soon
after his appointment as Minister of Economic Affairs, he
asked the Treasury to give 'every possible support' to
Harold Wilson in streamlining the staff of the Board of
Trade.(21) As a result, special machinery was set up in
the Treasury's Organisation and Methods division. Later,
'Examiners of Controls' were appointed for the Board of
Trade and several other departments. The Examiners met as
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a 'Co-ordinating Committee on Controls' (CCC), chaired by
P.D. Proctor, (22) and its records show that it pushed
hard for general decontrol, including the dismantling of
raw materials controls. This led to a strange situation
in which there were, in effect, two opposite developments
in economic policy machinery initiated soon after the
convertibility crisis: one aimed at increasing the
effectiveness of economic planning; the other aimed at
dismantling the apparatus of economic control as fast as
possible. It would be possible to regard the two aspects
of policy as the practical consequence of the general
principles of controls policy - dispensing with useless
controls and making necessary controls work effectively -
but this would ignore the fact that there was an internal
argument about the future direction of policy. In
particular, the organisation of the CCC was strikingly
similar to CEPS' Economic Planning (Official) committee,
and it is tempting to speculate that the former was
consciously designed as a foil to the latter. The aims of
the two committees were clearly in conflict insofar as
the implementation of plans depended on controls.
The idea of departmental Examiners of Controls was the
initiative of the Board of Trade, which had the most
ramified system of controls.(23) The Examiner appointed
to the Board, in February
director of BX Plastics
Plastics Controller at
1948, was L. Merriam, managing
Ltd., who had been wartime
the Ministry of Supply. (24)
Merriam organised the famous 'bonfires' which were




though there was less to this claim than
At the time of the first 'bonfire', in




that the 200,000 licences 'burned' would not
manpower. Brooks wrote to Bridges: "I hope




an administrative simplification described by a minister
in such glowing terms yields no substantial economy in
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Civil Service nan-power"; (25) The licences, it
transpired, had been issued by 53 staff: more than half
were permits for the purchase of vacuum flasks, issued
more or less automatically by 26 regional officials.
Woods thought that this was an example of administrative
efficiency, and professed himself surprised and irritated
by the suggestion that 'the splendour of any relaxation
of controls is to be measured by the number of civil
servants dispensed with as a result'. He claimed that
the Board had reduced its staff considerably, but not
through the 'bonfire'. As he pointed out, large numbers
of civil servants were involved in rationing the public,
not in regulating manufacture or rationing industry.
Clearly piqued, Woods asked: "could we add this
correspondence to the bonfire?".(26)
As Examiner of Controls, Merriam used a simple
criterion for decontrol: if allocations were not taken up
in full, it was time for relaxation. This was how the
'bonfires' were built. But he confessed later(27) that
at first he had been 'bewildered' by the profusion of
controls and reasons for controls. He found that what he
thought was a control was sometimes not regarded as such
by those who operated it; and even at the end of two
years
field.
he was not certain that he had covered the whole
He identified three purposes for controls (i)
allocation of scarce materials, or materials which cost
dollars; (ii) control of manufacture and distribution of
goods which were dollar earners; (iii) ensuring a
'sufficient proportion' of sound, inexpensive goods for
the home market. According to Merriam, by the end of
1949 he had been reduced to 'rounding up isolated
stragglers or discussing the few really baffling
problems'; the latter often concerned the controls which
remained, e.g. in softwoods and cinema film for
newsreels. Here the main problem was to find some
alternative to the 'base year' system,




firms could improve their market share. In general, he
found that there was usually good information about
supplies but it was often difficult to judge when
shortages were coming to an end from the demand side.
In Merriam's view another problem was that although the
Board 'led the way' in decontrol, its hands were tied
because it sponsored a number of industries whose raw
materials were allocated elsewhere. The leading example
was steel, which he believed could be partly decontrolled
(many officials, including P.O. Proctor, agreed with him
about this). As for an overall assessment of relaxation,
it is significant that Merriam felt unable to present any
illuminating figures. He had to admit, after the
embarrassing experience of the 1948




What conclusions can be drawn from this decontrol
campaign? The work of the CE committee illustrates the
tension that existed between the principles that senior
civil servants would like to have followed and the
practical situation they found themselves in. For them
the controls clearly were an unsatisfactory hangover from
wartime. They were looking for opportunities to re-
establish the operation of market forces as far as
possible within the constraints of government policy and
the economic situation, but on both counts there were
limits to the decontrol campaign. In particular, it
proved easier to dismantle the more superficial forms of
control operated by the Board of Trade, than to penetrate
into the territory of the Materials Committee.
II
To some extent, as has already been mentioned, the
prospects for decontrol seemed to depend on the success
of financial policy, and on fiscal policy in particular,
since the use of interest rates as a deflationary
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instrument was still anathema. While Dalton was
Chancellor it had been a common complaint that he did not
do enough to reduce the pressure of monetary demand, an
issue which came to a head in the autumn of 1947, over
food subsidies. By contrast, Cripps' 1948 budget has
often been seen as a turning point in economic policy.
Certainly, it had a clear disinflationary aim: on the
basis of arguments put forward by the Economic Section
there was agreement to aim at a large budget surplus in
1948-9; on assessment of the inflationary gap the
economic advisers proposed that this should be £500m.(28)
In fact, the basic principle of disinflation through a
budget surplus had already been implemented by
Dalton. (29) A small surplus was actually achieved in
1947-8,(30) and later analysis has shown that Dalton's
supplementary budget in the autumn of 1947 was
responsible for most of the surplus of £628m achieved in
1948.(31) How far this had a disinflationary effect, as
compared with other favourable changes taking place at
the same time, cannot be examined here. What is certain,
however, is that senior officials and economic advisers
felt that with Cripps they were beginning to get economic
policy onto a better footing. Therefore, Cripps'
Chancellorship marked a change of mood, even if the
changes of substance had begun under Dalton.
Recalling earlier resistance by Treasury officials to
making budget policy a part of economic planning, it is
relevant to ask whether there were any significant
changes after Cripps became Chancellor. An interesting
exchange between Hall and Plowden reveals that budget-
making was still a rather isolated and obscure process
within the central machinery of government at the start
of 1948. Hall wrote to Plowden about the Budget
Committee: "I don't know whether this committee meets
throughout the year ••• But it seems to me that there are
a number of problems about the general place of the
Budget in the national economy which could profitably be
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discussed at more leisure than we have had in recent
months". Plowden replied that, like Hall, he was a
newcomer to the Budget Committee, though he agreed that
there was no time for 'fundamental' discussion, and also
thought that there was a lack of basic economic knowledge
on which to frame budget policy (a rather surprising
judgement in view of the fact that the techniques of
assessing the inflationary gap by means of national
income and expenditure forecasting had been developing
since the beginning of the war). Nevertheless, Plowden
thought that the Budget was "now an integral part of
general economic planning".(32) Crippss general approach,
in his Budget speech in Parliament, bears this out.(33)
In April 1948 there was a meeting to discuss the
issues raised by Hall, who wanted a much more general
forward look at budgetary prospects and policies. Hall
wrote that he was worried about the high incidence of
taxation and its general effects on incentives of workers
and capitalists alike; he felt that income tax should be
reduced and super tax should not be increased.(34) With
this in view he saw a need to further reduce government
expenditure as a top priority, especially expenditure on
food subsidies (which was still increasing). (35) The
outcome was a 4-year budget policy paper, in which there
were no fundamentally new ideas, but which should be
viewed in relation to previous opposition from some
Treasury officials to the idea of making budget policy a
part of economic planning: a similar suggestion for
forward budget planning, made by Meade several years
earlier, had been cold-shouldered by Gilbert. (36)
Therefore, the opposition to expanding the role of the
peacetime Budget, which existed from the time of the
reconstruction discussions onwards, seems to have been
overcome in 1948, allowing the Budget to move into the
centre of policY4naking in the following years, when it
came to be regarded - at least by officials - as the main
instrument of planning.
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The most probable reason for the change of attitude
from the reconstruction discussions and those of the
early post-war years was that the emphasis had changed
towards budget surpluses and control of public
expenditure in inflationary conditions, as against budget
deficits and increases in public expenditure in
recessionary conditions. This was more acceptable to the
traditionally-minded because it did not involve the
danger of political profligacy. Moreover, a very
important consideration in the short-term was that
disinflation was the precondition for decontrol, and a
budget surplus was seen as the main instrument available
to push the process of disinflation along. Under Cripps,
as under Dalton, the option of 'disinflation by rising
prices' was ruled out: Cripps continued to stick to the
policy of stabilising the cost-of-living index, which was
as important as ever following the government's success
persuading the TUC, in early 1948, to agree to wage
restraint as laid out in the Statement on personal
incomes, costs and prices. (37)
Thus, during 1948 there came into being a close
connection between budget policy, disinflation and
decontrol. As the balance between the importance of
physical controls and financial policy altered, there was
some tension between those responsible for the different
aspects of economic policy. This is clear, for example,
in the deterioration of relationships between the
Treasury and CEPS during 1948. (CEPS moved into the
Treasury when Cripps became Chancellor in the autumn of
1947, but retained its separate identity and role). CEPS
had been made responsible for progressing economic plans
after the convertibility crisis, but it is questionable
whether it ever achieved the authority that it required
to carry out this task effectively. Although Plowden sat
on key financial policy bodies such as the Budget and the
Dollar Drain committees,
work mainly on 'physical'
CEPS as a whole continued to
policy-making, whereas the
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Treasury still held sway over financial policy, and its
traditional role vis-a-vis the departments began to be
reasserted as the special conditions of wartime were
replaced by the new peacetime concerns already outlined.
Indications of CEPS' difficulties are contained in the
report of a 1948 working party on 'Treasury administration
and modifications of Economic Surveys and Long-term
programmes~ This resulted from a complaint by CEPS that
changes in economic policy were being made without CEPS
being informed. For example, during 1948 clothes rations
were increased but CEPS only heard about it afterwards
(the Treasury claimed to have been ignorant about this
change as well). CEPS was responsible for checking on the
progress of policies, and in order to keep its work on
long-term plans and Economic Surveys up to date it wanted





plans before they were accepted, hence the
up of the special working party. (38) The report
working party concluded that most pOints were
covered by normal liaison. While agreeing that
there had been changes which affected the Survey policies
(which were still supposed to be strictly adhered to) the
working party concluded: "We do not think that the
Treasury Divisions can undertake any further police work
which would not make undesirable inroads into the
responsibility of the departments themselves". It was
also out of the question for the Treasury to acquire
information purely to pass it on to CEPS. Plowden was
left to appeal as best he could to department heads to
give CEPS the information it needed.
So the report did not uphold CEPS' complaints to any
significant degree: the impression given was that good
work was already being done. However, it did envisage
that liaison between the Treasury and CEPS would have to
become closer for another reason. The working party noted
that 'physical factors often impose more stringent limits
than do financial proposals', hence it was 'often tacitly
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assumed that finance will be forthcoming to cover
whatever physical resources are allocated'. However,
'Sooner or later ••• the financial considerations must
become relatively more important'; indeed, they would
'probably become so by 1950'. Links between CEPS and the
Treasury would have to become closer: 'so that the purely
financial implications of 1950 programmes can be watched
during the formative stages more closely than had been
thought necessary for earlier Surveys,.(39) Thus the
tables were neatly turned: an enquiry into why CEPS was
not being informed about impending economic policy
decisions was turned into an augury of the ascendancy of
financial policy over physical planning - and therefore
of the ascendancy of the Treasury.
III
The basic elements and early development of the new
policy on the balance of payments initiated after the
convertibility crisis were analysed in the last chapter.
It was shown that export policy was particularly
important: export markets became 'desirable and less
desirable'; and the priority of supplying more exports
was to be superimposed on the allocation and control
systems. As might be expected, the economic improvements
that became evident during 1948, and the thinking about
disinflation and decontrol discussed above, influenced
the further development of these ideas. In general, the
pressure to carry through unpopular and difficult
administrative direction of exports was reduced, though
the export strategy was energetically pursued, as is
evident from the records of the committees which had the
duty of seeing it through. The immediate responsibility
belonged to the Exports Committee, under Harold Wilson,
and the official Export (Plans) committee. The Exports
Committee was kept very busy, dealing with a fluid
situation: it made a monthly report on export figures,
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divided by commodity and by country, and set out as
actual and forecast percentages of export performance in
1938.(40) There were numerous detailed discussions about
hard and soft, desirable and less desirable markets.(41)
The purpose of all this activity was to keep targets and
programmes realistic,
supplies and providing
firms in line with a
and to achieve them by increasing
materials allocations
guidance, where necessary keeping
combination of discrimination in
and other measures. (42) The
between 1947 and 1948 exports
Dow comments: 'it is difficult
policy had some success:
rose by a quarter, and as




targets, which had been agreed in
with all the main industries while
was still at the Board of Trade,(43)
(subject, of
shortages) •(44)
course, to changes due to steel
But all this evidence of immense energy·
begs the question of whether the government was able or
willing to do much more than state the targets to be
aimed at and lay down guidelines for achieving them.
At the time of the convertibility crisis there was
certainly a greater will than there had previously been
to solve the problems of how to use controls to encourage
more exports; but nothing had changed the nature of the
problems since wartime studies had emphasised the
difficulties. One general problem was that because there
was no precise correspondence between the effects of
controls and the balance of payments almost any existing
control might be relevant.(45) In principle, any resource
controlled by a government department in any way could be




export drive: a policy of discrimination. A broad
of production licences and material allocations
theoretically be made conditional on agreements to
export, and could be revoked if export performance was
unsatisfactory. In the autumn of 1947 the Board of Trade
began an enquiry into discrimination in the allocation of
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scarce resources, (46) asking other departments to answer
a number of questions, the answers to which provide some
indication of how far dirigiste methods were actually
being used in the export drive:
"(a) How much are we discriminating? on the basis of
export performance? Have we tightened up?
(b) What is the existing practice?
(c) To what extent is discrimination towards firms
exporting to hard currency markets, and whose output
goes more (as a proportion) to dollar markets?".(47)
Replies from departments show that there were few areas
where discrimination was already firmly established, and
little enthusiasm for a strong policy. Specific
discrimination in favour of dollar-earners was said to be
difficult without a detailed knowledge of export
markets.(48) Points were made about cases where the home
market had priority over exports (to back this up there
was a system of export licences covering items such as
hand-tools for use in building). Moreover, the Raw
Materials Department of the Ministry of Supply pointed
out that, to be effective, a policy of discrimination
would have to take into account all the inputs used by
firms manufacturing for export - the example of glue was
given. (49) To iron out such difficulties would require
more staff, but it was an important aim of the government
to streamline the civil service. This is not to say that
there were no cases of discrimination in favour of
exporters in making allocations. The examples of paper
and leather were given by RMD.(50) The Ministry of
Supply replied that in the case of steel and some other
commodities it made separate allocations for export, with
the implied threat that allocations were dependent on
targets being achieved. (51) But the overall impression
was given that discrimination was not being applied on
any large scale, and though the possibility of controls
being used in the export drive was kept in mind during
the decontrol campaign this did not hold up the
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dismantling process in any important way.
There was a similar outcome to attempts to find other
methods of pursuing the export drive, which was the
responsibility of the official Export (Plans) committee.
One of its more radical steps was to recommend a policy
of supervising the order books of heavy engineering
firms. This was done by the Ministry of Supply in
conjunction with the Board of Trade.(52) But the Ministry
of Supply made much of the drawbacks: the specialised
firms that existed in the industry; its fragmented
organisation; the misleading picture given by perusing
order books; and the problems of respecting commercial
secrecy.(53) Later, the Export (Plans) committee had a
specific discussion on the distribution of exports of
capital goods - and came to a very negative conclusion
about the possibilities of government action: "The
difficulty of applying discriminating incentives or
sanctions to secure adjustment to the distribution of
exports of capital goods between the various markets and
the necessity of having to rely primarily upon the co-
operation of industry to secure the desired results must,
broadly speaking, be accepted".(54) Of course, the
export of capital goods presented a particularly knotty
problem. True, overseas demand was high, and so there
was little difficulty in selling anything that could be
produced; but domestic demand was also high; while total
supplies were particularly affected by steel
There were those who pOinted out that the
relief to the balance of payments from





disadvantage in the longer-term as overseas competitors
re-equiped while domestic re-equipment was being held
back in the name of the export drive. The worst of these
fears were removed by the shift of emphasis away from
engineering exports late in 1947, and by the easing of
steel shortages during 1948. But the argument was still
heard: capital exports in 1948 were above the target
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and or to (-)
cast- steel- Re- Net Home
ings makers usable Im- Ex- ex- deli-
Year made stocks steel ports ports ports veries
1937 12.98 -0.08 1.48 2.92 1.44 11.62
1943 13.03 +0.20 0.25 2.77 0.12 -2.65a 16.13
1946 12.70 +0.15 0.81b 0.48 2.30 1.82 11.64
1947 12.72 +0.30 0.85b 0.46 1.73 1.27 12.60
1948 14.88 -0.16 0.63b 0.50 1.98 1.49 13.87
1949 15.55 -0.25 0.52 1.09 2.36 1.27 14.55
1950 16.29 -0.11 0.48 0.56 3.15 2.59 14.29
Only the figures for ingots and castings are precisely
comparable before and after 1946.
a Net import.
b Presumably inflated by disposals from war stocks.
Source: D. Burn, The Steel Industry 1939-59, 1961, p.135
level, and there were worries that this success might
strengthen competition from US firms in overseas markets
in the future. So there were continuing doubts about how
far the policy of increasing capital goods exports should
be pushed. (55)
When the decision was made to change the emphasis of
the export campaign away from engineering products, in
the autumn of 1947, the government decided to put more
effort into increasing the export of textiles.(56) This
policy was also not an easy one to implement. If the
industry could not be expanded, more exports entailed a
cut in the clothing ration. Expansion could be achieved
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by faster re-equipment, but this would require cutting
back on exports of textile machinery, for which demand
was especially buoyant. Moreover, textiles had been
suffering from severe labour shortage since before the
end of the war; the workforce had to be expanded or
persuaded to work harder or longer. The campaign to
increase textile exports was taken on by the Production
Committee, and Douglas Jay, Economic Secretary to the
Treasury, had particular responsibility for it. But
effective policy instruments were limited. Labour
controls could not be used, as had become evident long
before; therefore the government depended such ideas as
encouraging the provision of day nurseries to attract
more women workers into the industry. Some effort went
into such measures, (57) and the textiles labour force did
grow, but in the end it was higher wages that eased the
problems of labour shortage, rather than any factor under
the direct control of the government. (58)
Table ~ U.K. textile industries labour force, 1938,
1945-51
(Thousands)
1938 1945 1946 1947
Total •••••• 859 469 536 576













a These figures are based numbers of insured persons. As a
consequence of the National Insurance Act the number of
insured employees probably rose by 10-15% in 1948.
Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.98
After the convertibility crisis, then, the government
went into the balance of payments problem in fine detail,
and strenuous efforts were made to inform exporters about
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what was expected of them, but the government was unable
to make much impact with its own direct effort. What
emerges from an examination of the records of the export
committees is that controls were still generally seen as
difficult to apply. Although initially there was a
commitment to increasing the supply and changing the
pattern of exports by use of materials allocation and
other measures, the use of discrimination in favour of
exports proved elusive, if not distasteful. In this
respect it was fortunate indeed that many of the supply
constraints were eased during 1948. Even in wartime,
with a large degree of public co-operation, priorities
had been found to be unworkable once they got beyond a
relatively simple aim like 'more planes'. The export
drive was the third major priority to be established
after the war, following those resulting from problems
with the building programme in 1946, and the fuel crisis
in early 1947. And each of these three priorities was in
fact a complex set of priorities. By the summer of 1947
it was already clear that priorities had become over-
complicated; policy-makers and the public were losing
confidence; in this situation officials were reluctant to
use discrimination or sanctions. Where controls were
strongest the shortages were greatest; so, consequently,
were the difficulties of formulating a clear set of
operating criteria. This combination of problems was
very evident in the case of steel allocations and
engineering exports. It is not surprising that the
Exports (Plans) committee came to the following
conclusion during 1948: "The present pattern of exports
is not ••• the result of a detailed central plan enforced
by government controls". Exhortation was the mainstay of
government influence. Guidance of export of capital
goods had proved particularly difficult, (59) and the use
of direct physical controls was confined to a few cases.
Moreover, "The existing memorandum on desirable and less
desirable markets has not proved as clear and decisive as
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we had hoped".(60) The difficulties that had been
experienced with the post-convertibility crisis policies
were to weigh heavily against adopting them anew when
balance of payments difficulties recurred at the
beginning of 1949.
IV
The convertibility crisis brought about a
balance of payments policies which were a
new set of
specifically
British response to the world's problems of transition




real root of this shortage was that the
had emerged from the war with a stronger
it had at the start, while most other
economies were war-shattered or, like that of Britain,
'empty'. Unless the United States was prepared to
undertake a vast programme of economic aid, as the
convertibility crisis showed, the chances of establishing
a liberal international economy were slim. Yet this fact
was not enough in itself to create sufficient support in
the United States for such a programme. The necessary
extra ingredient was the growing conflict with the Soviet
Union and the mission to defeat communist influence in
western, and if possible eastern Europe. Even then,
there was pressure to keep the amount of aid as small as
possible. This led to a paradoxical and complex economic
and political situation in which economic planning was
promoted on an international scale, for the purpose of
using United States aid as efficiently as possible, and
reaching an international equilibrium at the earliest
possible date.
At the same time, the concept of economic planning
became entangled with the international ideological
struggle. This is shown clearly by the fact that at the
beginning of 1948 Att1ee was being advised by Brook to
play down the idea of planning in Britain's overseas
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publicity. (61) This advice was part of the preparations
for a special Cabinet meeting to consider the general
implications for foreign policy of increasing conflict
with the Soviet Union. Bevin was intending to recommend
to the Cabinet that the United Kingdom should make a bid
for the "spiritual and moral" leadership of western
Europe. To this end he thought that, as well as taking
the offensive against Communism, the advantages of 'the
alternative British system of Social Democracy' should be
extolled. But Brook found it worrying that Bevin had
included, 'among the features of the system which is to
be held up as a model for Europe, some policies which
belong peculiarly to the Labour Party' - in particular,
planning. What was more, Bevin proposed to attack 'not
only the principles and practice of communism, but also
the "inefficiency, social injustice and moral weakness of
unrestrained capitalism'''. Brook asked Attlee how this
could be done without giving offence in the United
States: American support might not easily be secured for
a policy in which Britain gave a spiritual lead to Europe
with publicity 'designed to show that the policies of the
British Government represent a golden mean between the
disastrous extremes of Russian Communism and American
capitalism'. Brook suggested that controversy might be
avoided if the government 'played down the economic
planning and anti-capitalist aspects and laid the main
emphasis on civil liberties, human rights and social and
political justice'.
In case ministers were inclined to be careless of the
consequences of their overseas publicity on public
opinion in the United States, Brook was particularly
blunt on one point: 'As regards the United States, may it
not be better to face the fact that all the countries of
western Europe including ourselves are dependent
economically on the United States, with whom the economic
power now rests ••• ?' Britain could certainly make a
political contribution, 'especially in view of the
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political and administrative immaturity of the United
States', and had already shown that it could 'assume the
leadership among the European claimants to Marshall Aid'.
In this role Britain would be 'by the side of the United
States as her primary assistant in organising the
economic recovery of Europe ••• This would mean, of
course, accepting a position in which we should be
playing second fiddle to the Americans in the economic
sphere. But is not that in accordance with the facts?'.
fteIn/ event the Cabinet simply endorsed Bevin's publicity
proposals, including the idea that the world needed a
'Third force' for 'freedom, planning and social justice'.
The Cabinet Conclusions do not record whether Brook's
criticisms were conveyed to the Cabinet by Attlee or in
any other way.(62) His advice, however, provides an
excellent insight into official attitudes towards the
relationship between domestic policies and international
affairs at this time, and it is fair to conclude that,
being fundamentally opposed to the idea of economic
planning, officials like Brook were not averse to using
the economic dominance of the United States, and its
ideological predispositions, as a lever against the
policies that ministers were trying to follow. Something
similar happened the following year, at the time of
devaluation. Senior officials could not openly oppose
the government's basic policy ideas; but by appealing to
the force of 'reality', as demonstrated above, they could
certainly attempt to undermine them.
It was therefore ironic that Marshall Aid, the very
embodiment of American economic dominance, involved a
form of economic planning to make it effective. In the
first place it led to the fruition of the long-term
economic forecasting effort started in January 1946,(63)
which had aimed at predicting the prospects of industries
and regions and the balance of payments at the end of the
transitional period. The Long-term Economic Survey had
been revised several times as assumptions were altered by
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various crises.(64) In the summer of 1947, for example, a
particularly pessimistic view of long-term prospects was
drawn. (65) But once the OEEC initiative took root, and
renewed American aid became a certainty, a new
was found for the Long-term Survey: it became the
purpose
basis
for the British case in negotiations and discussions
about the size, distribution and uses of Marshall Aid.
Moreover, the Economic Planning Board was told, during
1948, that pressure for more detailed planning was coming
from the US, in connection with European recovery.(66) As
a result of this, the forecasts and economic programmes
of the countries which were to be recipients of ERP Aid
were put together and compared. The basic thinking behind
this exercise was to strengthen the OEEC economies while
minimising the amount of Marshall Aid required to create
equilibrium in a multilateral trading system. This use
of the Long-term Survey was a perfect example of what
E.A.G. Robinson (who had done much of the work on it)
thought the objective of transitional economic policy
~should be: planning aimed at making planning un~cessary.
Robinson himself became an economic adviser on the OEEC
exercise. (67) The Long-term Survey was highly commended
in a brief to Morrison dated July 15th 1948: 'it should
be adopted for planning purposes. It is in fact the
first considered basis for anything approaching long-term
planning that we have had and is, therefore, a
landmark,.(68) Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out
that this fruition of the Long-term Survey happened as
controls were weakening, economic ,improvements were
taking place, and the government generally had less
strong intentions and means to direct economic activity.
Several questions about the OEEC and economic planning
therefore arise. What problems were discovered when the
programmes of different countries were compared? .Was the
British government prepared to change its own plans as a
result?
The most important problem for the OEEC that was
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revealed, early on in the exercise, was that of massive
visible trade imbalances.(69) In light of this it was
proposed that other countries' plans be reviewed to see
how they impinged on the British programme, and how they
affected the European situation as a whole. (70) There
were 19 programmes in all, of which the most important
was the French. When the comparison was complete it was
agreed that urgent issues had arisen.(71) Indeed, there
was an allegation that the OEEC was in 'chaos,.(72) A
key example of the visible trade problem was that all
planning expansion of their textile
and OEEC countries overall were planning
countries were
industries, (73)
to produce more textiles than they were intending to





had put so much emphasis on increasing
(indeed, during 1948 the Board of Trade
increase Britain's textile export target
The OEEC exercise also discovered a
'shortfall' in demand for UK coal exports, which were
once again becoming a possibility. Robin Marris of CEPS
was candid about the policy options available to Britain,
which were: (i) try to persuade other countries to take
the coal exports; (ii) discourage foreign competition by
maintaining that it was going to export the coal whether
there was agreement or not; (iii) work on the basis that
the export figure submitted by Britain had been an over-
estimate anyway. (75) There were other similar problems
which put a question mark over the degree of co-operation
that could be achieved under the umbrella of Marshall
Aid: it was estimated that there would be over-production
of European steel in the early 1950's; despite this,
France and Italy wanted to go ahead with their schemes to
expand steel output. Tbe question arose of
Britain should consider cutting back its scheme,
general feeling was that there was no need











who supported the OEEC exercise thought that it
least revealed that the notion of Britain's
had completely changed between the end of the
1949.(77) The policies agreed in the Autumn of
1947 had been viewed purely from the view of getting the
British balance of payments into order and maintaining
the stability of Sterling. The OEEC exercise put this
into the context that nearly all countries were planning
an export drive similar to Britain's, and that this would
lead quickly to over-production and imbalance in the
European economy. But would the countries co-operate in
overcoming these problems? There was a wide range of
views about economic planning among the OEEC nations. The
Swiss followed an extreme laissez-faire approach and had
no plan. Robinson commented: "The Swiss representative
seemed to assume that an invitation to even think about
the problems of the future represented an attack on his
ideological virginity".(78) On a French paper, Robinson's
observed, by contrast, that "it was as if OEEC was
seeking to organise a super cartel and an epoch of
restrictionism".(79) Also, there were numerous doubts
about the accuracy of estimation and forecasting on the
part of other countries, and Britain was the only country
to submit its report on time.(80) From Britain, one
comment on the OEEC exercise was that there was no
possibility of a 'European Plan' because no-one was
prepared to make changes. This also applied to Britain:
when some countries asked for changes in agricultural
policy, it was argued that this was not possible because
ministers were 'committed' to the policies put forward to
the OEEC.(81) There were even those extremists, like
Donald Butt of the Economic Section who saw the whole
OEEC exercise as a waste of
'Numerology,.(82)
On balance, the OEEC planning did




because cold water was thrown on many of the ideas for an
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export drive that the government had developed in 1947-8.
The OEEC exercise therefore reinforced the doubts that
had arisen from the efforts to implement the post-
convertibility crisis balance of payments policy. In
this respect it is interesting that the OEEC exercise
coincided with the virtual elimination of targets from
the Economic Surveys,(83) and a suggestion by the




abandoned except for those to the US
This latter point underlines the fact




amalgamation of economic programmes: the trade between
the lender and the borrowing nations. The US recession
of 1949 brought this problem to the forefront, and led
ultimately to the necessity for devaluation, which is
dealt with in the next chapter.
v
Parallel to the issues arising out of the OEEC exercise,
there were other issues of economic planning relating to
Europe. These were the years when the groundwork for the
future European Economic Community was being laid,
through discussions and agreements about economic
integration. The British attitude towards this was one
of detached interest rather than wholehearted
involvement. Donald Butt of the Economic Section made a
comparative study of French and British economic planning
in 1947, without coming to any positive conclusions.(85)
At this time the French were keener on British
involvement in intra-European economic integration than
they were in later years. Indeed, Monnet - the architect
of French economic planning - suggested to Plowden in
February 1949 that the Central Economic Staffs of both
countries should sit down together and look at the
Anglo-French economy 'as one', instead of adopting a
nationalistic stance, as had been the rule up to then.
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Plowden replied, evasively, that CEPS could not work
independently of the United Kingdom official machine.
There was a polite interchange of information about
public and private investment programmes but Monnet's
suggestion came to nothing. (86)
The government was interested in the development of
European economic integration, but kept apart. Various
papers written at this time on France and Germany, and an
'assessment' of Monnet's 'philosophy' about Europe
display a marked reluctance on the part of British
officials to get involved.(87) It is not possible to go
deeply into this question here, but disenchantment with
the OEEC exercise played a part. Also, the significance
of European economic integration for the future was not
fully recognised. This was partly because the rate of
economic recovery in Europe was underestimated, but also
because there was a strong feeling that the principles
underlying the emerging forms of European economic
integration would conflict with the axioms of British
economic policy. The dominant British response to the
idea of European economic integration, was that it went
against the spirit of Anglo-US sponsored multilateralism,
and would turn out to be a kind of siege economy.(88)
Consistent with this view, too, was the attitude
towards the possibilities for organising some degree of
economic autarky· within the sterling area. It will be
recalled that sterling area development was one of
Morrison's concerns in his memorandum on 'Planning for
expansion', and that Cripps made much of its importance
in early 1948.(89) So, it is worth expanding briefly on
the progress of policy on sterling area development.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Montgomery visited
Africa in December 1947, and on his return he advocated a
quick and vigorous development of Africa as part of the
'Western world'. The Secretary of State for the
Colonies opposed the idea of controlling colonial
development from London, saying that there was already a
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plan for African development and that Montgomery had
over-estimated African resources.(90) Also, in early 1948
Attlee was given a 'sober' assessment of the most
ambitious project already underway, the East African
groundnuts scheme;(91) this was not yet infamous as a
bungled operation,(92) but exaggerated expectations were
being trimmed, and it was clear that no quick gains would
be made. Furthermore, Brook cautioned Attlee that
ministers should beware of being accused of
'Imperialism', pointing out that being too explicit about
a policy of colonial development could shock government
supporters, a point which Attlee noted that he agreed
with.(93) After Montgomery's report and this exchange
between Attlee and Brook a Colonial Development Working
Party was set up, chaired by Plowden. Its main
conclusion was that the rate of development was crucially
limited by the availability of materials. The government
decided that it would concentrate efforts of colonial
development on improving the infrastructure.(94) During
1948 a Colonial Development Corporation was set up, with
total resources of £100m;(95) but the policy clearly did
not achieve the 'prime importance' which Cripps suggested
it should have at the EPC in early 1948.
Thus, from events in 1948 it becomes clear that there
was not much enthusiasm for any of the forms of economic
planning
initially
associated with external economic policy. The
determined response to the convertibility
was not followed by the use of controls to any
This was partly because of the problems
crisis
extent.
involved, and partly because the emphasis of policy and
economic circumstances changed in ways that made their
use less important. Although the OEEC planning exercise
was important in revealing the contradictions between the
programmes of different countries, acceptance of
international co-operation in economic planning in this
context cut across purely British plans that had been
formulated previously. Furthermore, the British
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government proved to be unenthusiastic about European
integration in the longer-term, or in any further
ambitious developments within the sterling area. Exports
to North America were still seen as very much the
priority for further policy developments, and this set
the scene for the events of 1949: an export drive
'Operation Columbus' - to overcome an emerging American
recession, and when that proved insufficient, devaluation
and the various domestic policy-changes that followed in
its wake.
VI
The initial work of the Investment Programmes committee
in 1947, leading to the publication of Capital investment
in 1948 was dealt with in the last chapter. The IPC was
responsible for monitoring the progress of the policy, as
well as for formulating means of overcoming the problems
arising from the efforts to control building, and plant
and machinery. In 1948, broadly speaking, the IPC
discovered that the outcome of investment programming did
not conform closely to what had been intended, though
accurate estimation of actual investment was difficult.
Moreover, both the building and the plant and machinery
aspects of the investment programme ran into problems
during 1948.
Early in 1948 the IPC asked departments to submit
statements showing the progress on investment in 1948,
and the extent to which the policy was likely to be
fulfilled. The results of this enquiry caused the
committee to state, quite baldly: 'Contrary to the
expectations of the white paper on capital investment in
1948•••, investment in the current year is likely to
exceed the level achieved in 1947'. This must be compared
with the original aim of an 8% overall reduction. In
building, the total labour force had increased; the level
of plant and machinery investment was expected to be more
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than forecast, and to have a different structure. (96)
According to the IPC, in the case of building, the main
reason for the difference from the planned outcome was a
change of policy on housing. In the case of plant and
machinery, the main reason was an underestimation of the
lag between trying to reduce plant and machinery output
and actual reductions in output: 'Where the production
cycle of plant and machinery is long or where substantial
commitments have got underway, it is not possible to make
rapid changes without considerable dislocation and
probably net 10ss,.(97) For this reason it was
recommended that a planned reduction in goods vehicles
deliveries to the home market be delayed until 1949.
The IPC also stated that there had been
miscalculations in the original investment programme. For
example, the original plan had been to reduce industrial
building by concentrating resources on the most important
projects, but it had turned out that there were many more
important projects than at first thought.(98) 'As a
result of these changes in the pattern of investment, the
forecast 8 per cent decline between 1947 and 1948 is
unlikely to take place. Instead it is estimated that
there will be a rise of about 5 per cent'. This was an
astonishing conclusion in light of the significance that
had been attached to the original exercise, although there
had been some changes in the economic climate that made
ministers and officials more sanguine than they had been
in the Autumn of 1947. But this was not the end of the
story. In its third report, in 1949, the IPC stated:
'For the principal sectors of investment latest
estimates of investment actually carried out in 1948 show'
a substantial reduction compared with the estimates made
Shipbuilding, roads,
electricity had all
a year ago in our second report'.
railways, iron and steel and
performed less well than expected; while housing and
private manufacturing had performed better. Investment
in 1948 had probably increased by about 2% over the
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original forecast, as against the original aim of an 8%
fall. The IPC went on to point out that the previous
overestimate in the investment forecast (made in 1948)
had affected the forecast for 1949: 'insofar as the
original programmes for 1948 were not attained, the
amounts approved for 1949 and published in the Economic
Survey are also too high' .(99) The upshot of all this
was that what had bravely set out to be 'the first real
attempt at economic planning' had confirmed in full the
views set out in the 1944 white paper, and on numerous
other occasions, that investment though the most
Table 10. Gross Fixed Investment, 1948 and 1949, from the





Fuel and power 201
Transport and Communications 304
Shipping 97
Agriculture 92
Iron and Steel 46
Manufacturing Industry 377
New Housing 300
Other Social Services 68
Administration and Defence 59


































(Note: miscellaneous includes machinery and equipment,
and constructional work apart from new housing, e.g.
maintnance).
£
Source: Public Record Office(100)
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desirable aggregate to influence in theory - would prove
very difficult to control in practice. It is notable that
the areas that performed worse than expected were the
infrastructural programmes, such as Fuel and Power and
Transport and Communications, under the aegis of central
departments; whereas those that were mainly under the
control of local authorities, such as new housing,
performed better than expected. This confirmed the
studies of investment control that had been made earlier.
When the operation of the controls affecting
investment is examined it is clear that there was either
very little attempt to use them or serious problems were
created when they were used. An important case in point
is that of building controls. As part of the overall
review of controls initiated in the Autumn of 1947, those
relating to building were examined in a separate
operation. A review of building controls had become
urgent because there had previously been problems with
achieving the aims of the building programme and because
there had been many complaints about the clumsiness of
the licensing system. (101) Businessmen generally did not
understand or did not accept that industrial building
should be subject to detailed controls; while they often
called for curbs in investment in housing, they did not
believe that factories should be similarly limited. The
government, meanwhile, was determined to preserve its
social as well as its industrial priorities.(102)
The building controls were extremely complex. There
were separate administrative procedures to deal with
location, timing, and finance, involving a number of
different departments, and both regional and central
machinery. The changes made as a result of the review did
not significantly alter the situation, because in the
climate of investment cuts there was no incentive to
simplify the licensing process, and although some changes
were made, obtaining a building licence remained a
difficult procedure. This was frustrating from two points
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of view: that of the government, which was attempting to
operate priorities affecting types, timing and location
of building; and that of firms which wanted to make new
investment in buildings. (103) After the convertibility
crisis there was particularly acute rancour on the part
of some firms which had gone through a lengthy and
complicated procedure to get building licences, only to
get caught by the freeze on industrial building agreed as
a result of the lPC's work. Thus, although the government
could use building controls to put obstacles in the way
of new building, this generated frustration and lost
goodwill.
Closely connected with the declining acceptance of the
government's use of economic controls were problems with
the integrity of the controls. A raw material control
closely involved with building, where there were internal
complaints, was timber. In May 1948 a letter to CEPS
from M.l. Michaels of the Ministry of Health claimed that
there were signs of breakdown in the operation of the
control. Michaels had raised the matter at the Materials
Comnittee; but, "Russell Latham of Timber Control is a
great believer in the virtue and integrity of timber
merchants". Michaels tried to reconcile the stock of
timber over a period of time with the known issue of
timber licences, and found that the fall in stocks
coupled with the known imports was greater than could be
accounted for by the issue of licences.(104) Subsequent
enquiries by CEPS confirmed that there was a leakage, but
the conclusion was that the discrepancy was within the
margin of statistical error, and was not enough to
warrant action. Michaels, in subsequent correspondence,
stuck to his point: he claimed that about 10% of total
timber consumption was going 'astray,.(105) This type of
problem underlines one of the reasons why senior civil
servants were keen to get rid of controls: they did not
want the reputation of the civil service to be destroyed





October 1948, as part of the effort
controls, it was agreed to relax
materials controls agreed in 1946,
because of 'easy supplies', but also because the controls
were being dishonoured, and this could bring the legally
enforeable controls into disrepute. Cripps agreed that
they should be dropped.(106)
The job of solving the problems involved in the
control of plant and machinery was assigned to a special
working party under the IPC, and its records show that it
was not very successful. (107) There was little
information to guide the operation of controls, few
controls could affect the appropiate activities, and
decision-making in the central
key factor was the withdrawal
control at the end of the war,
machinery was diffuse. A
of machinery licensing and
which dried up the source
of statistics. During the war there had been strict
control of machinery via licensing of individual
machines, and this was the basis of detailed statistics.
Since machinery controls of this kind had virtually been
abandoned at the end of the war, and the government was
reluctant to re-institute them, there was little
information to guide policy-makers. The government toyed
with the possibility of re-instituting machinery controls
following the 1947 crises, but this seen as politically
undesirable. The government would have had better
information, but the frustrations of licensing would have
further raised the hackles of industrialists, as well as
requiring more civil servants, and the trend of policy
was towards simplifying controls and reducing administrative
staff. Total investment in plant and machinery could be
treated as a function of steel Supplies, to a sufficient
degree of approximation, but this was of limited
usefulness. It could help with dividing steel supplies
into totals for building and plant and machinery, but
could not help with the division into plant and machinery
of different types, or allocations to different end-
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users, or division between export and domestic
markets. (108)
In 1949 CEPS was reported to be still working very
hard on the question of obtaining information about plant
and machinery. (109) Also, in the June 1949 Budget a new
scheme of depreciation allowances was introduced; but
when there was a request for information about the
expected effects of the scheme on demand for plant and
machinery, it was admitted that no real information for
the purpose was available. (110) To add to the problems
caused by lack of information, at the centre there was a
division of decision-making between different bodies.
Overall allocation of steel was dealt with in the first
place by the Materials Committee, and sub-allocations
relevant to engineering were then made by the Ministry of
Supply. There was an export targets committee and
machinery for establishing the ratio of output that
should go to export, while the IPC was responsible for
the domestic side. Donald Butt of the Economic Section
concluded, in a study of this machinery in early 1948,
that there was a danger of 'utter confusion',
if all these committees worked in parallel.
especially
(A type of
problem was already evident from the difficulties arising
from the parallel work of the IPC and the Exports
committee).(111) In practice the IPC's working party on
Plant and Machinery sub-committee was restricted to
actions such as the enquiry it initiated in mid-1948,
asking for lists of plant and machinery holding up
departmental programmes (including the work of industries
'sponsored' by departments as well as government
projects). This enquiry produced a very long list
indeed, but was a crude measure of the problems; there
was no information that could give an accurate overall
picture, and this aspect of investment policy never
developed beyond a very primitive stage.
In attempting to control investment in building and
plant and machinery, then, there were complex problems
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for the planners, who had few means of solving them. In
many cases, as a memo written in early 1948 makes clear,
it was possible to arbitrate only on the basis of 'the
volume of protest from one particular industry in
comparison to the general level of hollering,.(112) It
is safe to conclude that planning decisions taken in this
way could not produce the most efficient results, or even
a quiet life. However, although lack of steel supplies,
was expected to be a big problem in controlling
investment and deciding priorities, it was much less of a
difficulty than might have been expected on the basis of
experience in 1947. Steel supplies was one area of the
economy which improved substantially in 1948, and
therefore reduced the need for very stringent control of
investment in plant and machinery, or resolution of
conflicts between exports and domestic investment.(113)
Despite the difficulties involved, the IPC continued
to produce new investment programmes. ~o later
developments in its work are worth mentioning. The first
was the realisation that it would be useful to take a
longer look at investment: in 1949 the IPC started to
look at investment trends up to 1952 on the basis of the
forecasts submitted by departments; as before,
departments were asked to specify their requirements in
physical terms and an attempt was then made to fit them
to what the IPC and the central policy machinery thought
would be available. At the time it seemed that a more
stable basis of investment forecasting was being
established, however, this effort was overtaken by
rearmament. (114) The second development was that in its
1950 report the committee produced alternative short-term
policies: one based on the assumption that financial
limits that had been set to public expenditure; the other
based on the assumption that there would be higher
taxation to pay for it. The first development reflected
continuing interest in pushing back the horizons of
planning and forecasting, but was unsuccessful because of
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continuing uncertainty. The second development reflected
a more general move towards policies based on the control
of public expenditure, and on taxation policies, rather
than the more general approach to planning that had been
adopted in 1947.(115) At the same time, conclusions were
being drawn about what instruments would be needed for
the control of investment in the longer-term, in the
context of the making decisions about the future of the
legal infrastructure of controls;
dealt with in the next chapter.
As far as the policy of
these developments are
economic planning is
concerned, it is clear that the year 1948 presents a
contrast to 1947. In the previous year the government
had been driven to tighten up a wide range of economic
policy machinery, and formulate its aims more clearly.
With recovery there was a relaxation in this process.
Indeed, the opportunity arose for a deliberate drive for
decontrol, with the implication that in future the
government would have to achieve its objectives using a
much more restricted range of policy instruments.
Compared with the effort put into disinflation and
decontrol, little went into ensuring that the policies
agreed in the Autumn of 1947 were carried into effect.
Ministers relaxed the objectives; officials relaxed the
controls. It was during 1948, in fact, that the stage
was set for the operation of 'demand management'.
Politically, it became much easier for the government to
contemplate a budgetary surplus and other measures of
financial disinflation in 1948. At the time of Dalton's
supplementary autumn Budget in 1947 the main reason for
the acute conflict with his officials was the fear of the
effects of financial disinflation with a worsening supply
position. Against a background of economic recovery,
with some of the major problems of the previous three
years receding, there was a change of approach which set
the stage for further developments in policy during the
devaluation crisis in the summer of 1949.
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THE AFTERMATH OF ECONOMIC PLANNING, 1949-51
Despite remarkable progress towards economic recovery
during 1947 and 1948, there was a new balance of payments
crisis in 1949. On June 29th 1949, Hall lamented in a
brief to Attlee: 'The country is now facing a major
crisis and it will ask how this can have come about when
production and exports are at record levels, and the
fundamentals of prosperity, the productive employment of
our resources,
assured,.(1)
apparently never before so well
The immediate cause of the renewed crisis
was a recession in the United States economy. Because of
this, 'Sterling exports to the United States fell
moderately, at a time when imports from the United States
had been allowed to increase,.(2) There were also
several aggravating factors. First, it was the United
States authorities' considered view that sterling should
be devalued, which fueled expectations that there would
be a devaluation; this speculation then affected the flow





tightened up after the 1947
still a general problem of
of the Dollar Drain committee,
responsibility of limiting the
supposed to have been
which was charged with the
outflow of dollars from Britain and
exchange controls were said to be
sieve' •(4)
However, the balance of payments weakness was most
the Empire, the
'leaking like a
crucial in the visible trade balance - not just of
Britain but of the whole sterling area - and was mainly
due to the long-predicted US recession (though there was
plenty of political argument about the 'real' reason).
Until recovery in 1948 it had appeared that the
'emptiness' of the British economy was the main danger to
economic stability; but after the recovery, and success
in increasing exports, leading to a trade surplus in
1948, the picture changed. The new situation resembled
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the most likely - but most difficult - scenario for a
post-transition employment crisis: a recession triggered
by a fall in export demand. This possibility had been
foreseen during the reconstruction discussions, but the
main questions that arose from it had not been answered.
There were no firm answers in terms of prevention (how to
get other countries, especially the United Stated, to
adopt stabilisation policies), or in terms of cure (how
to stimulate internal demand to substitute for an
externally induced fall in demand). As the threat of a
sharp fall in export demand grew, work was being done on
reflationary measures to meet it, such as the stimulation
of certain types of internal investment expenditure. It
was suggested, for example, that the GPO should spend
more on telephone machinery that would otherwise have
been exported. (5) But in general this work confirmed
what had long been suspected: that the stimulation of
internal expenditure could not offset a fall in external
demand in the way that it might if the cause of the fall
was internal. Indeed, the work being done on measures to
be taken in the event that the US recession turned into a
slump was brushed aside as 'hopelessly overtaken' by the
reserves crisis, as the government discussed devaluation
in June 1949.(6) Therefore, the 1949 crisis required a
fundamental policy choice, rather than a consolidation of
consensus, and the government hovered for some time
between a number of policies. It has often been argued
that devaluation was wrongly delayed, and should have
been done as soon as the crisis manifested itself. (7')
But the policy choices raised the political temperature
inside the government, which ineVitably involved delay;
meanwhile, the aggravating factors were at work, even
though the US recession did not deepen into a slump.
The discussions leading up to the 30% devaluation,
announced on September 18th 1949, marked a complete
change of approach to balance of payments policy. True,
devaluation had been often advocated as a first resort in
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a balance of payments crisis by economic advisers; some
of them had even pushed the idea of floating exchange
rates, generally regarded as outlandish at the time. But
most ministers had regarded devaluation as only slightly
less politically disastrous than orthodox deflation.
This was certainly the attitude at the end of 1947, as
the government waited for Marshall Aid and pondered the
alternatives. At that time, an intensification of
economic controls was considered preferable to
devaluation. (8) In 1949 this order of preference was in
effect reversed, but only after a difficult internal
debate. The ministers responsible for dealing with the
crisis were the 'Treasury 4': Attlee, Cripps, Gaitskell
(by this time Minister of Economic Affairs), and Jay
(Economic Secretary). (9)
The early discussion(10) resembled that which
preceded the convertibilty crisis of 1947, concentrating
on cuts in the dollar import programme, tightening up of
exchange controls and hopes for improved
productivity. (11) But it soon became clear that
fundamental decisions would be required. Many of those
concerned supported devaluation, with economic advisers
in the forefront. Hall recommended devaluation from the
start, in line with Economic Section thinking over a long
period. (12) Others proposed either an intensification of
the policies that had been agreed in the wake of the 1947
convertibility crisis, or a stringent dose of deflation.
There were, then, three different approaches; although
they were not mutually exclusive. The discussion was
particularly complicated because Cripps disagreed with
devaluation, and opposed deflationary action, wanting to
intensify the policies that had apparently worked so well
after the previous crisis.(13) He took part in the
initial discussions, but fell ilIon 19th July and went
to a clinic in Zurich. Two days later, a few officials







devaluation should be delayed at least until Cripps





in Zurich concerning the
letter was taken to Cripps by
date of
Harold
Wilson. After he returned from convalescence, Cripps was
still unconvinced about the merits of devaluation, which
he had publicly opposed, though he accepted the decision
without resigning.(15)
I
What had swung the argument so decisively against Cripps?
The internal discussion about devaluation got underway in
June 1949. Plowden, Rowan and Hall recommended immediate
devaluation plus deflationary measures. Bridges~ view
was that the situation could not be relieved by an
intensification of the previous policies. (16) The
collective view of the official advisers, (Bridges, the
Treasury 2nd secretaries, Plowden and Hall), expressed on
June 18th, concluded: "The only politically tolerable way
of adjusting costs is to devalue the currency". (17) Only
Cobbold, the Governor of the Bank of England, would have
preferred to rely on deflation alone. (18) In a paper
circulated by the Treasury on June 23rd, the Bank made
plain its opposition to devaluation, arguing that the
conditions for the success of such a policy were not
right: most non-dollar countries would follow suit; the
problem of large sterling balances would remain; a larger
aggregate dollar income after devaluation was by no means
certain; dollar imports were already strictly controlled.
In short, 'devaluation should not be undertaken unless
the new rate has ••• every human prospect of being
successfully maintained', and the Bank thought that the
prospects were not good. Therefore, 'unpleasant courses'
were proposed: a reduction in both sides of the Budget; a
revision of the investment programme; some tightening of
monetary policy. The purpose 'would not be Simply to
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force through what is sometimes called an "old-fashioned
deflation" ••• but to create the conditions for a return
of confidence in sterling and a new approach to the
Americans'. (19)
Deflation by itself was strongly opposed by all the
ministers. One can get a flavour of the foreboding that
was felt from some political'Thoughts on the Economic
Situation' written in July 1949 by Hilary Marquand, who
raised the spectre that deflation would 'encourage the
Communist Party if it did not split the Labour Party'. On
these grounds he supported devaluation rather than
deflation. (20) Of course, deflation was very strongly
abhorred in the Labour Party because of the catastrophe
of 1931. So, the argument among ministers was about
devaluation vs. intensification of the 1947 measures. But
a complication was that most of the officials wanted
deflationary measures to accompany devaluation, and this
led to a further argument, which continued after the
decision to devalue had been taken (for example, on
August 3rd 1949, Cobbold was recommending prior action to
reduce government expenditure and sterling balances.(21)
Within the 'Treasury 4' Cripps and Jay wanted to
intensify the previous policies. In a paper dated July
7th 1949, Jay argued that the crisis was not mainly a
crisis of UK prices and costs; rather, he thought that
the problem organisational. Accordingly, what was needed
was a switch of exports from non-dollar to dollar
markets: "If there is a solution, it will come from a
more planned and collective selling effort, backed by
both incentives and controls designed to steer exports in
the right direction •••".(22) (In Jay's view, put forward
in March 1949, the process of decontrol had gone too far,
and was jeopardising efforts to steer exports.) Jay was
accused of advocating 'Schachtian' measures,(23) but he
replied that the argument about multilateralism vs.
autarky,
that the
was over-simplified; it was patently




pointed out that if the US recession became a slump there
could be no solution by simply lowering prices and costs,
and suggested that there might be competitive
devaluations such as had occurred during the 1929-32
crisis. (24)
Hall characterised the arguments against devaluation
as moral rather than economic, and argued both against
more deflation and against an intensification of the 1947
policies. He raised a telling practical point against the
latter: under the current policy, departments had been
'notoriously reluctant to compel manufacturers to export
to dollar markets'. (In the last chapter it was shown
that this was, indeed, the case.) Also, deflation had
already been pushed 'as far as we dare'. Increased
productivity as a way out of the crisis might be possible
in the long term (it was rising at about twice the pre-
war rate), but the problems were immediate. Besides, Hall
argued, any unemployment resulting from deflation might
jeopardise Trade Union co-operation in getting rid of
restrictive practices and helping in other ways to
increase productivity.
Some of those who had supported the previous balance
of payments policy were by now wondering whether it was
time for a change. (25) After all, conditions had
changed; export diversion was most practicable in a
sellers' market, but this was just about over in many
cases. For example, many engineering goods were said to
be in easy supply by mid-1949,(26) whereas in 1947 it had
been possible to assume that as many could be sold as
could be produced, and supply was the limiting factor.
Therefore, a policy aimed at decreasing the price of
exports seemed most feasible. At the same time, if
increased demand for exports should result, the extent of
the recovery ensured that supplies would be available,
and would not run into the problems of bottlenecks.
Thus, it could be maintained that even if the previous
policies had been successful, conditions had changed in a
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way that made it inappropiate to continue them. But
questions were also raised about whether the previous
policies had in fact been successful, or whether it was
their failure that had led to the current crisis. In a
paper dated July 20th 1949, Oliver Franks argued that the
crisis was not just a matter of recession in the United
States, but was also a measure of the failure to close
the dollar gap and curtail government expenditure. Like
Hall, he emphasised how little effort had been put into
diverting exports to the United States - criticising what
he thought was a failure to allocate more steel to car
manufacturers, who had good prospects for exporting to
the United States.(27) This argument was influential for
several reasons: Franks had publicly advocated the
necessity of economic planning in 1947, had taken a
leading role in the OEEC planning exercise, and was
currently Ambassador to the United States.(28)
There was another influential objection to
intensification of the previous policies: they would lead
away from the 'one world' of multilateral trading. In a
brief to Attlee entitled 'EPC and dollar situation', dated
July 5th 1949, Hall argued for devaluation on the grounds
that the choice lay between "one world or two worlds",
multilateralism or imperial preferences. The argument
for devaluation therefore turned partly on sustaining the
aim of multilateralism, which remained strong despite the
partial retreat after the 1947 convertibility crisis.
Hall argued that matters had now come to a pOint where
there would be long-term consequences from different
methods of solving the balance of payments problem.
Another dose of the 1947 policies would result in a long-
term movement away from the ideal of multilateralism.(29)
Gaitskell noted, similarly, that 'we are at the parting
of the ways,.(30)
Thus there were powerful arguments to support the view
that there was little hope of Britain exporting its way
out of the new crisis by intensifying the 1947 policies:
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either conditions had changed; or, in crucial respects,
the previous policies had not been implemented. In these
circumstances, refusal to accept devaluation would have
left the options of a further round of 'austerity' along
the lines of wartime stabilisation policy, or an orthodox
deflation that might result in the return of mass
unemployment. The forces marshalled against the idea of
continuing with the previous policies, with which Cripps
and Jay had identified themselves, were formidable. Jay
became isolated when Cripps' illness transformed the
'Treasury 4' into 3, with Gaitskell a powerful supporter
of devaluation alongside most of the officials.
II
After the decision to devalue there was still the
question
officials
of other measures. From the start,
wanted
the
advocating devaluation also more
internal disinflationary measures, as a means of
restoring external and internal 'confidence', and the
ministers were divided about this. In a letter to Cripps
dated July 6th, Bridges urged an increase in interest
rates, a reduction of projected government expenditure
(not necessarily an absolute decrease), and no increase
in taxes. (31) But Cripps resisted any further
deflationary action; probably he saw this as the re-
emergence of pre-war ideas in conditions of incipient
slump, in which the exact opposite of deflationary action
would be needed.(32) Cripps~oPposition put the senior
officials in a difficult position. Bridges mentioned the
'delicacy' with which it was necessary to put forward to
the Prime Minister measures which Cripps did not wish to
advocate to his colleagues. This problem was presumably
eased by Cripps~ departure from the scene. (33) But











On 28th July Attlee was informed, in an official
brief, that there might be argument in the Cabinet on the
same day about the need for internal economic adjustments
at the same time as devaluation. He was advised that
devaluation
up. (35)
needed disinflationary measures to back
The issue of external confidence
it
was
particularly important, because there was to be a new
round of talks with the United States and Canada, and
what was at stake was an interpretation of the cause of
the crisis: was it purely an external shock hitting an
otherwise healthy economy, or was the crisis wholly or
partly
There
due to previous policies that needed
was still a strongly held view that
correction?
Britain's
economic predicament was due to 'trying to do too
much,.(36) In the Cabinet Morrison supported the view
that the level of public expenditure was 'disturbingly
high'; against this it was argued that the crisis was not
due to public expenditure, but to a fall in exports; cuts
in public expenditure would threaten important projects
and would not have much effect on costs. Furthermore, in
talks with the US government policies should not be
jeopardised by any concession to the view that problems
were due to the level of public expenditure. (37) As a
compromise, on August 4th Attlee put out a request to all
departmental ministers to cut out 'inessential'
expenditure, aiming to cut the rate of total supply
expenditure by 5%.(38)
This measure, which resulted in little more than the
euthanasia of senile quangos, did not stop the pressure
from officials for a more thorough revision of policy.
In a paper on government expenditure and the balance of
payments, dated August 15th, Hall argued that a reduction
of government expenditure would lead to an increase in
the budget surplus; this would allow a reduction in
taxation, and people would probably save more out of
their increased incomes; then a smaller budget surplus
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would be possible. "Not necessarily," Attlee
"if consumer demand is still unsatisfied as




that one can only get savings by letting some people have
incomes greater than they can spend". Having pointed out
the internal contradiction in Hall's argument, not to
mention its implicit political bias, Attlee added: "I
don't think much of this paper". (39) Economic advisers
did not have things all their own way!
Even those ministers and officials most strongly
committed to devaluation fell out with each other over
the question of internal measures to accompany
devaluation. Ministers felt that in the preceding couple
of years they had got the economy on roughly the right
lines, and that it was mainly external circumstances that
had led to the crisis. Officials were sceptical, partly
because they were critical of the government's domestic
policies, partly because they knew that opinion in the
United States was similarly critical. For example,
Lionel Robbins brought news from the 'US Corridors' that
the United States was in no mood to help Britain again,
and that it was not accepted in Washington that Britain's
problems were due to recession in the United States: the
recession had halted, and the Americans were pleased with
themselves. (40) The issue came to a head over the
drafting of a brief for ministers about the forthcoming
negotiations with the US and Canada. The initial draft
written by officials set out the view that the overseas
ministers would blame the British government's domestic
policies for the crisis, and that they would sit back and
let Britain make proposals on how it would extricate
itself from the problems. To restore their confidence, in
addition to successful devaluation, absolute reductions
in government expenditure and monetary action would be
required. Ministers had already turned these latter ideas
down, but the officials were still determined to revive
them, 'in a less direct form,.(41) Gaitskell's angry
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characterisation of the draft brief was that 'the first
part might have been written by someone who was
completely schooled in the anti-British American
press,.(42) Jay and Gaitskell produced their own version,
putting a very different view, stating that the main




factors and policies, and US public campaigns
the UK. On August 17th 1949, Bridges wrote a
to H. Wilson-Smith which contains evidence of
dissension between himself and the ministers of the
'Policy group' which included Jay and Gaitskell: 'In
order to keep the "Policy Group" in play we had to let
Gaitskell and Jay have a go on this paper yesterday. We
had another very troublesome time with them and as a
result have had to recast the first two sections of the
Memorandum in a more bedside manner still. Generally, I
still doubt whether our masters quite realise how
difficult a negotiation they are faced with, although
there is some indication, I think, that EB [Bevin] is
beginning to wake up to the situation'. Bridges felt that
both Gaitskell and Jay were 'obviously frightfully
sensitive about anything which implies that there can be
any justification whatsoever for any loss of confidence
in this country by the USA and Canada,.(43) The final
draft of this brief, which incorporated many of Jay's and
Gaitskell's points, was circulated to the Cabinet on
August 23rd 1949.(44)
One is left in little doubt that the officials and
ministers were arguing from very different starting
points about the responsibility of the government and its
programmes for the renewed economic crisis. Officials
were inclined to take a much more conciliatory tone with
the United States in the negotiations because they
fundamentally agreed with many of the criticisms that
were being made in the United States and Canada, and
because - more readily than the Labour ministers they
recognised the economic power of those countries and were
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willing to accept the consequences. Indeed, many kinds
of domestic critics of the government's policies clearly
had a vital interest in maintaining the kind of external
discipline over economic policy which resulted from
Britain's relationship with the United States. And in the
event, despite all the resistance that the ministers put
up internally to a policy of public expenditure
retrenchment, and desite their insistence that discussion
on internal policies should be kept out of the talks, it
was necessary for Cripps, when he went to Washington in
September, to make a statement that the government had
decided 'to reinforce our existing disinflationary
policies by a concerted attempt to bring down government
expenditure We are determined to do whatever is
necessary, as we have done over the last two years, to
avoid any increase in inflationary pressure'. According
to Franks, this statement was very well received, and the
'previous crisis of confidence was resolved,.(45)
This commitment was later to lead to deep divisions in
the government, when the attempt to control total
government expenditure took place in the context of
pressures to reduce expenditure on the National Health
Service while increasing expenditure on military
preparations. Meanwhile, devaluation involved several
other difficulties: deciding the scale of the change, and
judging the effects. The ultimate outcome depended to a
large extent on the reactions of other governments in the
Sterling Area and elsewhere, and also of domestic effects
on prices and wages. The Economic Section was
responsible for advising on the 'right' devaluation,
which was one of the most difficult economic forecasting
exercises carried out since the war. The Economic
Section would have preferred a floating exchange rate,
rather than a change to another fixed rate; but it was
recommended that, either way, the initial devaluation
should be large.(46) Meanwhile, a working party was set
up to look into the impact of devaluation on price
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structure. This took into account three main aspects:
changes in export prices; changes in costs (especially of
dollar imports); and the possible effects of other
countries' devaluations.(47)
The price structure after devaluation was difficult to
estimate, but it was important to attempt to forecast it
in order to decide on other policy measures. (48) At a
meeting on the Economic Situation on September 14th 1949,
chaired by Attlee, official reports on measures to
postpone rises in prices, wages
considered. Officials' analysis of














manufacturing costs, and devaluation bringing some
increase in the cost of living, there was a danger of a
cycle of wage increases nullifying the original purpose
of devaluation. Moreover, because wages were such a
large part of national income as a whole, there would be
a danger that wage increases could offset the 'effects of
the 5 per cent cut in government expenditure which is
contemplated as a means of reducing inflation', as well
as increasing the costs of government directly, in the
case of public employees; more severe cuts would then be
necessary. Finally, if devaluation resulted in price
rises at home firms might be tempted to divert output to
the home market, away from 'difficult hard currency
markets'. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this
was that both price controls and wage restraint should be
continued. (49) Ministers therefore decided that
departments were to be asked to enforce price controls
'rigorously'. In general, prices were to be held down at
the expense of profits. The future of food prices was
uncertain, which had implications for the continuing
policy of stabilising the retail price index by
subsidies. (50) The possibility of strong upward pressure
on wages raised the question of how far this could be
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Table 11.
Indices of retail prices = 1938, 1943-7; 1947-51
~ Working class cost of living index, 1938, 1943-1947
(1 Sept. 1939=100)
1938 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947a
All items •• 101 128 130 131 131 131
Food ••••••• 102 120 122 123 122 117
fhe.
a June 1947. After this, the basis oflofficial price index
was changed.
B. Interim index of retail prices, 1948-1951
(17 June 1947=100)
1948 1949 1950 1951
All items •• 108 111 114 125
Food ••••••• 108.2 114.1 122.7 136.3
Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.191
held back by the existing voluntary wages policy. On
September 13th Cripps asked that consideration should be
given to a short statutory prices and incomes freeze,
which he proposed to announce in a radio broadcast; but
this was opposed by the Treasury on the grounds that
though it could have a good psychological effect, it
would be difficult to enforce; furthermore, it was
recognised that there could be an explosive rise in wages
and prices at the end of the statutory period. A meeting
of ministers therefore turned down Cripps~ proposal. (51)
In the event it was felt that the trade unions continued
to take a responsible approach to wage rises after
devaluation. The wages situation was much better than
had been expected.
agreed in early
The voluntary restraint that had been
1948 lasted until 1950, when the




devaluation and changes in food subsidy
from the previous year. (52) But legal
limitations on wages continued to be opposed as being
'contrary to the English genius,.(53)
Table 12. United Kingdom indices of average weekly wage
rates of all workers = 1938, 1943-47; 1947-1951


























Source: Mitchell, B.R. & Jones, H.G. Second abstract of
British historical statistics, 1971, p.144
How did the government follow up the 30% devaluation,
and how did it assess the general outcome? The Export
committee's official sub-committee on plans made a report
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the situation
immediately after devaluation, concerned with export
incentives, prices, future exports to the dollar area and
export capacity. The main point made was the need for
the government to give a lead to exporters to give
priority to orders from dollar markets.(54) A general
observation was that there were few cases where it had
been possible to hold the former dollar price without
loss of goodwill. Whisky was one of the rare examples of
a commodity which did hold its dollar price, but
engineering goods did not.(55) This suggests that export
prices had been too high before devaluation, and that the
devaluation was not too great (as was frequently argued
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at the time, and since). A corollary was that the rise in
import costs was higher than hoped (this being a factor
which fed into wage demands and led to the breakdown of
the voluntary incomes policy in 1950). Apart from these
drawbacks, the overall assessment was that devaluation
had been a success.(56)
Harold Wilson visited the US soon after devaluation,
and was able to make some pertinent observations to his
colleagues. He saw the key problem as delivery times, and
thought that British exporters neglected the
possibilities of regional markets within the United
States. Exporters, he felt, had become 'soft' because of
the sellers' market after the war; though everyone must
have known that this would come to an end sooner or
later. This view was shared by officials such as Neville
Blond, who had put forward these conclusions some time
previously, during the government's campaign to increase
exports to the United States and Canada early in 1949(57)
Wilson favoured measures to divert exports to dollar
markets. He thought that the scale of diversion needed
was quite small, but important. According to Wilson,
many controls were in fact still being used - to a
greater extent than was realised. (58) Thus, there was
still some support and some action on the policies of
1947, even after devaluation. But this should not be
exaggerated. Gaitskell wrote a memo on economic planning
in 1950, which Hall said made "rather stronger claims for
our willingness to use controls to direct exports than
the facts warrant". He gave the example of fine china,
which was a certain dollar earner, but there was still no
firm delivery dates for exports 4 years after the end of
the war. This contrasted with the development of
military production during the war, and placed a question
mark over the seriousness of the government's dollar
export policy. Hall felt that if the government was
serious, then a measure of guidance and discrimination
was necessary. (59).
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Despite such criticisms, the government was quite
pleased with the outcome of devaluation. On December
14th 1949 there was an Economic report suggesting that
the improvements of the past eighteen months or so were
continuing; and the results of devaluation were stated to
be, if anything, better than expected. Also,
productivity appeared to be rising at about twice the
pre-war rate.(60) There were indications that better
productivity was chiefly due to changes in the supply
position; the example was given of sheet steel and
vehicles. The textile labour force was growing. The
dollar position was still precarious, partly because the
devaluation had affected the whole sterling area and the
position was still unclear. But overall optimism in
economic reports continued. (There was one bad spot:
unemployment was at 6.7% in Northern Ireland as against
1.8% in Britain as a whole - full employment as enjoyed
in the rest of Britain never did apply to Northern
Ireland).(61)
III
In the development of post-war economic policy the
decision in 1949 to devalue was a milestone. First, it
confirmed the government's commitment to the 'one world'
of multilateral trading, and eventual sterling/dollar
convertibility. (It should perhaps be mentioned that
'one world' meant one sterling/dollar world. The more
fundamental cold war political and economic concept of
'two worlds' - communist 'East' and capitalist 'West'
was solidifying at the same time. Indeed, the movement
towards 'one world' in the first sense was intimately
connected with the creation of 'two worlds' in the second
sense). In external economic policy devaluation therefore
marked the end of the movement towards partial autarky
initiated after the convertibility criSis, and the
virtual end of the idea of using economic controls for
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discrimination in export policy. This was the end of a
set of economic planning ideas which, admittedly, had
been only partially developed and partially successful.
Second, devaluation and the discussions stemming from it
confirmed the ascendancy of a counter-inflationary ,economic
strategy different from the disinfl~tionary policy
which preceded devaluation. Up to 1947 the government
had concentrated on preparing to combat recession with
reflation. In 1947 the empty economy and the dollar
shortage had reinforced the importance of economic
controls in an acutely inflationary situation, but this
proved to be a short-term extension of the transitional
period rather than a long-term development.
1948 facilitated a policy of financial
combined with decontrol.
When the early signs of recession came, in the export-
Recovery in
disinflation
led form that had long been predicted, it turned out that
the most feasible alternative to orthodox deflation,
namely devaluation, had to be accompanied by counter-
inflationary rather than reflationary policy. Instead of
trying to offset the possibility of unemployment in
export industries by expanding some other part of the
economy, the government found itself maintaining
employment by lowering the price of exports, while trying
to offset the inflationary effects of higher import
prices by holding down wages and restraining government
expenditure. This was a short step from the
disinflationary financial policy of the period 1947-9,
the main objectives of which had been to achieve
budgetary surpluses and to keep prices and wages steady.
But the new pressures from devaluation required further
development of these policies, and economic policy
discussions now became as dominated by the problems of
counter-inflationary measures as they had once been by
the problems of anti-slump measures. There was
consideration of what constituted an adequate measure of
the existing state of inflationary pressure; of how much
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disinflation was necessary; of the right mix of financial
instruments; of how to judge the outcome of counter-
inflation measures.
The need to accurately assess the effect of financial
policy on inflationary pressure led to fresh study of the
ways of doing this. The Economic Section's 1949
circulars show how financial 'disinflation' policies
moved policy-makers towards the notion of using the
unemployment statistics as an indicator of progress in
disinflation.(62) This technique began to replace the
previous techniques for assessing inflationary pressure,
which had eclectically examined various markets, trying
to identify examples of goods in easy supply in order to
to assess the possibilities for decontrol. Now there
began to be discussions about what the level of
unemployment should be at 'full employment,.(63) In
particular, the suggestion that the aim of fiscal policy
could and should be the fine-tuning of unemployment was
highly significant. (64) The changeover from the 'signs of
deflation', to the single indicator of the rate of
unemployment can be taken as a sign of changing
conditions as well as changing intentions. Though
decontrol was incomplete, the summing up of an
inflationary or deflationary gap in the single indicator
of unemployment required the existence of broadly free
market conditions to reflect reality. Just as
'inflationary pressure' could not be measured in terms of
the rate of price rises in a period of price controls and
administrative allocations, so the effects of
disinflation could not be judged by the Single indicator
of unemployment until market forces dominated the
operation of the economy. There was an atmosphere of
thinking the unthinkable in the Economic Section's
discussion of this idea. The reason for this is not hard
to grasp: in the existing circumstances of 'over-full'
employment, as some called it, the fine-tuning of
employment required a deliberate decision to increase
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Table 13.
Unemployment in the United Kingdom, 1938, 1945-51
(Percentage of working population)
1938 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
9.3 0.5 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1
Source: Feinstein, C.H. National income, expenditure and
output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965, 1972, Table 57.
unemployment. Obviously this was not easy to justify to
most of the public and to some ministers, who were still
attuned to the idea of recession. The advisability of
announcing such an aim was, understandably, discussed
with some trepidation in the Economic Section.(65)
Another crucial change that was taking place in this
period was that the Budget was emerging as the main
instrument of economic planning. (66) Because of the need
for surpluses this, again, was not completely accepted or
very well understood, even inside the government. In
March 1950 Hall wrote a brief on budget policy for
Attlee, about a Cabinet paper (67) which had been
prepared on the instructions of the Chancellor, (68)
'because of doubts felt by the Lord Privy Seal about the
wisdom of our policy of having large budget
surpluses,.(69) Hall advised Attlee: "The subject is
intensely difficult to understand [and] it is rather
doubtful whether in the end there will not have to be an
act of faith". He thought that the 1947 and 1948 changes
in budget policy amounted to a 'revolution', because the
government "took responsibility for maintaining full
employment, but avoiding inflation. It is the best
argument in favour of this policy that the revolution
passed almost unnoticed". Hall admitted that some saw a
danger in pushing deflation too far, but the real danger
was having too much inflation, espeCially after
devaluation, thereby producing a new balance of payments
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crisis. Accordingly, the 'plain duty' of the government
was to support the present policy: "Any departure from it
would be rightly regarded as an abandonment of the
principles of planning, and would ••• do great harm to
the cause, both here and abroad". By this time, then, the
notion of planning had been slimmed down to Keynesian




question arising from counter-inflationary
the Budget as the central instrument was how
the necessary budget surpluses, and this
brought back to the centre of economic policy-making the
issues of taxation and the control of government
expenditure. Monetary policy was not completely excluded
from consideration although it never achieved much
prominence under the Labour governments. While there had
been some retreat from the initial very low rates of
interest achieved under Dalton, it was still the
government's policy to keep them as low as possible.
Nevertheless, in the 1949 budget policy discussion there
were indications that some ministers were moving in the
direction of giving more weight to monetary policy;
Douglas Jay saw it as a means of staving off pressure on
the government's social objectives through constraints on
government expenditure; he suggested that too much had
been made to rest on budgetary disinflation, and argued
for credit disinflation and a milder dose of budgetary
disinflation.(70) But Jay's idea of a monetary
disinflation to back up the budget was rejected - because
it might reduce the volume of investment, raise interest
rates and possibly create unemployment. All in all it
was considered 'psychologically unsound,.(71) As
mentioned above, the tightening of monetary policy was
also rejected later on the year, in the discussions
preceding devaluation, when it was proposed by the Bank
as part of its alternative, and by other advisers as an
accompaniment, to devaluation.
Therefore the main debate revolved around fiscal
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policy, now being pushed forward by economic advisers as
the central instrument of economic planning. The level
of taxation was already generally regarded as too high,
and as a disincentive to workers and capitalists alike,
so pressure came on government expenditure, and social
policy in particular, which was the fastest growing
component of public expenditure. What worried the
conservative-minded was that the welfare state might
result in uncontrolled rises in expenditure. For
example, the central concept of the National Health
Service appeared to place the control of the public purse
in the hands of thousands of doctors.(72) Such fears were
not reduced by events in the early years of the NHS, when
Parliament had to be approached several times to endorse
supplementary expenditure. Thus, in the general budget
policy discussions for 1949, Bernard Gilbert commented on
the 'truly alarming' increases of estimated expenditure
on the NHS.(73) To those who worried that any
retrenchment might look like the 'Geddes Axe' of 1919-20
allover again, Gilbert attempted the reassurance was
that it was a question of controlling the rate of
increase of spending, rather than reducing services.(74)
A battle within the government over when and how to call
a halt to rising expenditure on social services in
general, and the NHS in particular, was therefore
inevitable, particularly after devaluation.
But what made the political situation after
devaluation so explosive was that within the general
effort to reduce government expenditure there arose the
apparent necessity to accommodate a higher level of
defence spending, and it was this combination of
circumstances that eventually split the government in
early 1951. From the end of the war a consistent aim of
the government had been to reduce military spending.
There was nothing remarkable about this: releasing
resources from the military sector was one of the surest
ways of increasing other supplies of all kinds, relieving
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inflationary pressure and helping the balance of payments
- and the armed forces throughout remained larger than
they had been before the war. Nevertheless, the armed
forces were operating on what to them appeared to be very
restrictive assumptions, especially given the increasing
bluster of the Cold War. In 1948 military spending
reached a low point' but in 1949 and 1950 the whole
process was put into reverse. Cripps, while he was still
Chancellor, advocated cutting defence as well as other
parts of government expenditure. Thus, in 1949 Cripps
wanted to continue to cut defence expenditure at a time
when others were proposing increases in both expenditure
and commitments; in this and other respects he stood out
against the Cold War policy. The defence programme
adopted in 1948 had called for about £840 million to be
spent in 1950-1. New estimates in 1949 put this at about
£810 million. Current defence spending was running at
about £790 million. Cripps wanted this to be cut to
about £760 million and further reductions to be made
thereafter. He actually called for a study of a £700
million defence programme, but this was rejected, as
'inconsonant' with foreign policy. Bevin, for example,
argued that the Cold War would 'intensify' if defence
spending fell further.(75)
Subsequently Cripps~ viewpoint was completely
overturned. In this the crucial event was the Korean war,
which broke out in June 1950, making a massive impact on
public opinion, on the economy and on economic policy. A
full treatment of rearmament is outside the scope of this
study, but it is useful to indicate why thia became so
intertwined with that of NBS expenditure, and to give
some insight into official and ministerial views at this
time. For in the background of these dramatic events the
last phase of the internal debate about the future of
economic controls and their connection with economic
planning was underway, and the outcome of this was
closely related to the foreground of political conflict
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on the international plane and within the government.
A key brief to Attlee from Bridges, dated July 22nd
1950, displays the conflicts that arose as the attempt
was made to reconcile pressures to raise the level of
preparedness for war with pressures to contain overall
government expenditure. (76) The defence departments had
produced proposals for increased military preparedness,
but Bridges felt that ministers would 'probably find
themselves in a dilemma'. They would want to make a
definite statement, in light of the fact that comparisons
would be made with the scale of rearmament that the
Americans were preparing. Bridges pointed out, however,
that the proposals were vague on two key points: (a) the
size and shape of the forces needed; (b) the date for
which preparedness was being planned. Shinwell, the
Secretary of State for War, had not shown that his plans
fitted in with any scheme for 'collective North Atlantic
defence', except in rhetorical terms; and he had claimed
that a time factor was difficult to arrive at. Bridges
proposed that the government should sanction an immediate
£3Om defence 'shopping list', but argued that the more
far-reaching acceleration proposals needed 'far more
study before they should be approved'. However, Bridges
also imagined that 'Ministers would feel that they cannot
get away with this, bearing in mind, not only the
political situation here, but the need to retain the
goodwill of the Western European countries and of the
United States'. Therefore, he recommended that a public
announcement should be made that there would be a rise of
£10Om in defence expenditure in the
it to £88Orn, while departments
authority to go beyond the shopping
coming year, bringing
should be given no
list. Bridges added
two further reasons for adopting this tactic. First, the
government would be able to escape from any early
announcement about service pay (on which there was a
dispute with the Ministry of Defence). Second, and
ultimately far more significant for the Labour
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government: 'unless a pretty specific announcement is
made about the increase in defence expenditure next year,
it is impossible to make a sufficiently clear and




can be little doubt that among the most
of these 'other things' was increasing
to have his
That battle
expenditure on the NHS, over which Bevan was
historic resignation battle with Gaitskell.
was as much about the scale of proposed rearmament as it
was about the NHS, and one of the points made by Bevan in
the course of the dispute rings very true in the light of
Bridges~ proposals of July 1950: Bevan argued that the
publicly announced 14% increase in defence expenditure in
one year was unrealistic because physical resources could
not be mobilised to this extent - at least not without
recreating
undoubtedly
the bottleneck economy - and he was
proved right in this. The effort of
rearmament, not just of Britain but of the United States
and other countries, caused a new bout of inflationary
pressure. Economic reports to ministers during 1950
showed signs of physical bottlenecks reappearing in coal,
bricks, timber, cement; import prices were rising; by
December 1950 the outlook for raw materials was said to
be 'grim'. The whole economic position, which had
appeared so promising at the beginning of
deteriorated drastically from the middle of 1950.
1950,
With
the economy becoming internally overheated, and balance
of payments difficulties just round the corner, the
partial reversion to a war economy threatened to roll
back the economic recovery. On July 30th 1951, E.M.
Nicholson briefed Morrison that the economic situation
was developing in an 'intricate and confuSing way, and it
is by no means clear whether the repercussions will prove
manageable or whether they will lead to some serious
economic crisis'. Rearmament had led to a 'labour famine
unparalleled here in times of peace'. The basic cause of
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the increased strain and uncertainty was that the economy
was being exposed to 'intense pressure and dislocation
from the Western rearmament programme, the pace and scale
of which are undeniably greater than the international
economy can stand without severe dislocation,.(78) The
acceleration of war preparations that had taken place by
late 1950 can be judged from the fact that the previous
British assumption had been no war before 1957: the new
NATO assumption was 1954; the United States itself was
working towards preparedness for war in 1951/2.(79)
A further indication of British military preparations
was the formation of a new Economic Steering Committee in
1950, with a membership of permanent secretaries and
other top officials. Reporting to the Economic Policy
Committee, it replaced the official committee on Economic
Development that had been formed in 1945. It was to
'advise ministers on economic implications of defence
policy and on the means for
requirements,.(80) Thus, a committee




replaced by one designed to oversee the economic aspects
of military planning. Although there is to space to
analyse this aspect in detail, it can be mentioned that
the records of economic policy-making for 1949-51 show
many indications of the partial reversion to a war
economy, brought about by the 'pace and scale' of
rearmament.
In essence the rearmament programme as formulated in
1950-1 involved a reversal of the view that had been
constantly put forward since the end of the war, that
various government programmes should be reduced in the
name of economic realism and the relief of inflationary
pressure. In addition, at the time of devaluation, it
had finally been accepted that government expenditure
should be more closely controlled as a step towards
creating overseas confidence. At the time of the Korean
war many of the same people, at home and overseas, who
305
had previously been so critical about the effects of
'trying to do too much' on inflationary pressure and the
balance of payments went into reverse for the cause of
rearmament. Bevan raised this issue when possible
compromises on NHS charges were being discussed in the
Cabinet during April 1951. The close connection made
between the two issues is especially apparent from the
record of the Cabinet of April 9th, when it was suggested
that it might be possible to postpone the introduction of
NHS charges for 6 months, and 'during the interval
Ministers should be able to resolve their doubts on the
question whether the money allocated to the increased
defence programme could in fact be profitably spent; and
they would then be able to see more clearly whether the
proposed economies on the Health Service were in fact
essential'. Bevan argued that the defence programme was
distorting the national economy at the expense of the
social services; but Gaitskell was adamant, and at the
conclusion Bevin read out a previous decision that a
£400m ceiling should be set to NHS expenditure. This
reaffirmation made Bevan's resignation inevitable, though
he delayed it until after the Budget. (81) Of course,
under the Conservatives, once the Korean War scare had
subsided, and presumably after 'far more study' had
finally shown it to be impractical, the rearmament
programme was trimmed to more realistic proportions; but
the developments outlined here help to explain some of
the bitterness which led to resignations from the second
of Attlee's government's following the 1951 Budget.
IV
These dramatic events of 1949-51 overshadowed the
discussions that were continuing on what had become the
more mundane political questions of the day: the long-
term future of the economic objectives and organisation
of government; the control of investment; the future of
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economic controls; and the relationship of all these to
the policy of economic planning. The development of
these discussions stemmed from the work of the official
Government Organisation Committee set up in the autumn of
1947.(82) Subsequently, a steering committee on Economic
Organisation was set up, comprising a number of permanent
secretaries, chaired by Bridges. (83) An Economic
Organisation Working Group was also formed, the records
of which show that it ranged over the entirety of the
government's economic effort. (84) As far as economic
planning was concerned, the discussions came to a head in
1950-1, around the question of whether economic controls
should be made permanent in some form.
An important point about the economic organisation
enquiry is that through it the officials sought to define
economic objectives that would be acceptable to all
parties in the future.(85) The tone was set by CEPS,
with a rather banal account of the 'Essential functions of
government
reiterated
in the economic field' - which simply
the basic elements of Employment policy. (86)
Not surprisingly, the question of influencing investment
was regarded as a very important one to be studied, for
which purpose a Control of Investment Committee was set
up.(87) The possibility that economic controls might be
needed in the long-term could not be excluded, and a
Committee on Economic Controls chaired by Gilbert looked
into the implications of this; its work being closely
related to that of an Emergency Legislation Committee,
which had the onerous job of gOing through all the
wartime emergency legislation (which covered an enormous
field, much of
recommend which
it unrelated to economic policy) to
parts of it should be retained and
why. (88) Thus, a set of official committees developed,
concerned with the strategic development of economic
which explicitly set out to establish a supra-
view of economic policy; there was no attempt to
policy,
party
include any notion of economic planning in the
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discussions, presumably because it was regarded as a
policy peculiar to the Labour Party.
The official Committee on the Control of Investment
(eel) was set up, in early 1949, at the instance of the
Production Committee, under a Treasury chairman,
P.D.Proctor. Its brief was 'to make a comprehensive
review of the powers and administrative machinery
required in the long-term for the control of capital
investment,.(89) The eel interpreted these terms of
reference as meaning that it had to show how to influence
investment when the controls over building and steel were
becoming weaker. The committee predicted the eventual
end of building controls and pointed out that 'controls
over investment in plant and machinery are already almost
non-existent and will disappear altogether as and when
steel allocations come to an end,.(90)
To look at the long-term problems in a completely
general way the eel had to take into account the problems
of controlling investment in recessionary and
inflationary conditions. Therefore, although all recent
experience had been of inflationary conditions, it was
still felt that departments should be prepared for
recession. For this purpose the idea of an investment
'shelf' for the public sector was again mooted, though by
now there was a much less optimistic air that this would
actually work. There had been hopes that nationalisation
would provide greater leverage on investment, but the
clashes that had already taken place between the
government and the boards of public enterprises (notably
the British Electricity Authority in 1947), resulted in
second thought about this. If the nationalised
industries could so vigorously resist cuts in their
investment programmes, they might also resist stimulation
if they thought that there was no commercial purpose in
expansion. However, the CCI did still regard the
socialised sector as a useful channel for government
influence on investment, and thought that there should be
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a continuous process of consultation between the
industries and the government. (91)
In inflationary conditions, where the continuation of
some of the existing controls might have seemed
appropiate to some extent, the CCI concluded that the
government should, in the long-term, rely mainly on 'a
general counter-inflationary financial policy; aided by
measures aimed specifically at investment, such as
capital issues control and initial depreciation
allowances'. The committee saw limitations in the
application of these measures, but thought that they
were more desirable than the alternatives of 'absolute
authoritarianism' (which was one way of characterising
the use of economic controls!), or the payment of
subsidies which would in practice be impossible to
withdraw. The committee was against any general system
of subsidies on the grounds that no-one would then
undertake investment without a subsidy.(92) One of the
major points in the committee's report was that if a
predominantly financial policy was to be followed, then
fiscal and monetary policies would have to be harmonised.
On this point the report included what were clearly
thought to be recent contradictions in policy: the fact
that depreciation allowances had been doubled at a time
when the IPC had been recommending a decrease in private
investment, and also that 'money rates were depressed to
the lowest rate on record at the height of the post-war
inflationary boom,.(93) In reviewing 'the different
tools' the government might be able to use to adjust the
level of investment, and 'the different areas of the
investment field in which such adjustments might be
made', the OCI found the results 'disappointing':
'••• each of the separate instruments which we have
examined has turned out, on closer inspection, to
be a good deal less effective than might have been
expected, and in each of the separate areas of
investment, not excluding the public sector, the
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practical difficulties of harmonising the
investment activities of the separate agencies with
the investment policy of the central government
becomes greater the more closely they are examined.
These general conclusions apply, in the long-run,
both to measures for restricting investment and to
measures for stimulating it, though the
difficulties are certainly greater under the latter
head' •
Of all its mainly negative conclusions, the OCl was
was
existing economic








similar results of official studies, it was not possible
to reject out of hand the possibility that controls would
have to be retained in the long-term in some form.
During 1949-50 the Committee on Economic Controls
examined whether any controls would be needed in the
long-term, and its papers provide further confirmation of
official thinking on this issue. The committee began by
posing two very basic questions: (i) what was meant by a
"control"? (ii) what sort of economy would there be
after 1950? On the first point, the committee defined
controls as essentially restrictive: they would be
intended to prevent people from doing something they
would otherwise have done, rather than to make them do
something that they would not otherwise have done. (It
was sometimes observed that 'restrictive' controls also
caused people to do things they would not have done
otherwise, but the crucial difference was that this was
not under the direct influence of the government). On
the second point it was assumed that the principles of
policy would continue to be full employment, balance in
external payments, and 'Fair Shares' while scarcities
continued. (94) In anwering both its main questions the
CEC followed exactly in the footsteps of previous
official thinking.
The CEC did not, therefore, come up with any new
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thinking about controls, but it did help to crystallise
two issues. The first issue concerned the future legal
basis for economic controls. Wartime emergency
legislation had been framed to allow the government to
fashion any tool thought necessary to deal with a
particular problem. It was recognised that in the future
there could be problems such as scarcities of raw
materials; ministers might decide that economic powers
should be available for use in such an eventuality; but,
as in war, the problems for which the use of controls
would be required could not be predicted exactly. The CEC
therefore concluded that if there were to be controls,
the legal basis would have to be just as broad as in















The outcome of the various studies that were made
under the umbrella of the Government Organisation
Committee's comprehensive plan for the review of
controls,(96) including those of the Committee on Control
of Investment and the Committee on Economic Controls, can
be set down in three simple statements, which were the
core of the official consensus on the future of economic
controls:
(1) Controls were unworkable, damaging and unecessary.
(2) Continuation of controls would require blanket
legislation similar to that used in wartime.
(3) In future, governments should rely solely on
financial instruments to pursue their economic policies.
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vMinisters were equally united in a conviction that it
would be useful to continue economic controls in some
form, although they were divided about various subsidiary
issues. To this end an Economic Powers Bill was drafted
in early 1950, as a result of the work of the Committee
on Economic Controls and the Emergency Legislation
Committee. The draft Bill followed the wording of the
existing controls legislation very closely. When he saw
it, Bridges commented: "I have read and shuddered - as I
suppose I was meant to". This cryptic remark can best be
interpreted as indicating the form that general official
opposition to the idea of permanent economic powers
initially took: the officials undoubtedly hoped that the
ministers would also read the draft Bill and shudder - at
its potential for making the Labour government
unpopular.(97) In this they were disappointed: a long and
tortuous road lay ahead.
Brook succinctly set out the problems posed by the
Economic Powers Bill in a brief for Attlee dated March
29th 1950. The existing controls rested on the Supplies
and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945. This could
be renewed from year to year, but permanent powers would
be needed sooner or later. The questions were: when and
in what form? Morrison wanted to pass new legislation
before the end of 1950, and 'Officials of the departments
concerned have come to the conclusion that it would have
to be a Bill taking power, permanently, to operate all
the economic controls now in operation'. The government
would not need to operate all the controls all of the
time, but 'they must retain full power to do so if they
are to continue an effective system of economic
planning. ,(98) Because of the global nature of the Bill,
it would 'certainly look pretty formidable. The critics
will be
planning
able to say that, for purposes




retain permanently all the war-time emergency powers
(except the power to direct labour) which were conceded
in the atmosphere of 1940'. Brook raised the spectre that
the Opposition would try to delay the Bill with
'improving' amendments. These might be difficult to
defeat, and if passed might leave the government with
'fewer powers than they thought necessary'. Implicitly
this was a recommendation to Attlee to drop the Bill.(99)
But ministers did not agree to drop the Bill, which
was backed, among others, by Morrison, Jay and Gaitskell.
Realising that it would be unpopular simply to make
wartime powers permanent, the Cabinet agreed that the
draft Bill should be looked at again with the aim of
turning it into a more politically attractive 'Economic
Planning and Full Employment Bill'. In June a new
official committee was set up, again chaired by Gilbert,
to try to knock the draft Bill into shape before the
summer recess, so that an announcement about it could be
made in the King's Speech the following autumn. In July
the problem was raised whether the Bill should contain
'positive' powers. To examine this issue a sub-committee
of the Production Committee, under Bevan, was set up to
consider what powers should be added. The aim was to
enlarge the Bill, 'to include positive powers to require
the public and private sectors of industry to undertake
activities which were necessary in connection with the
effective planning of the national resources and the
maintenance of full employment,.(100)
Around this time, an interesting practical issue of
the use of 'positive powers' arose. A firm was directed
to continue producing plaster-board after it had given up
to concentrate on more lucrative projects. The questions
raised by this were discussed at the Economic Policy
Committee, (101) where an extraordinary argument was
raised against the use of controls in this case: it was
said that the US government was preSSing for faster
rearmament, and that the British government was claiming
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that it could not go faster without re-introducing
undesirable wartime controls; if a firm could be
commanded to produce plaster-board, then the United
States could insist that similar steps be taken for
rearmament purposes. (l02) The issue went to Bridges as a
'complicated affair', because the other side of the coin
was indeed the question of how to interpret the draft
Economic Powers Bill (with its existing emphasis on
restrictive rather than positive powers) in relation to
the rearmament programme - the achievement of which was
rapidly becoming a primary aim of economic policy. It
might well become desirable to use powers of direction in
that case; so the whole question of 'positive powers' had
to be thrashed out. In this discussion it was clear that
positive powers were, in official quarters, acceptable in
the context of rearmament, but not for civilian
purposes. (l03)
Bevan's sub-committee only met twice, and the positive
powers recommended amounted only to empowering
departments to 'buy, manufacture or sell goods for
civilian requirements either directly or through an
agent' - without any specific ideas about how such powers
might be used. Attlee was briefed that this meant, in
effect, that Bevan was 'reporting against any wide
extension of the Bill' in the way that had originally
been proposed. (l04) Following this, it had to be
decided whether a reference to the Bill with positive and
negative powers should be included in the King's Speech.
Pressure against this was growing, though Morrison was
still 'emphatically' in favour.(l05) The Cabinet agreed
that there should be a reference to the Bill in the
King's Speech, (106) but still objections came, from
Gilbert, who insisted that the government should not take
positive powers unless it was absolutely clear what they
were to be used for. (107) Jay, expressed himself
'strongly opposed' to a 'merely negative and restrictive
Bill', which would give the impression that 'planning is
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a matter of saying "Thou shalt not"'. He rejected a
number of arguments that had been put forward against the
Bill. He did not think that the Bill would cause alarm
in industry, as had been claimed. He rejected Gilbert's
contention that reasons for powers should be thought out
precisely before they were taken.
it had been a weak point in the
employment policy that 'there has
Besides, Jay argued,
government's previous
been doubt whether the
Government has the power in the last resort to start
production in a factory b~ilt in an area of unemployment,
when a private firm will not do so. Indeed, it was just
to meet this proven need that the Minister of Health's
Committee was set up,.(108)
A new attempt to resolve these issues was made in
November, when Gaitskell was invited to submit a
memorandum to a reconstituted ministerial committee on
the Bill,
Bill goes
chaired by Morrison. Gaitskell's view of the
a long way towards explaining why there was
such strong agreement among ministers that both
'positive' and 'negative' economic powers would be
required permanently, and is therefore worth a brief
summary. Gaitskell argued that the starting point for the
Bill should be full employment policy, not the Supplies
and Services Act. This would ensure that it only
contained powers essential to its purpose. Gaitskell
thought that in normal circumstances it would be possible
to maintain adequate monetary demand in the home market
by monetary and fiscal methods, but circumstances might
arise, especially in some sectors of the economy, when
there would be a need to 'supplement these methods by
more direct action', and for this the government needed
extra powers - largely for counter-inflationary purposes:
'The necessity for such controls arises to a large extent
because the pressure of demand cannot be kept at the same
level throughout the whole economy. For example the
pressure on the building industry is likely for many
years to exceptionally great. Monetary policy could only
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relieve this by a general deflation which would carry
unemployment far above the present level'. Controls
would keep building in check while the rest of demand was
kept high. Similarly, the amount of general stimulation
required to eliminate unemploy_ment in the Development
Areas would create a serious situation for the whole
economy unless it was possible to 'keep a tight hold' on
the overall pressure of demand, while taking special
steps to increase it in certain areas. In addition,
there was a need for controls to restrict imports to
essentials and 'to influence the bulk of exports'.
Gaitskell therefore proposed that the Bill should contain
the following powers of control:
'(i) Power to control prices
(ii) Power to ration essential consumer goods
(iii) Power to allocate materials
(iv) Power to control building
(v) Power to control imports
(vi) Power to determine the proportion of output sold at
home or exported.'
In addition, while fiscal and monetary measures would be
more important than any other for deflationary
conditions, Gaitskell suggested that four other powers
might be useful:
,(i) Powers to stimulate public investment
(ii) Powers to stimulate private investment
(iii) Powers of manufacture
(iv) Powers of purchase.'
He made no further comment on the first group of powers,
but reiterated many of the familiar doubts and objections
about the second group. Also he felt that the phrase
economic planning should be dropped from the title of the
Bill: "although
are very much
the powers we require for this






I doubt if we should be wise to put
the latter. People will support
recognise that they can prevent
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unpleasant things happening, but I doubt if the term
economic planning is understood - or if it is, whether it
is a popular concept.,,(109)
The official committee revised the Bill in the light
of these views, and reported to ministers with a draft
Bill, now retitled the Full Employment Bill, on January
26 1951. It contained phrases to confer 'positive







and to purchase capital
private capital
goods on public
as well as a number of other changes.
pointed out that the purpose behind
But the
the Bill
changed. Originally, when Gilbert's CEC
existing emergency
in March 1950, before the outbreak
the aim had been to replace the
legislation. At the time the
committee had reported
of the Korean war,
replacement had been expected to be a comparatively swift
and easy procedure, but rearmament had changed things
completely. For example, it had been thought that one
regulation, under which goods and chattels could be
requisitioned, 'would soon only be required for
requisitioning vegetables grown by Members of Parliament
which they could not sell to the Ministry of Food without
risk of disqualification; whereas now D.R.53 is required
(inter alia) for requisitioning ships for use in Korean
waters and for requisitioning machine tools due to be
supplied under contracts with Russia." In short, the new
Bill would not clear up the problems of the emergency
legislation: 'The present moment is not an easy one at
which to substitute for a Defence regulation code of
controls, now again made specifically applicable to
defence purposes, another code in which the emphasis is
laid on long-term economic objectives. ,(110) In early
February the ministerial committee met, and decided to
recommend to the Cabinet that the Bill should not be
introduced. The Cabinet agreed, (111) and there the
matter rested.
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Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that
Gaitskell genuinely believed in the arguments for the
Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill that are
quoted above. His biographer notes that he had put a
similar view to the Economic Policy Committee earlier in
the year, and that he saw the major problem of democracy
as holding to full employment without inflation.
Gaitskell's recipe for this, as approvingly summarised by
Dalton, was always to have 'a bit of inflationary
pressure, but use physical controls to prevent it
breaking through'. Indeed, Dalton recommended to Attlee
that Gaitskell should become Chancellor on the basis that
he had a 'masterly' approach to this problem - and that
he could tackle the officials on it.(112) The argument
around the Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill,
and the reasons that Gaitskell gave for wanting to obtain
powers 'much the same as those required for general
economic planning', are therefore decisive proof that the
idea of economic planning had not faded away before 1951.
It was the officials who were most diligent in
consolidating the wartime consensus as represented by
Employment policy, because they were explicitly seeking a
supra-party view of economic objectives and organisation.
But in their opposition to the continuation of economic
powers in the long-term, the officials were fundamentally
at odds with the Labour ministers. The dropping of the
Full Employment Bill meant that for many years to come,
after the emergency powers were finally allowed to lapse,
fiscal and monetary instruments were to bear almost the
whole weight of economic policy. This was the result of a
conflict that was fought throughout the period of the
Attlee governments, rather than the consolidation of a
consensus.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis the idea that the development of economic
policy during the period 1945-51 was a consolidation of
wartime consensus about the future, as
Employment policy, has been shown to be




further and question whether the basis for a consensus
about demand management had even been established by
1950-1 - since ministers had not yet fully accepted the
idea that, in the long-term, economic policy should
depend solely on the use of fiscal and monetary
instruments.
To explain this, let us first recall some salient
points about the pre-war development of economic planning
ideas. In the 1920's economic planning had been
advocated by the extreme Left and a few others who
thought mass unemployment was a national emergency
justifying the overthrow of laissez-faire political
norms. This view was rejected by the Labour Party's
leadership at that time. Socialism was a distant aim to
them, and when in government they followed the principles
of orthodox economic policy. In the context of deepening
recession during the second minority Labour government of
1929-31, these principles amounted to a form of economic
fatalism, which led to the situation where the Labour
Party appeared to be a 'Salvation army that took to its
heels on the Day of Judgement'.
After the 1931 crisis the idea of economic planning
was wholeheartedly embraced by all sections of the labour
movement: its general significance was that it
represented the antithesis of economic fatalism. Indeed,
in the broadest sense the idea of planning encompassed
all those who - inside and outside the labour movement -
stood for the necessity of more state intervention in
economic policy; and at one edge of the spectrum this
included Keynes himself. The texture of Labour economic
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policy proposals in this period is best
Dalton's Practical socialism for Britain.
grasped from
The ideas of
economic planning presented there can be criticised as
eclectic by comparison with the pure economic analysis
with which Keynes operated in the 1930's; against this,
it should be recognised that the Keynesianism derived
from the General theory of employment, interest and money
was not designed to solve every practical problem; it was
aimed at the abstract problem of dealing with deficient
or excess aggregate demand. 'Beneath' this were a
multitude of problems such as structural change and
regional inequalities. 'Outside' it were the problems of
the balance of payments.
This broader range of problems was discussed
extensively during wartime reconstruction discussions,
which strongly reinforced the idea that there should be
radical changes in the conduct of economic policy after
the war, though the amount of agreement achieved within
the coalition as it tried, in Churchill's words, to 'peer
into the mists of the future', was limited. On the
assumption that after the war there would be a short
inflationary transitional period followed by recession,
attention was concentrated on two problems: how to
prevent the kind of boom-and-bust that had followed
immediately after the First World War; and how to reflate
the economy in a depression. The solution of the
reflation problem by the maintenance of internal demand
raised a number of practical and ideological issues about
how to establish the conditions for implementing such a
policy, and about how to deal with any likely side-
effects. It was recognised that a great deal depended on
re-establishing a favourable balance of payments, which
depended in turn on many developments which were both
unpredictable and outside the government's control,
particularly as a liberal multilateral trading system was
most favoured form for the reconstruction of the
international economy. As post-war events were to show,
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the possibilities of domestic economic policy
directly shaped by this objective.
It was easily agreed - deceptively so - that the
were
stabilisation problem in the transition would be solved
by the continuation of wartime measures. But the most
basic idea of transitional planning, the use of wartime
controls in whatever ways might be necessary to ensure
stabilisation, was not in fact firmly fixed. The
arguments raised towards the end of the war about a
'return to normalcy', and the practical obstacles to the
achievement of major economic aims by the use of controls
which were predicted by officials, show that the
consensus on this aspect of wartime reconstruction
planning was flimsy. The shaky assumptions and
disagreements of reconstruction planning lead to the
conclusion that the consensus within the wartime
coalition was limited and tentative, and it is therefore
hard to sustain the idea that Attlee governments were
consolidating it. Indeed, their experience inside the
coalition confirmed to Labour ministers the need for
their planning policy. To them the policy announced in
Employment policy did not go far enough, in the sense
that the means proposed were not sufficient to achieve
the end.
By promising to 'plan from the ground up' the Labour
Party certainly distanced itself from the anodyne
statements of Employment policy in the 1945 election
campaign. But its initial implementation of the policy
of economic planning was weak. The Prime Minister was
not drawn deeply enough into the economic planning
machinery; no Central Economic Planning Staff was set up;
Morrison was very keen on the idea of planning but was
fully occupied with Parliamentary business in general and
the nationalisation programme in particular. There was a
tendency to departmentalism, which exacerbated
differences between ministers and hindered the
development of a consistent set of planning objectives
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and the integration of different aspects of policy. Thus,
Cripps found himself on his own when he made proposals on
relations between government and private industry; and
Dalton at first sought to keep budget policy away from
economic planning as a whole. There was no general review
of controls, and there was unnecessary confusion about
labour controls. 'Licence inflation' developed unchecked
in steel allocations and the building programme. Worst
of all, there were inadequate preparations for a fuel
crisis, which was an obvious threat. In all this,
incompetence and difference of opinion played some part.
To some extent, however, the failure to act to bring the
situation under control is explained by a reluctance to
reduce programmes. Cuts were more or less continuously
urged by officials, but their views were pushed aside
until after the the convertibility crisis. It would be
wrong to ~y that this was simply irresponsible. The
government had long been advised that recession was just
round the corner. Because of this,
schemes were viewed as a 'reserve of
the reconstruction
work'. In this
perspective licence inflation was not as irresponsible as
it might appear with hindsight.
Nevertheless, the government cannot entirely escape
the criticism that it failed to get to grips with the
problems of inflationary pressure. The circumstances in
which the government's showpiece of democratic planning,
the Economic Survey for 1947, was launched vividly
illustrates this. No way was found to close the
inflationary gap that was revealed by initial studies
without making optimistic productivity assumptions. This
'failure', however, can be put in perpective:
productivity was, over the next few years, to rise faster
than it had in the inter-war period. More important was
the paradoxical situation that arose from the fuel
crisis. The government was forced to tighten up its
planning machinery as an emergency measure, while the
considered plan was called into question even before it
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was published. Subsequently, the government faced an
uphill struggle against loss of confidence in its
planning policies. Even the strongest display of
determination after the outbreak of the fuel crisis could
not alter or hide the fact that there had been inadequate
preparations beforehand.
Furthermore, despite the adoption of the fuel and
power expansion programme, the firmer approach to fuel
allocations, and the setting up of the Central Economic
Planning Staff, there was a period of 'drift' in economic
policy throughout the first half of 1947, because the
convertibility crisis was brewing and ministers and
officials could not agree on how to meet it. Morrison
pushed the slogan - unrealistic in the short-term - of
'Planning for expansion', while officials wondered what
the aims of planning really were. There was a growing
polarisation of views about planning, as anti-planners
argued that the transitional use of economic powers had
been mismanaged, and that the eventual date of
equilibrium - after which controls could be relaxed or
abandoned - was being delayed.
The convertibility crisis stopped the rudderless
motion
about
crisis to crisis. Questions were raisedfrom
the 'progressing' of policy; economic policy
was completely reworked; new programmes weremachinery
adopted
change
for exports and investment; there was a crucial
towards a disinflationary budgetary policy; and
firmer control of requirements was accepted because it
was at last realised that supplies could not be increased
in the short-term. All this betokened a new mood, at
least among ministers. Problems about the use of
controls that had not been studied in depth since the
reconstruction discussions were now looked at afresh, as
it seemed that some controls might have to be retained in
the long-term. However, the whole of this effort was
provoked by a crisis in external economic relations; and
the belief that a liberal international trading system
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provided the best hope for a prosperous Britain in the
future was still strong. While there was a turn towards
partial autarky after the convertibility crisis, and no-
one could be sure whether this would be for six months or
ten years, there was still the hope that dollar aid would
be renewed in some acceptable form. In retrospect, the
policies initiated after the convertibility crisis appear
more significant as a means of demonstrating that Britain
was putting its house in order prior to receiving further
dollar loans, than as a determined attempt to implement
economic planning.
Pessimism which lasted throughout the rest of 1947 was
replaced by optimism as the extent of economic recovery
became obvious during 1948. Recovery was due to a number
of factors: to natural processes of recovery from war
to actions by the government (in particular





budget surpluses); and to the advent of
With an easing of constraints on supplies.
the export drive succeeded without the drastic use of
controls which had been contemplated in the autumn of
1947, while investment programmes increased despite the
firm initial intention to use controls to reduce them.
Meanwhile, a series of official studies stressed the
practical difficulties of economic planning using
controls, and tried to establish the case for using
financial instruments as an alternative. The review of
controls which was begun in the autumn of 1947 turned
into a fashion for decontrol, most evident in the Board
of Trade. but also present in other parts of the economic
policy machinery. The urge to get rid of 'physical' or
'direct' controls went hand-in-hand with the development
of disinflationary budgetary policy. The connection
between deflation and decontrol can be seen very strongly
in the official discussions of the time. There was no
form of control which did not come under critical
scrutiny, even though it proved impossible in the short-
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term to remove a number of them.
In this situation some tried to reinterpret the idea
of economic planning. Thus, Hall presented the Budget as
the main intrument of economic planning. One thing above
all is certain, the consensus among officials was that
governments in future should rely on fiscal and monetary
instruments alone to achieve economic policy objectives -
whether circumstances were inflationary or recessionary.
To most, the overturning of the traditional idea that
budget policy should have no wider role than balancing
the government's income and expenditure, was probably
about as revolutionary as they were prepared to be.
Admittedly this was a step forward from the wartime
'consensus' which did not manage to arrive at this point,
but it was probably achieved so easily because of the
greater acceptability of having budget surpluses as a
counter-inflationary weapon, as against budget deficits
as a reflationary weapon.
With recovery in 1948 the movement towards decontrol
was swift, and at the time of devaluation the
difficulties of those who still wanted to press on with
previous policies were mercilessly exposed. Due to the
recession in the United States the government was faced
with three fundamental choices:
continuing with the 1947 policies, devaluation with some
other measures, or orthodox deflation. Against the 1947
policies it could be argued that conditions had changed,
or that the policies had never worked. Once again, a
crucial argument was that an intensification of the 1947
policies would put the achievement of the 'one world' of
liberal trading in jeopardy for many years. The point
that confidence in Britain was dependent on overseas
perceptions of domestic policies was pressed home hard by
senior officials. The outcome was devaluation, with more
discipline over government expenditure as an additional
measure. This latter policy eventually opened deep
fissures within the government, when it became clear that
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overall control of public expenditure required restraint
in the growth of NHS expenditure but was compatible with
a massive acceleration of military spending •.
It would be wrong to say that by this time commitment
to the policy of economic planning had completely faded
away, because there was the very Significant controversy
over the draft Economic Powers Bill, which became the
Economic Planning and Full Employment Bill and finally
the Full Employment Bill. Perhaps the most significant
thing about this controversy is that it reveals in
precise terms the gulf between the opinions of officials
and ministers about the long-term future of economic
policy. As already mentioned, from 1948 there was a
concerted attempt by officials to establish conditions in
which controls could be replaced by fiscal and monetary
instruments. But because there was still a danger of open
inflation, a cautious approach was required. One can
imagine that a high official of this time would have made
short work of the kind of arguments put forward by John
Jewkes in Ordeal by planning - while agreeing with his
general sentiments. For the views of most of the
officials coincided very closely with Keynes~, which he
expressed in his letter to Hayek about The road to
serfdom: that there should be more planning than before
the war, but in an atmosphere in which a purely
capitalist philosophy remained dominant. At their most
extreme, officials condemned the use of controls which
interfered with individual economic choice as 'absolute
authoritarianism'. Not surprisingly, the attempts made
by officials actually to formulate ideas on economic
policy on this basis led them to be hostile towards
practically everything that the Labour ministers did - or
wanted to be able to do - in the name of economic
planning.
The dispute over the continuation of economic powers
reveals that as late as 1950-1 there was a wide gap
between the views of officials and ministers. Officials
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were at this time trying to establish a supra-party view
of economic policy, sticking closely to the ideas in
Employment policy. Labour ministers, including
Gaitskell, were still sceptical that the chief aim of
economic policy, full employment without inflation, could
be achieved with fiscal and monetary instruments alone.
Indeed, Gaitskell argued that most of the powers required
for 'general economic planning' would be required to cope
with the problems arising either from inflationary or
deflationary conditions. This could not be said openly,
though, because by 1950 economic planning had become
unpopular.
The officials resisted such arguments as far as
possible. Of course, the officials' views were not
usually expressed in ideological terms; and they were
able to produce some very strong practical arguments
against controls. Moreover, ministers had been very
reluctant to use controls until they were forced to react
to a crisis. Yet, as Gaitskell put it, controls would
only be justifiable to the public if they would prevent
something very unpleasant happening. The fuel crisis is a
case in point: no adequate preparations had been made
despite the warnings. Was Gaitskell, therefore, being
realistic in supposing that controls would be used
effectively as a preventative measure? It would be
difficult to imagine inflationary conditions of greater
severity than those of 1945-6, short of war; yet the
government had been very reluctant to use controls,
preferring to take an optimistic view of the situation
until it was too late. Gaitskell had also come down on
the side of devaluation in 1949, and against the
intensified use of controls in balance of payments
policy. Therefore in terms of their own past actions the
Labour ministers were on weak ground in arguing that in
the future, when any inflationary pressure was likely to
be much milder than that already experienced, permanent
legislation to provide governments with sweeping economic
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powers would be useful.
The nub of the officials' opposition to permanent
economic powers was that they wanted to restrict economic
policy
Yet it
to the use of fiscal and monetary instruments.
had not been demonstrated that such limited
instruments, though they might preserve the maximum
economic freedom, were likely to be sufficient to support
full employment without inflation. If I had been writing
this conclusion a few years ago I might have been tempted
to fall in with the general consensus that full
employment sustained by demand management was an
established, irreversible fact. Today the political
objective of 'a high and stable level of employment' has
been rejected because it has proved impossible to achieve
it with the restricted instruments of demand management,
even though these have been far more powerful than those
envisaged in the reconstruction discussions. In short,
while the arguments of the ministers may have been weak
in many ways, it is legitimate to conclude that the
officials have been proved wrong by events.
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Appendix! MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS
A brief guide to posts held by most of the ministers and
officials mentioned in the text.
























Lord Privy Seal, 1943-5
Minister, Health, 1945-51
Minister, Labour, 1940-5
Sec. of State, Foreign Affs, 1945-51
Paymaster-General, 1942-5
Prime Minister, 1940-5
Minister, Aicraft Production, 1942-5
Presiden~, Board of Trade, 1945-7
Minister, Economic Affairs, 1947
Chancellor of Exc., 1947-51
President, Board of Trade, 1942-5
Chancellor of Exc., 1945-7
ParI. Under-Sec., Fuel and Power,
1946-7
Minister, Fuel & Power, 1947-50
Minister, Economic Affairs, 1950
Chancellor of Exc., 1950-1
Minister, Labour, 1945-51
Economic Sec., Treasury, 1947-50
Financial Sec., Treasury, 1950-51
Minister of Production, 1942-5
Paymaster-General, 1947-8



























Minister, Fuel & Power, 1945-7
Sec. of State, War, 1947-50
Minister, Food, 1946-50
Minister, Supply, 1945-7
Secretary, Overseas Trade, 1947
President, Board of Trade, 1947-51
Chancellor of Exc., 1940-3
Minister, Reconstruction, 1943-5
Ass. Sec., Board of Trade, 1941-4
Adviser on industrial location,
Board of Trade, 1945-6
Joint 2nd Sec., Treasury, 1938-48
Chairman, Inter-dept. committee




Perm. Sec., Treasury, 1945-56
Perm. Sec., Office of Min. of
Reconstruction, 1943-5
Additional Cabinet Sec., 1945-6
Cabinet Secretary, 1947-56
Economic Section, 1945-47
Economic AdViser, Board of
Trade, 1946-9
Economic Section, 1945-7
Economic Adviser, Min. of Fuel &
Power, 1947-51
Economic Section, 1940-45
Economic Section, and Adviser to
Treasury, 1945-54
Joint 2nd Sec., Treasury, 1945-52
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Joint 2nd Sec., Treasury, 1944-56
P.M.'s political adviser, 1947
Adviser, Board of Trade, 1946-7
Director, Economic Section, 1947-53
2nd Sec., Board of Trade, 1946-52
Perm. Sec., Treasury, 1942-5
Principal Ass. Sec., Office of
Min. of Reconstruction, 1943-4
P.M.'s Statistical Section, 1940-5
CEPS, 1947-50
Chief Ass., Economic Section, 1940-5
Director, Economic Section, 1946-7
Examiner of Controls, Board of
Trade, 1948-50
Ass. Sec., Min. of Health, 1946-54
Sec. of Off. of Lord Pres., 1945-52
Chief Planning Officer and
Chairman of Economic Planning
Board, 1947-53
3rd Sec., Treasury, 1948-50
Director, Economic Section, 1943-5
CElS and Economic Section, 1939-42
Economic AdViser and
Head of Programmes
Division, Min. of Production, 1942-5
Economic AdViser, Bd. of Trade, 1946
CEPS, 1947-8
Economic Section, 1945-7
2nd Sec., Treasury, 1948-51
Economic Section, 1941-7
Member of EPB, 1947-8
Perm. Sec., Board of Trade, 1945-51




Tuesday, 22nd November, 1949,
at 6.15 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE BOARD OF TRADE PRODUCTION DEPARTMENTS
AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH INDUSTRY
1. Administrative Civil Servants as a class probably find
it pretty difficult to answer the question "But what do
you do?" None of them find it more difficult than one
who is serving a term in a production department, or, as
it is now more commonly coml.ng to be called, a
"production authority". In the end it usually comes down
to his saying, "Oh, well I take an interest in hard
haberdashery", or "Oh, well, I look after the chaps who
make shop fittings".
And the odd thing is that those two phrases "take an
interest in" and "look after" are really just about as
near as you can get, in most cases, to describing the job
a production authority does. What it doesn't do - as of
course anyone who has heard of the Holy Roman Empire
could tell you off his own bat - is to produce anything
or to exercise very much authority.
2. The first - and very nearly the last - function a
production authority performs is to be a post office, or,
to be more precise, part of a post office - a letter box.
Let us say that the particular production authority we
are dealing with is the one for clothes-pegs. (I am not
sure offhand whether at this moment my own Branch may not
in fact be the production authority for clothes-pegs; who
is the production authority for what depends on a
complicated theology.) Two or three clothes-peg
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manufacturers tell their trade association - the National
Federation of Washing-line, Clothes Maidens and Clothes-
pegs Manufacturers Association - that the quality of the
material they are getting for fastenings for pegs is
deteriorating, and representations should be made to the
Government about it. The Federation's President - who
controls 85% of the total output - hears that a large
aircraft firm are planning to make metal clothes pegs
from their scrap; he brings it up at the Joint Industrial
Council, and both employers and employees (who are
organised partly in the Clothes-peg Pinners' Society and
partly in the Transport and General Workers Union) agree
that this is a grave threat to the security and well
being of the established firms and the established
workers in the industry, and the Government should put a
stop to it. The Member of Parliament for Chorlton-under-
Twistle gives notice one Friday that on the following
Tuesday he will ask the President of the Board of Trade
whether he is aware that housewives in his constituency
are finding it impossible to buy clothes-pegs, and that
there is consequently grave hardship and risk to health
because of the prevalence of dirty linen, and what steps
the President proposes to take to increase output of this
vital commodity. (The Question is really deSigned, of
course, to give the hone Member an opportunity to ask an
awkward Supplementary about the Cabinet washing dirty
linen in public.) A firm of clothes-peg manufacturers
want to rebuild their factory destroyed by fire; another
firm want the Board of Trade to issue an Industrial
Development Certificate in their favour; a third firm
want to import a machine which will boost their output of
clothes-pegs from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 a day. The
Federation is gravely concerned at the competition they
face through imports of clothes-pegs from Morocco. And,
once a year, the Federation is holding its annual lunch,
and would like their dear friends from their production
authority to join them. Sooner or later letters about
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all these things will find their way to the desk of the
Assistant Secretary who is at the head of the Branch
which is the production authority for clothes-pegs, or to
the Principal or Senior Executive Officer who is his
chief lieutenant, and who really knows what's cooking in
the clothes-peg world.
3. And with all of them he deals in one way or another.
First of all, of course, and whether or not delay in
dealing with other work means shutting of factories,
falling off of exports, or chaos and desolution, he must,
in the interests of the democratic system, deal with the
Parliamentary Question, which has been housed in a bright
orange folder instead of the plain folders which less
influential letters rate. He advises the President to
tell the hone Member that there is no reason to suppose
that the shortage is any worse in Chorlton-under-Twistle
than in other similar areas, but that additional
quantities of softwood are being allocated, and some
general improvement in supplies may be expected - or
alternatively that no general improvement in supplies is
to be expected because all the suitable softwood is going
into the manufacture of duckboards for export; and adds a
suitable little note for the Supplementary. He sends the
complaint about the quality of fastenings to whoever is
the production authority for clothes-peg-fastenings,
probably someone in the Engineering Industries Division
of the Ministry of Supply, with a request for comments
(marking the file to be brought forward in 14 days). He
writes to the J.I.C. to say that the Government have no
power to prevent new entrants into the clothes-peg
industry, since (after loud clamour from the industry
about the stifling effects of controls and in the teeth




S.R. & O. 1941 No.
1473 (as amended) was thrown into a "bonfire". He looks
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at the record of the firm who want a building licence;
finds from a report made by the Regional Office that they
have recently despatched a large consignment to a
department store in Denver, Colorado, and have confident
hopes of repeat orders, and of starting a Middle-West
boom in British clothes-pegs, and minutes his opposite
number in the Priorities Division (who will have to deal
with the Ministry of Works on it) that the Board of Trade
should support the issue of a licence. He sends the
I.D.C. application to the Distribution of Industry
Division, who will deal with it in the light of his
comments on the firm's export and general capabilities,
against their general background policy on industrial
location; and does much the same sort of thing with the
import licence application. He tells the Federation as
politely as possible that he doesn't care a damn how much
competition they get from the Morrocans. And finally he
accepts the invitation to lunch, duly goes to the
Connaught Rooms on the appointed day, eats the standard
lunch of hors d'oeuvres, poulet poele and poire melba,
and goes through the standard conversations with the ex-
President of the Federation sitting on his left and the
Secretary of the Association of Washing-day Accessory
Distributors on his right.
4. So far we have dealt only with the reaction of our
production authority to what comes to him from outside.
But a good deal also happens within the Government
machine which has to be communicated to the industry;
this is a two-way traffic. The raw materials which the
industry uses may be scarce ones which are subject to an
allocation system. If they are, somehow or other the
amount which is to be provided for making clothes-pegs,
as an element in maintaining the essential supplies
needed for the life of the community, has to be fixed;
and when the total has been fixed, the method by which
this total has to be shared out among the firms in the
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industry has to be settled. No one has yet, to my
knowledge, succeeded in producing an answer to the first
of these questions which he knew to be the right answer,
or to the second of them which was demonstrably and
universally equitable. However, if the machine is to
work at all someone has to take a shot at saying how much
softwood and how much steel is needed; the production
authority gathers such information as he can by enquiry
from and discussion with the Federation, thinks of a
number, and adds to it 10% or whatever figure he thinks
is likely to get knocked off the figure he submits by the
inter-Departmental Committee, presided over by the
Economic Secretary to the Treasury. In the event, the
amount that gets knocked off is always more than he
expected; and he goes back and breaks the news to his
industry. By this time, of course, he has become quite a
familiar figure with the officers of the Federation and a
few of the more active members of the Federation. He has
visited a number of factories, and learnt something about
the techniques of the industry; he can tell the
difference between the turned clothes-peg made in the
main centre of the industry in Somerset, the whittled peg
made in Lancashire, and the peg made by the new (and
still secret) process developed as a side-line by one of
the washing-line manufacturers, much to the chagrin of
their fellow members of the Federation. He knows a fair
amount about the personalities, and the cross-currents of
likes and dislikes, rivalry and inter-connections,
between a lot of the firms. He has put up the Treasurer
of the Federation (whose firm have a good export record
and have set a good example in the establishment of joint
production committees in their factories, and who is
personally an agreeable fellow who talks sense in
meetings and keeps his colleagues in order) for a C.B.E.
in the last Birthday Honours list, and is wondering
whether he mightn't try to get the Secretary of the Trade
Union an M. or an O. in the next. But he still hasn't
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discovered how to share out 40 standards of softwood
between 375 firms, who between them want, or say they
want, 72, without creating a lot of malcontents, most of
whom will descend on him or his staff breathing fire and
fury, many of whom will write to their M.P.s, who in turn
reverse the
that the President of
wickeJ decision which
the Boardwill demand






and one or two - but never more - of whom
represent,
will write
nasty letters to say that, of course, anyone knows that
you can get all the softwood you like if you are prepared
to do things that they aren't prepared to do, and they
will take steps to see that a real scandal is uncovered.
The production authority's officials are therefore pretty
fully occupied between allocations in dealing with the
aftermath of the last one.
5. Other things are going on simultaneously.
agreement has been made with Zanzibar in




endeavours to see that Zanzibar is able to obtain in the
United Kingdom 4 million clothes-pegs. The Anglo-
American Productivity Council have suggested that British
clothes-peg manufacturers could learn a great deal from
American methods, and would it not be a good idea for a
team of employers and workers to go to America to see?
The British trade consuls in the United States believe
that there is a large market for clothes-pegs in the
Southern States, and can the industry be encouraged to do
some market research? The President is making a speech
in South Wales; how is the proposal which one firm put
forward some months ago for transferring their output to
the Development Area getting on? And so on, and so on.
On all these questions there will be enquiry of the
industry, calls for reports by the Regional Office on
particular firms, a great deal of activity which must,
in the nature of things, be ephemeral and pointless. And
343
above all, in the present circumstances, there will be
the losing of no opportunity to exhort and admonish. We
must export, we must earn dollars. We, the production
authorities, are the channel through which Government
policy is expounded to our industries. We post a few
letters of our own in return for the many that are posted
to us.
6. But here too - that is in the transmission of policy
through the channel of the production authority - the
traffic is two-way; the production authority is a Janus
figure. For just as he transmits and expounds his
masters' policy to his industry, so also does he transmit
his industry's views on policy, and their claim to their
share of whatever is going, to his masters. He is,
indeed, in a very real sense, the representative of and
the advocate for their interests, inside the government
machine. He engaged in their behalf in the most violent
inter-departmental warfare; he distorts the facts and
embroiders the truth to get whatever he can for them in
the way of allocations of scarce materials, claims on
investment resources, and advantages, indeed, in every
field of Government policy. And so there is built up at
the very centre of government a delicately poised system
which can produce approximately right answers only as a
result of every interest - the clothes-peg manufacturers
and the boat builders, the motor car makers and the
upholsterers, the whisky distillers and the bacon curers
- being adequately represented, not only by its own
organisation outside government, but by the production
authority inside government.
That, I think, is where I came in. "Production
authority, what do you do?" "Ob, I take an interest in
clothes-pegs; I look after the chaps who make them."
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7. And to conclude: it must be clearly understood that
all the characters in this story bear a startling
resemblance to lots of real guys; but the whole thing has
been written in invisible ink, and the writer takes no
responsibility for any of the statements made. Any
complaints must be addressed to the production authority
for seminar papers - whose address, I am glad to say, is
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A. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE DOCUMENTS
BOARD OF TRADE: Commercial Department Correspondence
BT 11 3960 1947-8 Discrimination in the allocation of
scarce resources on export grounds.
BT 11 3993 1948-9 Announcement of export targets
for 1949
BT 11 4137 1949 Survey of supply position in UK
BT 11 4203 1948-9 British industrial and export
prospects
BT 11 4249 1949 Export drive to North America
BT 11 4389 1949 Report to Chancellor of the
Exchequer on the export position
after devaluation
BOARD OF TRADE: Regional Controllers' conferences
BT 173 2 1947-9 Board of Trade regional controllers
conferences: agendas, minutes and
papers
DittoBT 173 3 1950
BOARD OF TRADE: Economdc affairs office
BT 195 81 1947 Cabinet Office: organisation chart
and list of functions
BOARD OF TRADE: Export promotion department
BT 225 10 1947-8 Regional export committees, minutes
of meetfgs, Bristol,
BT 225 42 1948-9 Cabinet committee on exports
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CABINET OFFICE: registered files
CAB 21 1701 1946-47 Organisation of Cabinet committees
CAB 21 1703 1945-50 Cabinet committees book.
CAB 21 1704 1946-50 Cabinet economic committees,
preparation of guide to:



















1948 Building Controls committee:
general correspondence
1946-9 Revocation of Defence Regulations
1949 Ditto
1949 Ditto
1950 Economic planning and full
employment
CAB 21 2190 1947-8 Use of official information, etc:
"Economic studies and the problems




CAB 21 2200 1947-8 Balance of payments committees:
CAB 21 2199 1947
procedure
CAB 21 2216 1946-8 United Kingdom:
general economic position
CAB 21 2217 1947 Outline history of central

































1947-50 Prime Minister's notes for weekly
visits to the King
1939-50 War Cabinet conclusions: carrying
out of, (Policy)
CAB 21 2278 1947
CAB 21 2279 1948
Prime Minister's minutes
Ditto
CABINET OFFICE: War Cabinet minutes
CAB 65 33 - 36




CAB 65 49 - 50 1945 Ditto Jan 2 - May 18
1945 Ditto May 30 - July 24
CABINET OFFICE: War Cabinet papers
CAB 67 9 1941 War Cabinet memoranda 1 - 160
CABINET OFFICE: War Cabinet committees
CAB 69 7 1945 War Cabinet Defence Committee
(Operations), meetings and papers







Lord President's Committee, meetings
Ditto
Ditto
CABINET OFFICE: War Cabinet, reconstruction committees
CAB 87 5 1943-4 Reconstruction COmmittee, meetings
CAB 87 6 1944 Ditto
















1943-4 Reconstruction Committee, sub-
committee on Control of Post-war
Building














1941-2 Post-war economic problems and
Anglo-American co-operation
CABINET OFFICE: Minister of Reconstruction and Lord







1943 Future of aircraft production and
scrapping policy for surplus
products
1943-4 Report of the Steering Committee on
Post-war Employment
Ditto, comments by the Ministry of
Aircraft Production
Ditto, comments by various
departments on the location of
industry




1945-50 Shipbuilding: post-war policy
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Report of the Steering Committee on
Post-war Employment: note by
Treasury on subsidies for re-
equipment and modernisation
Employment policy: comments by Lord
Cherwell, Paymaster General, on
White Paper
Employment policy: drafts of White
Paper by Mr. Fleming and Professor
Robertson
Employment policy: drafts of White
Paper by Lord Cherwell, Professor
Jewkes and Office of the Minister of
Reconstruction
Employment policy: revised drafts
and final version of White Paper
Employment policy: general
correspondence on draft White Paper
and briefs for the Minister of
Reconstruction
CAB 124 215A 1944 Employment policy: Comments by
departments on draft White Paper













taken on draft White Paper
CAB 124 216 1944-5 Employment policy: reports of
private conferences at Nuffield
College, Oxford






















CAB 124 242 1943-5 Plans and estimates of capital
expenditure in the post-war period
CAB 124 452 1947 Post-war housing policy
CAB 124 488 1944 Decisions bearing on reconstruction
policy
CAB 124 489 1945 Statistical assumptions for post-war
reconstruction policy
CAB 124 566 1944-45 Correspondence between the Minister
of Production, Mr Oliver Lyttelton,
and the Minister of Reconstruction on
the discussion of controversial
matters in the Reconstruction
Committee
CAB 124 630 1944-5 Proposals for the control of post-
war building
CAB 124 631 1945-8 Ditto
CAB 124 632 1943-5 Post-war building programme
CAB 124 678 1943-5 Discussions on the future of
economic controls
CAB 124 679 1944 Ditto
CAB 124 680 1944 Ditto
CAB 124 681 1944 Ditto
CAB 124 682 1944 Discussions on economic controls in
the transition period following the
defeat of Germany
CAB 124 683 1944-5 Ditto
CAB 124 684 1944-5 Draft White Paper on economic
controls
CAB 124 685 1944-5 Informal working party on economic
controls during the transition
period
CAB 124 686 1945 Ditto
CAB 124 687 1945 Ditto
CAB 124 688 1945 Relaxation of economic controls
CAB 124 689 1945-6 Ditto





























1945 Working party on economic controls:
proposed amendments to report
Proposals for the relaxation of
labour controls




1944 Discussion on the problems of price
controls during the transitional
period
1946 Materials Committee: meetings,
papers and correspondence on supply
















Arrangements for the post-war
conversion of industrial capacity to
civilian needs
Ditto
Proposals for the provision of
consumer goods following the end of
the war with Germany
Ditto
Correspondence with the Daimler
Company on its difficulty in finding
premises for post-war production
Interim report on post-war
reconstruction by the Trades Union
Congress
Critical appreciation by the
Economic Section of the War
Secretariat of Sir William
Beveridge's book "Full Employment in
a Free SoCiety"
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Organisation for the central
















Machinery for economic planning and
control
CAB 124 1112 1945-50 He-organisation of function and



































the Lord President of the Council
Secretariat
CAB 124 1134 1946-50 Briefs submitted to the Lord
President of the Council for
meetings of the Cabinet
CAB 124 1139 1947-9 Briefs submitted to the Lord
President of the Council for
meetings of the Economic Policy
Committee
CAB 124 1166 1948-9 Central planning of economic
development
CAB 124 1167 1950-1 Ditto
CABINET OFFICE: private collections
353
CAB 127 112 1947 Sir Stafford Cripps: letters
received following appointment as
Minister of Economic Affairs
CABINET OFFICE: Cabinet minutes, 1945-51
CAB 128 1 - 22 1945-51 Cabinet conclusions and confidential
annexes
CABINET OFFICE: Cabinet papers, 1945-51
CAB 129 1 - 47 1945-51 Cabinet papers
CABINET OFFICE: ad hoc committees, GEN and MISC
CAB 130 19 1947
CAB 130 27 1947
CAB 130 35 1948
CAB 130 53 1949
CAB 130 60 1950-1
CAB 130 65 1951
Balance of payments: import
programmes, meetings and papers
The 1948 dollar programme, meeting,
paper. Also, investment programmes
review, meeting
Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs
and prices, meeting
Economic Situation, meeting and
papers, September 1949
Official committee on Economic
Planning and Full Employment Bill,
meetings and papers
Economic Planning and Full
Employment Bill
CABINET OFFICE: Defence Committee
CAB 131 1 1946 Defence Committee, meetings
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committees











Lord President's Committee, meetings
Ditto
Ditto
Lord President's Committee, sub-




Productivity, meetings and papers
1947
1948











Committee on Involuntary Absenteeism
in the Coalmining Industry, meetings
and papers
Balance of Payments Committee on




Balance of Payments, Statistics sub-
committee, meetings and papers
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
relating to balance of payments,
papers
Coal committees, ministerial and
official, meetings and papers
Committee on Control of Investment,
meetings and papers


































1949 Commonwealth Economic Development
Committee, meetings and papers
1946-8 Civil Services Manpower committees,
meetings and papers.
1947-8 Distribution of Industry Committee,
meetings
1950 Committee on Distribution and
Marketing
1945-6 Committee on External Economic
Policy and Overseas Trade, meetings
and papers
Committee on Exports, papers
Committee on Exports, meetings
Committee on Exports, sub-committee
(Plans) on Visible Exports
Ditto
Emergencies Committee, meetings and
papers
European Economic Committee,
Economic Commission for Europe
working party, meetings and papers
Official Committee on Economic
Development, meetings and papers
Ditto
Official Committee on Economic
Devlopment (Overseas), meetings and
papers
Official Committee on Economic
Development Working Group, meetings
and papers











Information, meetings and papers
1945-8 Emergency Legislation Committee,
meetings and papers
1947 Ministerial Committee on Equal Pay,
meetings and papers


































Economic Survey Working Party,
papers





Committees on Future Legislation,
meetings and papers











1947 Working Party on the Guidance of
Exports, meetings and papers






Ministerial Committee on Economic
Planning, meetings and papers
Programmes Committee, meetings
Ditto, papers







































PREM 8 489 1947
PREM 8 491 1947






Housing return for February and
March 1946
Housing: proposed to set up a
Housing Production Executive for the
co-ordination and control of housing
materials, components and labour
Changes in Cabinet committees as a
result of Sir Stafford Cripps~
appointment as Minister of Economic
Affairs
Mr A. Bevan, Minister of Health,
expressed dissatisfaction at the
present method of taking minutes of
Cabinet meetings
Parts I to IV, Fuel Crisis,
Main file
Coal allocations to industry
Transport of coal
Coal (National Union of
Mineworkers), Prime Minister agreed
to NUM's request to attend before
the Fuel Committee during the crisis
Financial policy (File parts I & II)
Report of Investment Programmes
CoIllllittee
Supplies and Services (Transitional
Powers) Bill to extend the Supplies
and Services (Transitional Powers)
































question re scope of Bill
Interdepartmental organisation for
handling balance of payments
questions
Formation of Ministerial Economic
Policy Committee. General summary of
balance of payments situation and
recommendations of Economic Planning
Board
Discussions on economic recovery of
Europe. Talks with Mr Clayton. The
Marshall Plan for US Aid
Establishment of a Working Party to
handle the UK case of the
discussions arising from the
Marshall offer
Direction of manpower and the
Control of Engagement Order
Investigation into the working of
existing machinery for controlling
issue of steel and iron to
manufacturers
Functions of Central Economic
Planning Staff under Sir Edwin
Plowden and decision whether it is
to be part of Cabinet Office or Lord
President's Office
Reports from the Federation of
British Industries and the TUC on
the economic situation. The TUC had
discussion with the Prime Minister
and other ministers.
Coal prospects for winter of 1946-7
The Prime Minister decided to see














Part I: Reduction of Armed Forces
overseas and in the United Kingdom
Part II: Size and Shape of the Armed
Forces
Supply of heavy electical generating
plant with particular reference to
effect of export orders on plant to
home stations
Economic Survey for 1948
Prime Minister issued directive
giving priority for labour and raw
materials to projects aimed at
expansion of fuel and power
resources
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